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How small a thought it takes to fill a whole life! Just as someone may travel around the 
same little country throughout his whole life, & think there is nothing outside it!
	
 You see everything in a queer perspective (or projection): the country that you 
ceaselessly keep covering, strikes you as enormously big; the surrounding countries seem 
to you like narrow border regions. 
 	
 Ludwig Wittgenstein, 
	
 Manuscript 131, 180: 2.9.1946
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Introduction
_____________
The following thesis can be made sense of  in a number of  ways. Firstly, it is in part a 
continuation of  the parallelism undertaken by David Owen, and later Cressida Heyes,1 
in their treatment of  Wittgenstein and Foucault as thinkers of  complementary thoughts. 
Despite the works of  Owen and Heyes acting as an impetus for this text, it analyses 
neither of  their work in great detail. Instead its focus is upon the plausibility of  this 
move, and derives its justification from an alternate set of  exegetical analyses, in order to 
reveal those interstices in which such complementarity is shown to be not only plausible 
but compelling. Chief  among them is the analysis of  the work of  Gordon Baker who 
(besides our two protagonists) represents my most sustained interlocutor, with his 
influence felt most explicitly in Chapters I, II and VI. Other philosophers certainly leave 
their mark on my reading – most obviously Oskari Kuusela, Paul Veyne and David 
Owen himself  – but Baker’s analysis is constitutive, rather than instrumental, to the 
thesis. Secondly, my focus upon a form of  parallelism has led to a peculiar treatment, 
one that omits many of  the topics which, for Foucault and Wittgenstein, are understood 
as being almost ‘trademarks’ of  their thought. Frege and Russell, for instance, are 
entirely absent from this thesis – a sin most cardinal, for example, in Travis’s view 
(2006). It is in this regard that, like Heyes, I accept that – while the primary set of  
problems that concern Wittgenstein are to be found within metaphysical philosophical 
statements – his remarks concerning conceptual dogmatism have many applications 
beyond those fields of  academia relevant to metaphysics and logic.2 Likewise, Foucault’s 
triangulation of  knowledge, power and the subject only appears here when distorted 
through a prism that is quite alien to many of  his exegetes, especially those in the social 
sciences. The clearest and most simple reason for these omissions can be best 
understood as a preoccupation with the two modes of  authorship, and the methods of  
philosophical practice, that Wittgenstein and Foucault exhibit in their activity, and 
6
1 Cf: Owen 2002 & 2003 and Heyes 2007.
2 Heyes 2007, p17.
project through their incitement of  their reader’s task. In Chapters II and IV I argue 
that to elide these characteristics of  their work is unsustainable, if  one acknowledges 
their shared commitment to the incitement of  anti-dogmatic thought in their reader. 
This brings us the third, more general manner by which to conceive of  this thesis’s 
remit; its various chapters – each representing a different overture upon related themes – 
are intended to combine in a portrayal of  the key aims of  the methods that so concern 
me. This is the locus upon which my comparison turns, and I premise that this thread 
runs with remarkable consistency through four decades of  philosophical writing, penned 
by authors working in differing traditions, largely unaware in the main, of  each other’s 
work.3 
 Finally, then, and in some sense unrelated to the first way of  understanding it, this 
text is concerned with the extent to which both authors can be considered as 
overridingly antidogmatic in their account of  what those tasks are that constitute 
philosophy. From a central concern with invention and self-creation, and therefore self-
determinacy, emerges a set of  procedures, presented in notations particular to their 
purpose, that work upon the principle of  the incalculable indeterminacy of  an 
individual’s operations with words and concepts. Both methods respect this 
indeterminacy as a key criterion as to what philosophy should acknowledge as pertinent 
to its own procedures. From this central perspective an ensuing set of  similarities can be 
observed to emerge and reflect usefully upon each other’s methodological concerns, in a 
manner that suggests a kind of  compatibility or accrued effect, quite in keeping with 
Owen and Heyes. Chapter V is devoted solely to comprehending and comparing 
Foucault and Wittgenstein’s notions of  dogma; suffice to say here that I advance an 
account of  dogma as the habitually collocated commitment to a certain set of  concepts 
as revelatory, natural, essential and otherwise generally indispensable tools in our 
conception of  human affairs. A key premise of  the thesis, entailed by this third aspect, is 
that, for these to be judged as sound and compelling methods, such anti-dogmatic 
philosophies must not commit the self-aggrandizing and fatal mistake of  omnes sed mecum 
(or ‘everyone but I’). Exactly what is entailed by these author’s refusal of  any exhaustive 
position upon which to secure the status of  their methods is a chief  concern for 
Chapters II, V and VI.
7
3 Although see Sluga’s account of  Foucault’s stated eagerness to learn more of  Wittgenstein, shortly before 
his death, as well as his apparently crediting Wittgenstein for his notion of  a language game, recoined by 
Foucault as a “game of  truth”, in Miller 2000, p416, n28.
 There are a significant number of  contemporary philosophers whose interest takes in 
both the philosophies of  Wittgenstein and Foucault. To my mind, the foremost examples 
of  this set are Michel de Certeau, Raymond Geuss, Ian Hacking4, Pierre Hadot,5 
Martha Nussbaum6 and Hans Sluga.7 Aside from these, the following is an experience 
that may be familiar to any reader of  Foucaultian scholarship: to happen across a brief, 
often underdeveloped, yet philosophically complementary contingency with 
Wittgenstein’s philosophy, to be found for example in the works of  Janik, Flynn, 
Dreyfuss & Rabinow, Rajchman and Oksala.8 Yet none of  these authors begin to 
undertake the task of  reading their perceived similitude – suggested by their brief  
employment of  Wittgenstein’s notions of  ‘throwing away the ladder’, of  ‘language 
games’, or of  ‘pictures’ at work in our language – with anything approaching the rigour 
necessary to continue in a clarifying manner. 
 The number of  exegetes who do concern themselves with comparative or 
combinatorial treatments of  Foucault and Wittgenstein’s philosophy is very limited, and 
the foremost members of  this small group, as already mentioned, are Heyes and Owen – 
hence their influence upon this thesis. In two papers in particular (2002 & 2003) Owen 
‘sketches’9 out a claim regarding a sympathy between the works of  Michel Foucault and 
Ludwig Wittgenstein that is in great sympathy with the one advanced in this thesis. 
8
4 Hacking perhaps best represents this set – his concerns, in their synthesis, reflect those of  Wittgenstein 
and Foucault, but he neglects, for whatever reason, to reflect upon any comparative understanding 
between two of  his greatest influences. Of  particular relevance to this convergence is Hacking’s 
description of  himself  as a “dynamic nominalist”, interested the manner in which “our practices of  
naming interact with the things that we name.” (2002, p2) His work stand on its own however, not as a 
commentary, but as a novel application of  his inheritance from both thinkers.
5 Hadot was perhaps the first interpreter of  Wittgenstein, outside of  the circle of  his students, to 
preference an account of  his method as therapeutic. As early as 1959, Hadot reflect that the purpose of  
Wittgenstein’s philosophical texts “imposes a certain literary genre: the work cannot be the exposition of  a 
system, a doctrine, a philosophy in the traditional sense … Philosophical Investigations wishes to act little by 
little on our spirit, like a cure … The work therefore does not have a systematic structure, strictly 
speaking.” (cf: 1999, p18) Hadot has also written with great critical precision about the later Foucault’s 
turn towards ethics and self-invention, and his use of  stoic texts.
6 Despite her generally negative appraisals of  the work of  Foucault (cf: 1997, p40), Nussbaum is clearly 
respectful of  Foucault (e.g. see Nussbaum 1999), and represents an important interlocutor to his thoughts, 
and it is a shame, in this author’s opinion, that the two will never have the opportunity to engage in 
debate.
7 I am in direct disagreement with Sluga when he disambiguates Wittgenstein from Foucault along the 
lines that Foucault was a thinker of  ‘essentialist and reductive formulas’ (2011, p138), or that Wittgenstein 
‘was certainly in no way a political thinker’ (ibid, p132).
8 Cf: Janik (2007, p317–8), Flynn (2005, p31), Dreyfuss & Rabinow (1982, pp50–75, 94 & 125), Rajchman 
(1988, pp104 & 108) and Oksala (2005, pp171–2)
9 See Owen 2002, p225.
Owen’s comparison of  the two models of  philosophy is based upon what he takes to be 
the key operative conception at work in Wittgenstein’s later writing, in order to conclude 
a kind of  equivalence between the philosophical aims of  Foucault and Wittgenstein. By 
combining remarks made by Wittgenstein in On Certainty (§§94–147) and Philosophical 
Investigations (§§109–127) in a portrait of  his use of  the term “picture”, and by presenting 
a series of  quotes as constitutive of  what this term cashes out as, Owen’s aim is to both 
posit ‘picture’ as an element which unites Wittgenstein’s later work, and more generally 
to “draw out the centrality of  pictures to our lives as necessary conditions of  thought 
and action.”10 The concept of  a picture is taken to denote the “prior systems of  
judgments that generate an unquestioned background determining truth value.”11 In 
alliance with Gordon Baker, the inability of  an individual to notice, or alter, such 
pictures is taken as the cause of  a condition Owen refers to as “aspectival captivity” – 
defined as a type of  self-imposed “non-physical constraint on our capacity for self-
government”.12  Once this characterisation of  captivity has been arrived at, it is then 
paralleled convincingly with Foucault’s various genealogical projects, in “that genealogy 
is best understood as a practice of  critical reflection directed to enabling us to free 
ourselves from a condition of  aspectival captivity.”13 Yet, as we shall see in Chapter I, 
Owen’s methodological premise – that a singular notion of  “picture” can be excavated 
from a wide territory of  Wittgenstein’s remarks, and that such remarks are 
unproblematically accumulative – result in his positing a determinate set of  conceptual 
features that disagree somewhat with my account of  Wittgenstein’s method, and with 
Bakers interpretation of  it.14
 I therefore take it, regarding Owen & Heyes’ claim of  similitude concerning the role 
of  aspectival captivity in the work of  Foucault and Wittgenstein, that there is a story 
with a different emphasis to be told regarding the methodological, rather than necessary, 
conditions that make such a claim possible. As it currently stands, the proposal rests 
upon a notion of  the meaning of  the term picture in Wittgenstein’s later philosophy, one 
which seems to be in partial disagreement with the later work of  Gordon Baker (see 
§1.4). This thesis, then, is in alliance with Owen’s groundbreaking exegetical decision to 
9
10 2003, p83.
11 Heyes 2008, p71.
12 Owen 2003, p82.
13 2002, p227.
14 Owen 2003, pp83–4.
base a genealogical account of  aspectival captivity upon an apparent conceptual unity 
in Wittgenstein’s later philosophy, that of  ‘pictures’. Rather than attempting a 
clarification of  that term in order to then reintroduce a qualified account of  it into 
Owen and Heyes’ account of  aspectival captivity, however, I will advance a more 
fundamental rethinking of  the points of  methodological similitude between these two 
thinkers.
 While the approach of  this thesis will diverge from Owen and Heyes’, then, its 
conclusion will be in significant agreement. Negatively, it will not warrant claims of  
hidden equivalence between a great deal of  the elements of  the two philosophers’ 
terminology; the closest we will come to making such a claim will be with regard to the 
two notions of  Wittgenstein’s switching an aspect of  comprehension, and Foucault’s 
dislocatory experience of  a new problematisation. Nor will we find ourselves, at 
investigation’s end, availed of  the ability either to identify a contiguity in those elements 
that collectively constitute their two philosophical methods, or to reduce them down to a 
core set of  similitudes: for example, the philosophical work being done by Foucault’s 
presentation of  parrhesia and Wittgenstein’s ‘private language argument’ will, on this 
reading, remain noncontiguous. Positively, the operative intention behind both 
philosophers’ creation of  new philosophical techniques will be the point of  convergence 
to be documented, with important similarities being entailed throughout their methods’ 
intended effects upon their practitioner. Hence tracing the impact left upon the reader 
of  such texts will be rendered as of  paramount importance to the comprehension of  
these methods.
 The first chapter portrays a seminal moment in our understanding of  Wittgenstein – 
namely the exegetical revisionary work that demands that we refer, just as with 
Wittgenstein, to an ‘early’ and ‘later’ instantiation of  the work of  Gordon Baker.15 The 
central qualification for such a division is argued to be the shift in Baker’s understanding 
of  the status of  Wittgenstein’s grammatical remarks. This shift, from a veridical 
conception to an aspectival one, is examined in detail because it is employed in many of  
this thesis’s central arguments, occurring not only in relation to Wittgenstein but 
Foucault also; this aspectival shift is clearly echoed in §4.3. 
 Having ‘struck my colours’ as a Bakerian reader, Chapter II does its best to confound 
this position, by arguing against a central element of  the later Baker’s reading of  
Wittgenstein. Specifically, the therapeutic understanding of  the role of  the philosopher 
10
15 Indeed, by Kahane, Kantarian and Kuusela’s count, Baker was the author of  at least three schools of  
Wittgenstein interpretation (cf: 2007, p2).
in such a method is disputed, with a more modest and less interventionist position being 
developed, one that focuses upon the imaginative, open-ended and interrogative nature 
of  the later texts. So that, while this thesis is most evidently Bakerian in reading, and 
owes more to his exegesis than any other, this chapter presents the grounds for my 
limited disagreement with his conception of  philosophy.
 The final piece needed to establish my exegesis of  Wittgenstein’s later method is 
Chapter III, in which a more traditional interpretation of  the text is argued against, in 
favour of  conceiving of  its style as a constitutive, rather than a contingent (or even 
maladapted) element of  Wittgenstein’s later methods. In making this defence, I advance 
an understanding of  Wittgenstein through his use of  ‘schemes of  interruption’, with this 
defence against revisionism being equally as important for the previous chapter’s claims.
	 Chapter IV marks the introduction proper of  the philosophical methods of  Michel 
Foucault to the thesis, beginning with a consideration of  the status of  historical theory, 
and the revision that his work represents, along with sympathetic historiographers, 
towards acknowledgement of  its narrative status. This being the basis for my 
comparison of  methods, Chapter IV plays a key role in this thesis, and hence its final 
section seems as good a place as any to conduct an overview of  the parallelism this thesis  
has posited thus far.
	 Chapter V continues from this account by establishing a complimentary reading of  
the notions of  dogma at work in our two methods, offering a number of  examples of  
how and where conceptual unity can become constrictive. The parallelism posited in 
this thesis is shown to be derived from the methodological implications of  this 
understanding of  dogmatism.
 Chapter VI begins by presenting two of  the most commonly asserted and bitterly 
disputed critiques of  Foucault’s method. It responds to them by presenting as a key facet 
of  our two methods a notion of  creativity as the condition for freedom, rather than 
freedom in itself. This notion is derived in part from Foucault’s own remarks, and in part 
from the key themes of  this thesis.
Ian Hacking, in his Historical Ontology, presents Foucault as a thinker consumed with the 
question of  how it is that we come to do the things we do to ourselves. Hacking sees the 
responsibility for dogmatism as laying with oneself, and like Wittgenstein, tasks the 
philosopher as someone who must investigate the manner by which she subjects herself  
to disciplinary foreclosure:  
11
Again, it is we who are doing it, not having it done to us. The knowledge/power story has 
been elaborately illustrated in Foucault's books, but those are outer-directed narratives-
what we say about others, say to others, have said to ourselves by others, do to others, or 
have done to ourselves. They leave out the inner monologue, what I say to myself. They 
leave out self-discipline, what I do to myself. Thus they omit the permanent heartland of  
subjectivity. It is seldom force that keeps us on the straight and narrow; it is conscience.16
What one “says” to oneself, and the task of  dissolving the strictures which are daily 
reaffirmed through the collocating expression of  our conceptions, is the ideal of  
philosophy to which this thesis is addressed as an answer. In particular, Wittgenstein’s 
method will emerge as therefore being a uniquely apt complement to that of  Foucault’s, 
both in its treatment of  the inner monologues that determine and set in place our 
conceptions of  the world, and in its direct sympathy with Foucault’s three procedural 
precepts, examined in Chapter VI: those of  curiosity, refusal and innovation.
	 Lastly, a few words justifying my overall approach. I hope that this thesis will not 
strike the reader as merely an exegetical parlour game. Both Foucault and Wittgenstein 
located the perspectival element that represents the centre of  my parallelism as 
procedurally fundamental17 to their conceptions of  philosophy, conceptions that thereby 
emerge as radically different to much of  what they took philosophy to previously be. 
Hence, I take it that my reading provides the opportunity of  not only achieving a certain 
clarity concerning what these coherences constitute, but of  being able to employ them 
in a way that makes these philosophies more purposeful in their combination than alone 
in singularity.
12
16 Hacking 2002, p116
17 As Foucault remarked, “This experience that permits us to single out certain mechanisms (for example, 
imprisonment, penalization, etc.) and at the same time to separate ourselves from them by perceiving 
them in a totally different form, must be one and the same experience. This procedure is central to all my 
work.” (1991c, p38) Likewise, Wittgenstein’s qualifications, while less straight-forward, can be considered 
to revolve around a principled aspectival activity – see for instance Kuusela 2008, pp161 & 164, or Baker 
2004, p33.
Chapter I
The Status of a Grammatical Rule
___________________________________
What is philosophy if not a way of reflecting, not so much on what is true and what is false, 
as on our relationship to truth? … e movement by which, not without eﬀort and 
uncertainty, dreams and illusions, one detaches oneself from what is accepted as true and 
seeks other rules – that is philosophy.
 — Michel Foucault, ‘e Masked Philosopher’.1 
13
1 1997a, p327.
In 1991 Gordon Baker published ‘Philosophical Investigations §122: Neglected Aspects’, a 
paper containing a forceful critique of  the then (as now) prevailing exegetical model for 
understanding the later philosophical methods of  Wittgenstein. Remarkable for both the 
precise depiction of  its target and its “radical redescription”2 of  key passages in the 
Investigations,3 the impact that Baker’s paper had upon his field is undoubtedly due in 
part to the fact that – much like Wittgenstein’s j’accuse in PI §113-5 – the philosophical 
model abrogated was one authored by the critic himself. Working as co-author to his 
colleague and friend PMS Hacker in the seventies and eighties, Baker wrote a series of  
seminal works that were later elaborated upon solely by Hacker, which include 
Wittgenstein – Meaning and Use, Language, Sense and Nonsense, and Rules, Grammar and Necessity. 
This chapter examines the pivot upon which Baker turned in his reassessment of  the 
grammatical methods extolled by Wittgenstein. Consequently this chapter also, by 
extension, casts light on the development that led to such disagreement between Baker 
and Hacker over Wittgenstein’s conception of  his philosophical method.
 Following Kuusela (2008), this pivotal element in Baker’s rereading will be posited as 
the methodological status to be attributed to the grammatical remarks, rules and 
comparisons that populate Wittgenstein’s later work. Specifically, the treatments of  a 
grammatical rule as alternately a model for comparison or as a veridical constituent of  
its language will be posited as the shift that led to two remarkably divergent exegetical 
models being postulated by the earlier and the later Baker. To this end we will initially 
examine the relevant features of  the original model, as postulated by Baker and Hacker, 
then consider four remarks that raise exegetical concerns, some of  which at least seem to 
have motivated Baker’s exegetical repositioning, finally then introducing Baker’s revised 
model, which centres upon the notion of  an ‘aspect’.
 Perhaps unsurprisingly, in 2007, Baker’s former co-author, PMS Hacker, published 
an article deeply critical of  this later account of  Wittgenstein’s method, identifying five 
features particularly deserving of  close attention. Briefly, Hacker’s criticism focussed 
upon: philosophy as being primarily a therapeutic task; as being person-relative rather 
than concerned with alternate schools in philosophy; as laying the responsibility for 
philosophical confusion with the individual, rather than with given features of  a 
language’s grammar; a lack of  concern with argumentation per se; and instead a concern 
with philosophy as being motivated by the construction of  alternate pictures for the 
14
2 NA, p30 (See Bibliography for an elaboration of  all abbreviations; they are recorded in bold under relevant 
references).
3 Most noticeably, of  course, PI §122 and its precursor TS 220. 
alleviation of  philosophical confusion. It should be noted that none of  these five 
characteristics will be considered at any great length in this chapter. While the treatment 
here is so brief  as to be nonexistent, these themes are considered in depth over the 
following two chapters. The reason for this should become clear – all five characteristics 
so identified by Hacker depend upon Baker’s central requalification of  the status of  a 
grammatical remark, and can be better understood as implications Baker derived from 
this requalification. It is this move that is both conspicuously absent from Hacker’s 
critical 2007 paper, and the subject of  the present chapter. 
The reasons for my beginning with such an investigation should be largely self-
evident to the reader; Baker and Hacker’s original collaborations bore fruit that 
demands to be recognised as the most detailed, considered and connotatively exhaustive 
example of  Wittgenstein exegesis to date. Similarly, Baker’s later volte face represents both 
a critique of  that position from the unparalleled vantage point of  one of  its authors, as 
well as a novel and promising model of  interpretation in its own right. Therefore an 
understanding of  the contention that led to the genesis of  this later position lends one a 
deeper understanding of  the model of  philosophical methods advocated by 
Wittgenstein. More specifically, the two models here explored mark in bold relief  two 
alternate ways of  understanding that method, as described by Wittgenstein himself; 
those of  philosophy as an account book for the meaningful transactions made in our 
language, and of  philosophy as a form of  work on one’s conceptions as a transformative 
undertaking4. It is not a contention that the two are mutually exclusive, but that Baker 
and Hacker and the later Baker offer alternate interpretations that output two models of 
philosophical method that demonstrate extreme fidelity to the aims of  these two aspects. 
This will become more important as the thesis progresses. Looking forward, for 
example, this distinction between aspectival and veridical exegesis is mirrored in 
Chapter IV’s reading of  the methods of  Michel Foucault. 
 The characteristics of  Baker and Hacker’s conception of  grammar that are most 
relevant to Baker’s later critique are of  grammar as edificial, veridical, additive and 
sense-determining, and outlining these characteristics will be our starting point proper. 
Throughout the outline, the idea of  assembling pertinent grammatical features in a 
surveyable, cartographic presentation will be acknowledged as best exemplifying the 
method as understood by the early Baker. The notion of  aspects will be considered and 
expanded upon as a starting point for the later Baker’s critique, and it will be 
15
4 cf: P, p187 & Z, §273 respectively.
demonstrated why an aspectival consideration of  grammatical features of  language is so 
compromising for his earlier qualifications of  the status of  Wittgenstein’s grammatical 
remarks. In addition it will be argued that Baker’s later account of  grammar 
demonstrates fidelity to a certain class of  remarks that can sensibly qualify those 
passages his earlier model relied upon for direction and that, crucially, the reverse 
cannot be achieved without a degree of  exegetical contortionism. 
§1.1 The edifice of language
According to the exegetical model under investigation, Wittgenstein’s philosophy’s 
purpose can be found in his tracing “the web of  conceptual connections by means of  
which we conceive of  the world.”5 The nature of  this project and its proposed elements 
might appear rather grand on first hearing. Here are a few abstract qualifications: The 
‘conceptual web’ alluded to above consists of  the rules by which a language community 
tacitly operates with its words, and can be satisfactorily elucidated by explicitly 
accounting for these normative relations; the rules that constitute this network are what 
determine the limits of  sense made within a language by its community of  users; the 
majority of  philosophical questions, puzzles and theories that occur in a language can 
be clearly posited as the obfuscation, miscomprehension and misapplication of  these 
same rules and, hence, most philosophical claims can be diagnosed as operational 
mistakes arising from errors in the application of  the rules of  language. Now, these are 
not modest claims, by anyone’s measure. Indeed, on first blush they appear acutely 
theoretical in nature – that is, they appear to posit fundamental and necessary 
characteristics present in human language that both enable the possibility of  sensible 
language use and, through the collection and arrangement of  its normative relations, 
also offer the opportunity to act as arbiter in clearly identifying where an individual 
transgresses those same rules. Quite apart from an immediate potential discrepancy 
between such a method’s theoretical mode and Wittgenstein’s repeated claims to be 
operating in a way that avoids theoretical postulation, the inquisitive reader might 
sensibly ask the following of  such a bold position: from whence does the philosopher 
derive their license to make such claims? Or, what is the source of  the certainty from 
which a philosopher can posit and derive the rules for a word’s use? This is the 
16
5 Hacker 1972, pp151–2.
qualification we shall first turn to in seeking to elucidate both this model and Baker’s 
derivational, aspectival account.
 One of  Wittgenstein’s most common qualifications of  grammatical rules is in 
analogical relation to the rules of  a game: "Grammar” can be considered to have 
“somewhat the same relation to the language as ... the rules of  a game have to the 
game."6  Baker and Hacker commonly employ exemplars in relation to this key 
depiction of  grammar, such as the following:  
Rather like ‘The chess king moves one square at at time’, propositions such as ‘Red is 
darker than pink’ or ‘Red is a colour’ are partly constitutive of  the meanings of  their 
constituent expressions (in whatever language these statements are made), determine the 
concepts thus expressed, and license (or prohibit) inferences.7  
The two statements ‘Red is darker than pink’ and ‘The chess king moves one square at 
at time’ share regulatory characteristics: they can both be taken as stipulating a rule 
within a local8 system. For example, it is a grammatical rule that if  a rose is said to be 
lighter than pink, it cannot be inferred from this statement to be red; if  someone moves 
a king chess-piece two squares up and one to the side, that means it is necessarily not 
operating as a king in that person’s move, whether they are aware of  it or no. In both 
cases were such an aberrant use to occur, we would be liable to judge such activity to be 
in discord with the established rules by which we use a chess king or the term red9. 
There would therefore be a discrepancy between the normal use and the current 
aberrant use, and this accordance is precisely the normative strength of  a grammatical 
rule that a philosopher seeks to employ in the resolution of  conceptual confusion. The 
application of  a rule is correct, or else goes astray, with either a different game being 
played or a confusion taking place in how to follow the grammatical rule. This is to say 
that such instances of  normative regularity are not empirically necessary in regard to the 
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7 RGN p26, but see also there pp19, 51, 158, 242, etc. 
8 Whether it could make sense to say ‘that red is darker than pink’ seems doubtful, if  the red being 
referred to were a communist. Hence the rule being given in this example is localised to a set of  language 
games, just as the rules of  chess are irrelevant to twister.  
9 “If  someone claims that a combination of  words has perfectly good sense for him, while we can discern 
none, we can only assume that he uses language differently from us, or else that he is talking 
thoughtlessly” (PR p97).
nature of  the chess piece or rose in question (rules are dynamic,10 and of  course change 
in response to pertinent developments), but instead relate to our modes of  
representation. If  we wish to employ such terms as ‘king’s move’ or ‘red’ within the 
interconnected set of  rules that allow for a certain action or expression (i.e. playing the 
game of  chess or describing the colour of  a rose), we must apparently abide by certain 
rules, or suffer the consequences of  partaking in a nonsensical kind of  activity; a 
mistaken application of  rules means that one fails in what one set out to do – either 
move out of  check or converse with a gardener in a way she might understand, as the 
case may be. Thus sentences such as ‘Red is darker than pink’ and ‘The chess king 
moves one square at a time’ are expressions of  grammatical rules; they do not need to 
state empirical facts to be so,11 but instead determine certain rules by which states of  
affairs are so represented. We are free to employ novel uses that countermand a given 
set of  rules, but at the expense of  our no longer saying something sensible within the 
bounds of  how others might normally expect us to play and speak.12 
	 In order to capture the normative relations that are to be the building blocks of  
philosophical method, these grammatical rules must be solely and unproblematically 
elicited from, and observed in, the use of  language as it is commonly practiced in 
consensus by its users. Another way of  stating this premise is that someone is competent 
in a language if  and only if  they know of  and operate with words in accordance with 
those grammatical rules that are of  interest to the philosopher:
Grammatical description merely makes explicit what is already known by competent 
speakers of  the language – the humdrum standards of  usage according to which they 
proceed (and also various comparisons and contrasts between familiar rules, which they 
may not have realised).13
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10 Baker describes this ‘conception of  language ... as loosely governed by rules that do not try to budget for 
all conceivable eventualities’. (WUM I, p50)
11 Although they may well be so used – e.g. ‘it is a fact that, in the modern game of  chess, the king moves 
one square at a time’.
12 “We would not call something ‘red’ if  it were lighter in colour than any pink thing; we would not call 
someone a ‘bachelor’ if  he were married; and so on. Could we? – Of  course, but then we would not be 
talking of  the colour red or the status of  being a bachelor, but of  something else. For these concepts are 
determined by this pattern of  grammatical, conceptual, connections” (RGN, pp263–4).
13 RGN, p59.
The grammatical constituents of  philosophical practice must be “humdrum” in the 
sense that when clearly articulated they are familiar, to the point of  assumed normativity, 
to their employer. If  an individual does not know a given rule for the use of  a word, then 
they cannot be said to be operating in accordance with it. Hence the grammatical rules 
that are elicited and employed in philosophy cannot be posited contrary to an 
individual’s claim of  ignorance, because that individual can only apply a rule and 
adhere to its use if  she acknowledges it in practice. In this way the constituents of  a 
philosophical account must be derived in complete agreement with users of  the language 
that is being elucidated. This premise provides certain license to the grammatical 
philosopher: if  one is merely stating those humdrum standards of  usage that everyone 
freely admits to, the burden of  viability is dramatically lessened in two key ways. Firstly 
there is an appeal to the descriptive fidelity of  a grammatical account: when one’s 
instruments include such common-or-garden artefacts as “red is darker than pink” and 
“men are mortal” then the danger of  contention is significantly lessened.14 Secondly, if  
an individual does not recognise a rule being employed by a philosopher, then that 
particular employment must be irrelevant to that individual: they are not aware of  a rule, 
and therefore they cannot be said to be operating in accordance with it. Hence, contrary 
to first blush, the early Baker could help himself  to a claim that the method he advocates  
is purely descriptive, being that it is only relevant in relation to those who acknowledge 
the accuracy and pertinence of  the rules so described. We will see, however, that this 
second qualification does nothing to compromise the purview he wishes to claim for his 
conception of  grammatical philosophy.
 The normative features of  language that are to be picked out and arranged in this 
philosophical method are immediately available and recognisable, then, due to their 
being followed in every example of  normal language use one cares to examine. What is 
the relation of  such rules to the language they each partially describe? Well, they are the 
local accounts of  how people do and most likely will, perhaps even should, operate with 
words in relation to a given field of  concepts. The rules of  the language games are local 
norms of  representation pertaining to relevant features of  the life of  that community 
who partake in these games. There is of  course a spectrum of  alternate features and 
alternate employments to be considered in relevance to the use of  a word, and this 
complexity varies across alternate areas; colour terms may demonstrate pretty similar 
rules of  use across different language games, while one sees the utmost complexity and 
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14 There are, of  course, far more debatable rules explicated in the work of  Baker and Hacker. We will 
return to this shortly.
alterity in psychological concepts such as to know, think, believe, etc. The important 
issue, in the meantime being, is that of  determining that rules may be broadly applied or 
parochial; clear or obfuscatingly complex, according to the area of  language being 
investigated. And these characteristics are due to the grammatical rules they exhibit. 
Hence, while we say of  grammar that it is local to a discrete segment of  a language, it 
does normatively pertain to that segment in a constituting manner: the various rules for 
the use of  a word, combined and synopsised, present the inner structure of  that given 
segment of  language. It is this structure, or rather the connections that adhere within 
this structure – whose rules are to be tabulated in order for their user to be able to ‘take 
in at a glance’, that provides the philosopher’s tools with which to resolve the 
dissembling confusion that arises when one does not know one’s way about these 
normative features of  language.
 Taking one step back, away from given instances of  grammar, towards a more birds-
eye-view of  how a remark’s instance interconnects with other rules, one can begin, 
according to the early Baker, to achieve a perception of  language’s rules as they stretch 
away and interact with alternate boroughs of  language use in a reasonably formalisable 
manner. Grammar is therefore referred to as an extensive, ramifying or reticulating 
patten that is edificial to the possibility of  individuals within a language understanding 
each other. Without such an edifice there would be no rule-governed language use, for 
language would lack the regularity that understanding and agreement supervene upon. 
Grammar is therefore the inner structure of  language that is at once both tacitly relied 
upon in daily discourse, and immanently available through reflection and inquiry to 
every user of  that language.
§1.2 Grammar as veridical
Philosophy, under the interpretive scheme established in the works of  Baker and Hacker, 
is designed to provide the philosopher with “descriptions of  normative connections 
within the web of  concepts that constitute our form of  representation. They are said to 
be true.”15 So far we have been concerned with establishing a conception of  grammar 
as constitutive of  the language it describes, and certain characteristics follow quite 
validly from such a model. One of  the most striking is that these normative relations, 
being both derived from the behaviour of  a language’s users, and constitutively 
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necessary for the possibility of  language, are veridical de jure16 descriptions of  a language. 
This is because the forms of  representation that they describe accurately capture the 
way people use words and form agreements when operating in a given segment of  their 
language. Hence ‘Red is darker than pink’, our earlier exemplar, is true in virtue of  our 
rules for representing a certain set of  colours. This status, accredited to such 
grammatical rules, means that while their investigation will not conclude in a final 
analysis, it is an enterprise best considered as a quest for complete clarity, in the sense that 
one can aim at achieving the correct point of  view of  one’s language, if  one accrues the 
pertinent normative relations in one’s philosophical work, thereby completely dissolving 
the problems that triggered the investigation.17 It is because they are veridical, structural 
elements of  our language that they “can be organised to act as reminders, guidelines 
and boundaries that come into play at moments of  philosophical confusion.”18 
 It follows quite sequentially from this account that the elucidation of  grammatical 
rules qua the veridical account of  normative relations should be the central enterprise of  
Wittgenstein’s later philosophy. In a sense, Wittgenstein’s work is reducible to a concern 
for their elucidation:
“The focal point of  all grammatical remarks [in the Investigations] is the rules of  grammar, 
whether or not these remarks are themselves rules of  grammar.”19 
Therefore Wittgenstein’s common use of  imaginative scenarios and fictive examples (to 
name just two of  the more multivalent traits of  his writing) serve to lead the reader into 
recognising such oddness and fiction precisely as a result of  some disobedience to the 
rules that govern normal utterances in our language games. On this understanding, no 
matter how odd Wittgenstein’s chosen tools may appear, he keeps at all times one eye on 
the veracity of  his descriptions of  the normative relations relevant to his task at hand. 
 Similarly, one can derive from a veridical notion of  grammatical rules their potential 
for accumulation within a tabulated account. Indeed it is not just an option, but an integral 
task for the philosopher to accumulate more and more of  the rules that govern a 
language game’s ‘internal structure’. Grammatical investigation “is a holistic notion; we 
are striving to take in as a whole a segment of  grammar, to grasp the environs of  a 
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18 RGN, p64, my emphasis. Cf: pp242 & 370.
19 Baker 1986, p26.
concept.”20 This makes grammatical investigation an additive and progressive affair; 
more and more substantive in its eventual corpus of  norms, as a condition of  its greater 
and greater perspicuity. Completeness and comprehensiveness in our systemic models 
are therefore regulative ideals for a philosopher to act in accordance with.21 The role of  
philosophy is constructive and positive due to this possibility, and lends itself  well to an 
analogy with the art of  cartography. As with grammatical investigation, cartography is 
concerned with capturing local detail, such as a terrain’s shape and notable features, in 
an easily surveyable representation intended to be referred to in moments of  uncertainty 
when traversing the relevant terrain. Through contour lines, shading and various other 
legends, a map’s user can determine the position of  any feature within a given segment 
of  terrain, as well as its relation to other features; an ability that is simply unavailable 
from solely traversing the terrain being depicted. In philosophy, the cartography of  
grammatical features allows the privilege of  attaining a synoptic viewpoint from which 
to take in features at a glance, equivalent to “the mastery of  the logical geography of  
concepts in a given domain.”22 Thus our common inability to grasp the rules by which 
we operate is cured by the attainment of  their correct perspective. It would be unfair, 
then, to characterise Wittgenstein’s method as negative, for it offers the possibility of  
accumulating a unique kind of  knowledge about language – one that, at a glance, can 
resolve the confusions that have so dogged philosophy as a discipline. 
 In this way Baker and Hacker’s model of  grammatical investigation seems to imply 
two distinct ways of  doing philosophy. Firstly, there is the role of  the cartographer, 
whose groundbreaking work and attention to discursive detail result in a set of  ever-
increasingly exhaustive permutations for the employments of  given words and concepts. 
It is she who follows the example set by Wittgenstein, through expanding upon and 
renovating his work in new ways, as new philosophical problems emerge in new cultural 
and scientific developments. There is also the secondary role of  one who benefits from 
these tabulations, employing them as guides with which to navigate the often tricky 
ground of  language use. Baker and Hacker conceived of  this second group as being 
made up of  not only philosophers, but also neuroscientists, linguists, and other 
theoretical researchers, ideally with such individuals’ uses of  philosophical tabulations 
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intended to occur antecedent to their composition of  working hypotheses23. In this way 
philosophers can provide positive assistance to theoretical endeavour, by ensuring that 
the language contained within such theories does not wander from the ‘high roads’ of  
sense, a mistake that would doom their research to barren investigation along 
conceptually confused avenues. These synoptic presentations are of  course equally 
efficacious for students of  philosophy, as they resolve in clear, programmatic steps many 
of  the problems returned to again and again in philosophy. Tabulations are not 
philosophical autopilots by any means, as their application, remembrance and 
occasional tweaking are all still required, but the task of  resolving philosophical 
questions is fundamentally and positively altered by the accrual and synoptic 
presentation of  language’s normative relations. Tabulation is, by this account, intended 
as “a permanent prophylaxis against whole sets of  philosophical problems”.24 Part of  
this application results in one’s use of  expressions being bounded by the rules so expressed 
– with the result being that complex-use terms such as language, thought and belief, “if  
used intelligibly at all, must have their everyday meanings; this must be true of  them 
even if  they appeared in a philosophical grammar.”25 
§1.3 Some exegetical concerns
To understand the disillusionment that led Baker to shift towards his later standpoint, we 
can consider some remarks that seem to generate notable friction with the interpretation 
established thus far. These remarks will also prove useful in the following section, 
providing starting points with which to compare the early and later Baker’s 
qualifications. It is also a method particularly suited to the study of  the exegesis of  
Baker, given that it appears that the consideration of  this class of  remarks seems to have 
played a large role in Baker’s volte face, and that the later Baker paid so much credit to 
the importance of  the modal qualifications present in Wittgenstein’s work.26 
 Firstly recall that we saw how there was a positive role to be played in philosophy and 
that, despite the central objective being the resolution of  philosophical problems, there 
was also room for a constructive account in which one might accumulate the rules for 
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23 Presumably in order to stop such theorists from “merely pursuing yet another monstrous 
chimera.” (LSN, p11)
24 NA, p27.
25 WUM, p341.
26 A sensitivity that resulted in Baker’s proposed principle of  exegetical minimalism. (see NA, p67)
the employment of  a given set of  language games. In this manner we saw how Baker 
posited an apparent and “obvious connection between [Wittgenstein’s] positive 
conception of  philosophy and his analysis of  the concepts of  a rule and of  following a 
rule.”27  This account depends upon the possibility of  accruing the various meanings, or 
established rules of  use, for a word, and thus being able to tabulate these rules in a 
sense-bounding and synoptic presentation. Yet in the following passage, taken from one 
of  Wittgenstein’s mid-1930s lectures, he describes his method in a way that apparently 
seeks to describe language in a manner quite unlike the earlier veridical model, 
qualifying it as discretely negative in purpose:
“The point of  examining the way a word is used is not at all to provide another method of  
giving its meaning. When we ask on what occasion people use a word, and in reply try to 
describe its use, we do so only insofar as it seems helpful in getting rid of  certain 
philosophical troubles.”28 
This is an unequivocal report of  the reasons for which a philosopher might examine and 
describes language use. The method so accounted for does not seem to have much 
relevance to a positive undertaking of  accruing rule sets; indeed, grammatical 
investigation is presented here as unconcerned with the task of  establishing the 
normative meanings of  a word. Instead, investigation is presented solely as a concern 
with the removal of  certain philosophical troubles.29 Perhaps the most puzzling element 
of  this remark is the point that the philosophical act of  examining the way a word is 
used is not equivalent to a method of  providing its meaning, indeed it is not at all 
intended to make such provision. Not only does this seem problematic for Baker’s earlier 
conception of  the task of  philosophy – for what is tabulation if  not the accumulation 
and synoptic presentation of  normative meanings? – but it also begs the question of  why 
one should bother at all to perform such an examination. In a similar manner, it appears 
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not thereby complete our knowledge of  its use, and we do not tell people how to use the term. Logical 
analysis is an antidote. Its importance is to stop the muddle someone makes on reflecting on words." (ibid 
p21). Further, “Our investigation does not try to find the real, exact meaning of  words; though we often do 
give words exact meanings in the course of  our investigation.” (Z, §467)
29 The wide range over which the tabulated rules of  grammar is intended to extend likewise seems open to 
serious question in Wittgenstein’s own remarks, and this seems so in two ways. Firstly, the sheer 
impossibility of  tabulation in every case of  language use, and secondly in the apparent misconstrual of  a 
necessary equivalence between meaning and use. See Kuusela 2008, Chapter IV, for an exegetically 
detailed consideration of  the limits of  meaning as use in the later Wittgenstein.
somewhat doubtful that we can help ourselves to the assumption that Wittgenstein 
considered the status of  grammatical rules for terms such as ‘red’ as being qualitatively 
consistent with those rules that might bound the sense for such terms as ‘to think’:
There are words with several clearly defined meanings. It is easy to tabulate these 
meanings. And there are words of  which one might say: they are used in a thousand 
different ways which gradually merge into one another. No wonder that we can't tabulate 
strict rules for their use.30
The model of  tabulation, earlier presented in §1.2, is dependant upon a quantitative 
difference between the rules for the use of  the terms ‘red’ and ‘to think’, in that their 
difference is equivalent to the number of  permutations and relations that pertain to their 
use in our language. This is because the proposed philosophical method concerns itself  
with the accumulation of  pertinent norms relating to problematic terms such as thought 
and meaning. If  there is, as this passage seems to suggest, a qualitative difference between 
such troublesome areas of  language and more clearcut areas – in that the meaning of  
certain words resists the possibility of  clear instantiation – then their inclusion within a 
tabulated surview is rendered somewhat implausible. For how is one to synopsise the 
central rules governing the use of  a word when those rules do not suffer elucidation as 
discrete norms, but instead “are used in a thousand different ways which gradually 
merge into one another”? If  we are unable to tabulate the uses of  certain words due to 
their rules’ coalescence rather than their complexity, it seems problematic for such a surview 
to lay claim to attributes such as ‘correct’, ‘sense-bounding’ or ‘topographical’, especially 
when it is considered that it is precisely these more problematic areas of  language use 
that are most likely to require philosophical elucidation. For the notion of  division 
inheres to the notion of  a norm; something is to be judged either correct or incorrect, in 
or out, allowed or forbidden, all according to the application of  a boundary to the field 
of  inquiry. Yet if  the subject of  our investigation will not yield to such divisive 
descriptions, the method must surely reflect this characteristic nature of  the things it 
wishes to describe. Hence the early Baker cannot, by this understanding, help himself  to 
the idea that, in our language use, “More involved cases are just more involved cases”.31
 To this end, we can consider the following remark as an early indicator of  the reasons 
that motivate Wittgenstein’s peculiar notion of  philosophical method:
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	If  we look at the actual use of  a word, what we see is something constantly fluctuating. In 
our investigations we set over against this fluctuation something more fixed, just as one 
paints a stationary picture of  the constantly altering face of  the landscape. When we study 
language we envisage it as a game with fixed rules. We compare it with, and measure it 
against, a game of  that kind. If  for our purposes we wish to regulate the use of  a word by 
definite rules, then alongside its fluctuating use we set up a different use by codifying one 
of  its characteristic aspects.32
Here the ‘codification’ of  actual uses of  a word as both fixed and rule-governed is 
presented as – rather than a veridical account of  the normative structure of  a language 
– a stipulation on the philosopher’s part. When ‘envisaging’ language use as highly 
regulated, the philosopher employs a strategy in which she ‘sets over against’ language a 
model with which to ‘compare it with, and measure it against’. This constitutes an 
explicit denial of  the ideal that language reflects Wittgenstein’s methodology in its inner 
structure, instead making double reference to the interminable, fluctuating condition of  
language use. It therefore appears that Wittgenstein’s methodologically regulative 
stipulation is accorded its worth due to the purposes of  the philosopher, rather than 
according to a necessary status of  language as rule governed; this recalibration of  a 
grammatical account’s portrayal of  rule-governed activity as methodologically 
purposeful rather than necessarily veridical is absolutely central to the later Baker’s 
exegesis. Hence, when the early Baker remarks that “[t]here is no such thing as meaning 
independently of  rules which determine how an expression is to be used”33 he is, judged 
by his later understanding, equivocating between a facet of  language use and a 
methodologically codified presentation of  that use, composed to resolve a certain 
conceptual confusion.
 Finally, consider the range over which Wittgenstein’s investigations were earlier 
considered to operate: grammatical rules supposedly revealed the rules that are 
constitutive of  meaning34, and thus the bounds of  sense. The rules themselves are 
autonomous, and cohere in a shared, consensual web of  conceptual connections by 
which we conceive of  the world. The accrual and tabulation of  our grammar, therefore, 
is a grand undertaking, one which reveals to the confused individual the culturally 
26
32 PG, p77, my emphasis.
33 Baker & Hacker, in RGN, 1985 edition, pp66-7.
34 WMU, p20.
established usages to which they already adhere, without conscious acknowledgement of 
this fact. Yet in the following passage, we are presented with a very different remit by 
which we concern ourselves with the uses of  words:
What is it that is repulsive in the idea that we study the use of  a word, point to mistakes in 
the description of  this use and so on? First and foremost one asks oneself: How could that 
be so important to us? It depends on whether what one calls a ‘wrong description’ is a 
description that does not accord with established usage – or one which does not accord 
with the practice of  the person giving the description. Only in the second case does a 
philosophical conflict arise.35
Here, Wittgenstein sees such a concern with studying our established usage as in some 
sense unimportant, perhaps even repulsive, in its interest in regulating the use of  a word 
according to compliance with the uses we think we discover. Only in the practice of  a 
given individual’s use of  that word does a philosophical conflict arise – with philosophy, 
as conceived of  by Wittgenstein, deriving its purpose solely36 from such arising conflicts. 
 To summarise, then, the later Baker’s exegesis developed an acute sensitivity to a set 
of  methodological characteristics that were previously obscured by his emphasis upon 
grammar as veridical, accruable, and sense-bounding. Specifically, we have seen how a 
series of  his earlier working assumptions can be challenged by consideration of  four of  
Wittgenstein’s remarks: that the consolidation of  a set of  meanings is not the purpose of  
philosophy; that certain complex concepts refuse to yield to clearcut tabulation 
according to their convergent and merged meanings; that Wittgenstein’s presentation of  
language as coherently rule-governed is a methodological stipulation, rather than a 
veridical fact of  language use; and that philosophical problems emerge in, and are 
relative only to, a given individual’s conceptions, and thus the individual stands as the site 
of  grammatical investigation, rather than a grand matrix of  normative conventions 
operative for language in use. It is by now clear, I think, that when Baker remarked that 
“[c]ommentators on Wittgenstein seem to be pulled by powerful gravitational forces 
towards assimilating all of  his remarks to factual observations about the logical 
geography of  natural languages”,37 he considered his former self  to be most assuredly 
guilty of  indulging in this assimilative tendency. 
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 We can also use these four remarks to get clear on another substantial problem Baker 
came to perceive in his earlier position. Unlike, for example, Wittgenstein’s infamous 
remark regarding the methodological benefit in treating meaning as use38, in these four 
examples we see very little of  the author’s frequent and characteristic use of  limiting 
modal qualifiers, such as ‘can’, ‘might’, ‘we can say’, or ‘imagine it as’, etc39. There is no 
equivalence present in such remarks as: “No wonder we can’t tabulate strict rules for [a 
certain word’s] use”; “The point of  examining the way a word is used is not at all to 
provide another method of  giving its meaning”; “When we ask on what occasion people 
use a word, and in reply try to describe its use, we do so only insofar as it seems helpful 
in getting rid of  certain philosophical troubles”; “Only in the second case does a 
philosophical conflict arise”; or “Our investigation does not try to find the real, exact 
meaning of  words.” Indeed, we can surmise that the disqualifying modality that 
characterises these remarks make them particularly important in understanding 
Wittgenstein’s methodological intentions. While one can, with some light footwork, 
marginalise an author’s modal qualifiers and thereby render a sentence in a more 
universal sense than may have been originally intended, one cannot inversely ‘build’ 
modality into sentences that are as univocally disqualifying as those presented above. 
And this seems to be clearly in keeping with their intended method. As Read and 
Hutchinson argue, 
Positive pronouncements on subjects, such as meaning, are presented with care so as to 
clearly guard against our seeing them as anything other than reminders for a particular 
purpose. Remarks about this method of  philosophy are stated in a manner that clearly 
projects (and clearly delimits) its scope.40 
With Morris, Read and Hutchinson, then, we can qualify Baker’s later exegetical 
practice as one highly sensitive to the modal qualifications present in Wittgenstein’s text, 
in that he grew to take these elements at face value: as recommendations of  intent and 
attenuations of  applicability, rather than as moments of  modesty or uncertainty.41 We 
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39 Cf: Morris 1994.
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will now see how such attentiveness to the conditionality and context of  Wittgenstein’s 
remarks led Baker to a radically new model of  reading.
§1.4 From language is rule governed, to language as rule governed
Remarks such as those central to §1.3 appear troubling to the model of  philosophy 
Gordon Baker earlier attributed to Wittgenstein, problematising, as they do, central 
assumptions that Baker considered himself  to have indulged in. Wittgenstein’s 
characterisation of  certain areas of  language – indeed, precisely those same areas where 
we are most in need of  clarity – as being simply too coalescent and complex in their use 
to be successfully tabulated, present the problem of  how to judge the assertion that 
tabulation of  grammatical features is the central purpose of  philosophy. Baker was faced 
with the prospect of  concluding Wittgenstein’s method as being inoperative, then, in 
that it invented a tabulating method of  description that could find no purchase when 
confronted by the harder problems of  philosophy. More generally, the modality of  his 
remarks, and Baker’s acknowledgement of  his previous insensitivity to the importance of 
such modality, also clearly left quite a mark on Baker’s later exegesis (as testified in his 
two papers “Remarks on ‘Language’ and ‘Grammar’” and “Italics in Wittgenstein”).42 
Baker could also, of  course, have considered these problematic remarks as somehow not 
representative of  Wittgenstein’s actual position. Instead he proceeded under a drastically 
modified notion of  what Wittgenstein thought he was doing when he assembled 
grammatical remarks in service of  dissolving philosophical confusion. His revisionary 
avenue of  interpretation turned upon his understanding of  Wittgenstein’s conception of 
an aspect. The “unity of  his method” was not now to be derived from the method of  
veridical tabulation, but from “the application to grammar and language of  the concept 
of  an aspect (and of  the related concepts of  seeing an aspect and being blind to an 
aspect).”43 Baker considered that, whilst primarily found in his remarks on perception, 
the notion of  an aspect should not be considered as restricted to only those passages, but 
instead offered a coherence to his methods that demonstrated fidelity to the notions of  
philosophy as the stipulated codification of  rules in the service of  remedying an 
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43 NA, p33.
individual’s confusions, rather than in the search of  a total cartographic assembly of  
rule-governed meaning.44
 An ‘aspect’, as Baker presents the term, can be understood as a particular way of  
seeing that alters one’s way of  orchestrating one’s perception, with the ‘dawning’ of  a 
new aspect appearing in our experiences as “half  visual experience, half  thought”.45 
Contemplating a face and suddenly noticing its likeness to another;46 seeing a triangle as  
alternately striking one as “a triangular hole, as a solid, as a geometrical drawing; as 
standing on its base, as hanging from its apex; as a mountain, as a wedge, as an arrow or 
pointer, as an overturned object which is meant to stand on the shorter side of  the right 
angle, as a half  parallelogram, and as various other things”47; and seeing a schematic 
cube first as a lying down, then as receding from view48: these are just some of  the 
examples Wittgenstein uses to explain how one can “switch” between ways of  noticing 
features in that which we observe. Anyone who has laid back on the grass and picked 
out differing forms in the clouds that pass overhead is well aware of  this switch. Hence 
while “noticing an aspect” changes the way we see the thing we are examining – 
perhaps its dimensions reverse, its features orchestrate in familial resemblance to another 
face, or its identity switches over to reveal that thing as something other than what we 
previously considered it to be – we can also say that nothing has actually has changed in 
the thing itself. “The expression of  a change of  aspect is the expression of  a new 
perception and at the same time of  the perception’s being unchanged.”49 
 This account of  the term aspect is directly relevant to the task of  philosophy in the 
following manner: Baker’s ‘turn’ occurs in his treatment of  the notion of  an aspect as 
being “closely analogous” with that of  a conception. Conceptions are “ways of  seeing” 
the world too, and many of  “the points made about the concept of  visual aspect-seeing 
seem to hold equally for the wider use of  ‘aspect’ or ‘way of  seeing things’ in application 
to conceptions in philosophy.”50 Morris goes so far as to put it thus: “Conceptions are, to 
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46 Ibid, p193.
47 Ibid, p200.
48 Ibid, pp193 & 208.
49 Ibid, p196.
50 NA, p283, but Baker is keen to qualify this “most”; he lists a number of  useful disanalogies too, see 
p286–7.
put it crudely, the intellectual counterpart of  visual aspects.”51 Rather than this only 
constituting bold stipulation, Baker’s reformulation can derive serious exegetical 
plausibility from Wittgenstein’s frequent use of  the term aspect when remarking on the 
method of  philosophy. For aspects, far from being a term to be confined to perceptual 
experience, are clearly crucial to the comparative task of  considering alternate analogies 
and systems of  expression that is the pivotal mechanism in Baker’s reading. For example, 
We change the aspect of  things by juxtaposing with one system of  expression other ones. 
– Thus can the thrall in which an analogy holds us can be broken, if  it is juxtaposed with 
it another analogy which we acknowledge to be equally justifiable.52
 
The ends of  philosophy, then, appear not to be solely the cessation of  a particularly 
troublesome system of  expression, but instead the dawning of  a new aspect that occurs 
because of  this change. By reflecting upon Wittgenstein’s earlier remark, that in “our 
investigations we set over against this fluctuation something more fixed, just as one 
paints a stationary picture of  the constantly altering face of  the landscape”, we can 
place the notion of  an aspect as playing a crucial role in this proposed methodology. For 
such ‘fixed pictures’, by which we describe language use, are to be set up alongside our 
actual use to resolve our conceptual difficulties: “We then change the aspect by placing 
side-by-side with one system of  expression other systems of  expression.”53 Once again, 
we see that the aspect of  our conception is altered by the system of  expression we 
habitually employ, being juxtaposed with an alternate system, one which draws attention 
to alternate characteristics of  the field of  inquiry. The method is not interdictory, then, 
but seeks to trigger the noticing of  a new aspect, one that means we no longer find our 
previous notation wholly satisfactory, precisely because it did not admit of  this new way 
of  seeing. It is this change, rather than the accompanying one in our expression, which 
matters for Wittgenstein.
Actually I should like to say that ... the words you utter or what you think as you utter them 
are not what matters, so much as the difference they make at various points in your life ... 
Practice gives words their significance.54
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Hence aspects govern what our systems of  expression seek to depict, and contribute to 
the kinds of  practices that we invest ourselves in, just as that system expresses and 
reinforces a preferred way of  conceiving. Because one’s consideration and application of 
differing notations can trace for one the possibility of  a new aspect, “how it comes about 
that it appears” can be “characteristically exemplified”55 if  we consider certain ways of  
asking questions which best express the logic of  such systems of  expression. Such 
questions as "Where does the present go when it becomes past, and where is the past?"56 
speak of  a manner of  conceiving of  time as a mysterious relation between tenses, one 
that may well prove striking in certain circumstances (see §3.2). Many of  the questions 
posed by Wittgenstein resemble such ‘characteristic exemplification’. It is this being 
struck, being taken with a certain expression, which leads to a way of  seeing things in 
which we may “become obsessed with our symbolism.—We may say that we are led into 
puzzlement by an analogy which irresistibly drags us on.”57 What one is “dragged on” 
into is the orchestration of  the world more and more exclusively according to this 
aspect, leading to a point at which we “aren't able to rid ourselves of  the implications of  
our symbolism.” It becomes increasingly difficult to shift away from this way of  seeing 
time; we are “tempted” or “lured” into making further statements in accord with this 
aspect, “which seems to admit of  a question like ‘Where does the flame of  a candle go 
to when it's blown out?’ ‘Where does the light go to?’, ‘Where does the past go to’?” 
Such a problematically abided aspect “thus becomes analogous to continuous aspect-
seeing. The person behaves intellectually as if  his picture represented the only 
possibility.”58 
 If  instead we can be convinced that a given style of  question or description can be 
foresaken, then there is a chance that a rigidly adhered-to aspect can be discarded in 
favour of  a new dawning. If  prompting an aspect switch is now understood to be the 
purpose of  presenting the reader with a particular language game, an intermediate case, 
or a model of  comparison, then it is equally important to note that philosophical 
problems arise “because the forms of  representation of  our language have taken on a 
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disquieting aspect”.59 Baker emphasises that Wittgenstein’s use of  the term aspect is 
common to both the problems to which his methods are addressed, and the alleviating 
means of  this addressal. The rule-governed systems of  comparison that Wittgenstein 
lays alongisde language “stand on the same level as the unexamined analogies which 
they are intended to displace in dissolving particular philosophical problems”, and 
therefore, “both philosophical problems and their dissolutions involve conceptions or 
‘aspect-seeing’”.60 Philosophy is no longer to be in the business of  interdiction, but 
instead of  noticing, then judiciously presenting, ways of  seeing that have been neglected, 
in order to achieve an aspect switch, analogous with that half-sight/half-thought when 
one notices the ‘duck’ in Köhler’s famous diagram, rather than the ‘rabbit’. Neither the 
means of  the switch, or the new aspect itself, are hierarchically superior, more precise or 
more widely applicable than those that gave rise to the initial problem. An individual 
who remarked upon suddenly seeing the duck, “aha! Now I see the right way of  looking 
at this picture” would not have understood that picture’s purpose at all, nor what had 
just happened to her. Likewise, the antidote matches the problematic conception in form 
because it contests the comprehensiveness of  that problematic rule-set, rather than 
because the ‘correct’ or exhaustive rule-set is now made available through due 
grammatical diligence. Sometimes, perhaps certain aspects might prove to be so likely to 
cause conceptual confusion that Wittgenstein feels compelled to give a warning against 
their use.61 In such cases, these aspects can be made sensible through explication, to then 
to be used to presage against their seemingly simplifying or intriguing possibilities.62 
This does not reduce, however, to a hierarchy of  correctness, only a forewarning of  
possible confusions that may emerge in the practice of  a particular aspect. 
 This is the reason why the later Baker chose to refer to Wittgenstein’s method as a 
form of  ‘homeopathy’ – it suggests the introduction of  a small dose of  a pathological 
element in the treatment of  the condition which that element gave rise to. The 
analogical choice of  homeopathy here is perhaps somewhat unwise, however, with 
perhaps ‘vaccination’ being a better choice. This is because not only does vaccination 
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62 Certain propositions may sound remarkable and lead one into a way of  seeing a state of  affairs that 
promise to be revelatory, such as “fractions cannot be arranged in order of  magnitude” – a statement that 
on first blush appears revelatory. Upon further inspection, Wittgenstein notes, this facet of  fractions 
reveals itself  to be derived from mathematical notation, rather than a regularity in an object that can be 
cashed out in relevant applied domains, such as physics. (See RFM, p137)
avoid certain unhelpful connotations with a discredited medical method, but because 
many of  the grammatical remarks that permeate Wittgenstein’s later work relate in 
some sense to a form of  ‘dead’ philosophical confusion, whose introduction allows the 
reader to examine this disquieting aspect in the light of  alternate aspects, so as to be able 
to recognise and counter its occurrence elsewhere in his life with language. These 
models not only provide examples of  what it is to apply rules beyond their remit – hence 
at the expense of  attention paid to alternate aspects – but as we shall see, they also 
invoke the voice of  such confusion. Perhaps this is the pertinent feature of  what 
Wittgenstein referred to as his ‘talent’ – to keep grasp of  his confusion, to not let it slip 
between his fingers before it could be dissected.63 His mastery of  the ability to switch 
between aspects now becomes our strongest candidate for the kind of  perspicuity his 
writing advocates. Previously, let us remember, the accumulative effect of  philosophical 
practice was the achievement of  a perspective in some sense above or outside language 
(what the later Baker termed the ‘bird’s-eye view’), through the assembly of  a 
cartographic account of  its features in which we are given to stand outside of  its 
functioning:
In general, what is necessary is to obtain a kind of  synoptic view without getting lost in 
the details which would produce completeness. A surview must delineate the salient 
logical articulations forged by grammar, the central structure of  the net of  language, not 
the local refinements.64
The purpose of  philosophy was positive in its accrual of  grammar by which people may 
avoid the problems inherent in language. Now, Baker’s later Wittgenstein presents his 
models in order to achieve a kind of  perspicuity that involves switching between 
conceptual aspects, and knowing how to employ alternate notations that help trigger 
such a switch. Perspecuity becomes an ability to cycle through different aspects of  
language use, rather than being able to survey a greater and greater totality of  language 
at any given time. Hence perspicuity is rendered as a personal ability one develops, 
rather than a synoptic position afforded by the good work of  past philosophers, for such 
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clear). The art of  the philosopher is not to be cheated of  his puzzlement before it is really cleared 
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64 WMU, p543.
an ability allows one to approach our concepts without prejudice. A perspicuous 
representation is, on these grounds, to be comprehended as an achievement term, rather 
than a synoptic model of  grammar. Similarly to perspecuity, prejudice now means 
something quite specific – it is no longer the preformulation of  a concept which we 
unquestioningly take to be universally correct; it is rather a form of  captivity to a certain 
way of  seeing the world, one that lures us into making philosophically confusing 
expressions; a brake upon our reasoning, rather than a wall that we cannot pass.65 In 
much the same way, the notion of  clarity is not the striking off  of  the chains of  
language, but “the complete disappearance of  particular philosophical problems relating 
to problematic concepts, which does not require once-and-for-all accounts or ‘completed 
grammars’ of  the relevant concepts.”66 From §1 (“the individual words in language 
name objects—sentences are combinations of  such names.”) through to p225 ("I cannot 
know what is going on in him"), Wittgenstein’s Investigations orbits around particular 
expressions that might strike the reader as either wholly sensible or deeply problematic, 
depending upon whether they themselves see with the aspect which such sentences 
exemplify. It is when such aspects go unacknowledged as being voluntary, rather than 
necessitated by the thing being represented, that we require assistance, for “[w]e don’t 
see that something can be looked at in a certain way until it is so looked at. We don’t see 
that an aspect is possible until it is there.”67 In such circumstances – those which concern 
philosophy as a method – one finds oneself  in an arrested position “comparable to that 
of  someone who continuously sees a single aspect in the duck-rabbit diagram.”68 
 Aspects are mutually exclusive of  each other, because they are optional in their 
adoption. One aspect may lead us to a conclusion that is based upon a confusion as to 
the status of  our expressions, while another may provide an account that reveals the 
fallacy or incompleteness of  that first aspect. Hence, the term ‘aspect’ gestures towards 
the different ways in which we judge something to be the case, according to the 
pertinent features that appear to us when attending to that thing, with the proviso being, 
of  course, that certain connections and characteristics will not ‘appear’ to us as pertinent 
when conceived under a particular aspect. Hence, in order to alter the aspect of  our 
seeing, new cases, new questions, newly imagined alternate conditions need to be 
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considered in order to allow a new field of  pertinence to emerge. In order to ‘teach us 
differences’, Wittgenstein proposed the ‘laying alongside’, or ‘measuring against’, of  a 
new model of  comparison, in order to effect the dawning of  a new aspect upon his 
reader. The notion of  an aspect is, in this regard, a way we can model the “transiently 
exclusionary”69 character of  our understanding. Ways of  seeing are not combinatorial, 
but competing, and consequently, “seeing something in one way interferes with seeing it 
differently.”70 An aspect instantiates a given way of  seeing the use of  our words that may 
contradict or make irrelevant alternate aspects: as with the duck-rabbit, differing aspects 
represent differing orientations, but unlike the duck-rabbit, aspects can be chosen, 
encouraged, warned against and, most importantly – as demonstrated by Wittgenstein – 
invented.71
We have now before us a radically different notion of  philosophy to that one considered 
in §1.1 and §1.2, one in which inciting the dawning of  a new aspect which overwrites a 
previously problematic conception is, methodologically speaking, absolutely 
fundamental to its success. As Wittgenstein advocates, “philosophy’s entire task is to 
shape expression in such a way that certain worries disappear.”72 Similarly, imagining a 
particular procedure or behaviour to be markedly different – not as an account of  what 
is or is not the case, but in terms of  what is possible – can change the aspect of  a 
problematic account.73 It can therefore be “very useful to imagine” events to be very 
different from how they are, not because one is assessing the viability of  one’s imagined 
scenario, but precisely because “this changes the aspect” by which one views the subject 
being represented.74 The status of  Wittgenstein’s grammatical remarks are no longer 
predicated upon those rules they represent as being veridical, or as bounding the realms 
of  sense in some complete manner, and now “the focal point of  all grammatical remarks 
is” no longer “the rules of  grammar, whether or not these remarks are themselves rules 
of  grammar.”75 This is a key characteristic of  the proposed method, and likewise, to be 
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which to proceed. We will return to consider this notion more fully in the final chapter. 
72 BT, p421.
73 Cf: P, p131.
74 TS 220, §99.
75 Baker 1984, p26.
consistent, we should extend this qualification to the tools of  its own application. An 
aspect itself  is a procedural description, not a psychological or metaphysical one. Indeed, 
Rupert Read goes so far as to consider this feature as being “in the end an obstacle to be 
overcome. The last temptation of  the Wittgensteinian philosopher is to treat these terms 
as providing a kind of ersatz foundation.”76
 If  we accept this account of  aspects, then we are bound to follow Baker in 
overturning his earlier position regarding what it is that restricts the breadth of  the set of  
grammatical rules that can be sensibly tabulated. The previously conceived purpose of  
philosophy lay in “surveying all the uses and applications of  words, phrases, and 
sentences in a given domain of  thought which gave rise to philosophical perplexity.”77 
This project of  assembling a surview was restricted by the brute fact that “language as a 
whole cannot be taken in at a glance. It is here that piecemeal (but not unsystematic) 
work is all that can be hoped for. Problems are tackled as they arise, segments of  
grammar surveyed, but the totality cannot be grasped at once.” The piecemeal nature of  
Wittgenstein’s investigations is to be accounted for in terms of  the task attempted and 
the limits of  comprehensibility, defined by the limits of  sensible work that such a surview 
could be put to. In short, then, the completion of  such rules was possible, but the 
resulting account’s use would be impossible. Hence for the early Baker, tabulation is 
functionally asymptotic but ideally exhaustive; “With time, a total picture may emerge … 
But, it does not follow that the total picture can itself  be readily surveyed.”78 
 Yet as we have considered, grammatical rules are not unproblematically 
accumulative. They are codified aspects of  a constantly fluctuating field of  phenomena. 
We adopt a notation which “sharpens”79 particular instances of  such phenomena only 
for good methodological reason; to address certain aspects that have led us to expressing 
(similarly sharpened) problematic accounts of  meaning, thought, definition, experience, 
etc. To expect an amalgamation of  these antidotal notations to accrue as a completely 
tabulated map of  our language is akin to expecting a photo album to define the events it 
portrays in their interactional, emotional, figurative & symbolic totality. Rather, such 
comparative tools stand against, compromise, or cast new light on alternate aspects, that 
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implication.
77 WUM, p531.
78 ibid, p543.
79 I use Chomsky’s terminology here. See Chomsky (2000), p127, for an interesting and sympathetic 
discussion of  the deep problems involved in trying to ‘sharpen’ everyday meaning. 
were previously presented as definitional, bounding and constitutional of  the use of  a 
given expression. Hence for the later Baker, grammatical remarks do not cohere within a 
systematic presentation unproblematically.80 This is certainly not to deny that 
normativity pertains to language in use, but instead it is to assert that it is exactly the 
overly rigid application of  a rule, which we formulate when reflecting upon the way that 
language is used, that stands as the source of  most of  our philosophical troubles.81 
Wittgenstein’s philosophy has thus shifted from a way of  reflecting on what is sensible 
and nonsensical, to a method of  detaching oneself  from what was previously accepted 
as necessarily true, by modelling other rules and acknowledging other possibilities.
In conclusion, we would do well to acknowledge, as Baker did82, that many problems 
remain for his aspectival later reading. Chief  among them might be numbered his 
exegetical reliance upon Waismann’s collaborative work with Wittgenstein, even though 
Wittgenstein suspected the results of  that collaboration to be somewhat incongruous 
with his own work. There also remain many exegetical battles to be fought, most 
noticeably in explaining the sympathy between Baker and Hacker’s account of  
philosophy’s purpose as accumulating the grammar of  our language in order to provide 
a surview of  the treacherous, confusing terrain of  language in use, and a set of  remarks 
by Wittgenstein, which refer to the task of  philosophy as being either cartographic or to 
the philosopher’s task being to act as a ‘tour-guide’ to a complex geography.83 While 
neither of  these problems would prove unsurmountable, they will not further concern us 
here, in part because of  the work done by a student of  both Baker and Hacker, Oskari 
Kuusela, in his book The Struggle Against Dogmatism. His close study and refutation of  the 
early Baker’s position in favour of  a position close to his later one is extensive, particular 
and, hence, convincing in a manner in which this single chapter does not hope to be. 
That is not to say that avenues of  research are not still available to the reader of  Baker – 
he explicitly set out a number of  pointers as to how his research could be continued with 
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81 Cf: Cavell 1998: “That everyday language does not, in fact or in essence, depend upon such a structure 
and conception of  rules, and yet that the absence of  such a structure in no way impairs its functioning is 
what the picture of  language drawn in the later philosophy is all about.” (p48). Cavell provides an 
excellent discussion of  this point, and in particular, a cutting treatment of  an author who treats 
Wittgenstein as advancing a normative theory of  language use (see especially pp47–8).
82 Cf: Morris 2004, p13.
83 See Read & Hutchinson 2008, pp142–9, for just such a treatment of  this point of  contention.
great benefit84. Sadly, this thesis cannot take up Baker’s challenge – instead, we will 
continue by addressing a new problematic in Baker’s later reading. Specifically, the 
following chapter addresses Baker’s over-emphasis of  Wittgenstein’s analogy between 
therapy and philosophical investigation, and the manner in which this emphasis renders 
Baker’s later exegesis incapable of  wholly sloughing off  his earlier interventionist 
understanding of  philosophy.
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Chapter II
The Promise of Therapy
______________________
Curiosity is a vice that has been stigmatised ... I like the word however. To me it suggests 
something altogether different: it evokes ‘concern’; it evokes the care one takes for what 
exists and could exist; an acute sense of  the real which, however, never becomes fixed; a 
readiness to find our surroundings strange and singular; a certain relentlessness in ridding 
ourselves of  our familiarities and looking at things otherwise; a passion for seizing what is 
happening now and what is passing away; a lack of  respect for traditional hierarchies of  
the important and the essential.
 — Michel Foucault, ‘The Masked Philosopher’1
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Two interpretations of  the status of  a grammatical remark, and therefore of  the method 
of  grammatical investigation, were depicted and contrasted in the previous chapter. It 
was argued that accompanying these models, or rather implied by their characteristics, 
are two discrete conceptions of  the tasks that doing philosophy consists in. Adopting 
either a cartographic or aspectival understanding of  the concept of  grammar led to 
radically different notions of  what philosophy is, and how it should be applied in the 
remedy of  philosophical confusion. The present chapter is a limited critique of  what 
was judged to be the more viable interpretation, tested in, and therefore inherited from, 
the previous chapter – that of  Baker’s later reading. Specifically, we turn now to the role 
of  the philosophically confused individual, namely that individual whose problems are 
to be addressed in Wittgenstein’s later texts, and the roles he expected his reader to fulfil. 
More generally, I seeks to address the questions implicit in Wittgenstein’s cryptic 
statement that “anything your reader can do for himself, leave to him”2 — namely ‘what 
is it that is left to the reader?’ and ‘why should it be so?’
Firstly, we will examine the identity of  the reader (or accordingly the patient, or 
grammar-transgressor) as entailed by both the early and later Baker, noticing their 
similarities and dissimilarities, specifically the increased importance of  the confused 
individual’s (or patient’s) participation in, and ability to alter the procedure of, the 
process of  philosophy-as-therapy.  Secondly we will consider three accumulative3 
characteristics of  the later writing of  Wittgenstein that not only support this move 
towards an individual-relative concept of  doing philosophy, but also challenge the scope 
allowed for by the later Baker in this regard. Recasting the reader, alternately, in a more 
dynamic and less determinate role has an effect upon the way we understand the 
comparative elements of  Wittgenstein’s philosophy, leading to a more substantial 
reevaluation of  many of  the central tenets of  Baker’s model of  therapeutic philosophy. 
The tenets considered in this light are the therapeutic role of  the interlocutor, the role of 
the patient’s acknowledgement and the possibility of  their resistance as a hindrance to 
the process of  therapy. It will be argued that a choice naturally presents itself, between 
the adoption and investigation of  this new characterisation of  philosophical 
investigation, or instead an avowal of  a strict Bakerian interpretation that, while 
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work in depicting certain facets of  the text. The contention is that the reader’s imagination is purposely 
elicited through the portrayal of  open-ended scenarios, and so the three characteristics could, if  one 
preferred, be considered one. 
admitting of  its own lacunae, dismisses them as of  limited importance. Unsurprisingly, it 
will be argued as a conclusion to the chapter that, considered as a whole, the problems 
lain out here represent a critique of  what the application of  therapy might hope to 
achieve that is too significant to wholly ignore, and that therefore the opportunity to 
develop a modified model of  the later philosophy of  Wittgenstein should be grasped 
with conviction.
§2.1 Anything your reader can do for himself, leave to him
The early Baker’s conception of  grammar as bounding and determining with regard to 
the activity of  a group of  language speakers 4 – and therefore of  the role of  the 
philosopher as guardian to those boundaries of  sense as entailed by this conception – 
imply a number of  concrete characteristics. Any individual who transgresses the 
grammar of  their language, as tabulated and presented by the philosopher, is likely to 
draw nonsensical or irrelevant conclusions from their own grammatically bankrupt 
language use. The role of  the philosopher is therefore one concerned with theoretical 
generalisations in particular – whether scientific, humanistic, or philosophical – because 
of  the possibility for the establishment and circulation of  conclusions based on 
grammatically incoherent premises. While the stakes may differ, the task remains 
essentially the same, whether the transgression takes place in personal conversation or in 
peer-reviewed journals: “a philosopher has a duty as a policeman to deprive [such 
theorists] of  the enjoyment of  their ill-gotten gains.”5 Since the grammatically confused 
individual is in a muddle, and cannot find their way about their own language, they 
quite naturally cannot be considered a meaningful partner in the resolution of  their 
problems, as any statements they make on the subject of  their confusion are necessarily 
compromised by their lack of  a surview of  their own language use. Yet Baker did 
postulate that the patient, as master of  the techniques that constitute her language, 
already knows the rules of  grammar that are being violated in her confused utterances, 
and therefore only needs reminding of  them in order to cure her bafflement. As Hacker 
remarked,
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“[Problems] can be dissolved by a surview which the philosopher endeavours to attain by 
arranging the grammatical rules which he elicits from the person who suffers from the 
bafflement. The touchstone of  the correctness of  the rules he thus elicits is the language 
user not the independent judgement of  the philosopher.”6
Clearly, then, the grammatical rules by which the patient’s confusion is alleviated are 
first elicited from her by the work of  the philosopher, so why the insistence that the early 
Baker, with Hacker, leaves no significant role for his patient? Because, despite his 
stipulation that the touchstone of  correctness of  the rules thus elicited is the language 
user herself, there remains the all-important task of  qualifying the elicited responses as 
either rule-governed sense or ungrammatical nonsense; a task placed firmly in the remit 
of  the philosopher. As Hacker & Bennett later elaborate, 
“The issue is not whether a certain doctrine propounded by a dualist or a physicalist – for 
example, that the mind is a spiritual substance or that the mind is identical with the brain 
– makes sense to him, but only whether it makes sense.”7
It therefore makes as much sense to argue with the rules clearly laid out by the 
grammarian as to attempt to explain why robbery is a perfectly acceptable form of  
wealth redistribution to a policeman. Both figures of  authority would respond by 
repeating the rules that they know to have been violated by the actions of  the individual 
in question, until that individual relents, accepting the incontrovertibility of  the position. 
According to Baker and Hacker’s interpretation, therefore, “the end result, or what will 
be agreed upon, is already known in advance. Discussion will be resumed until 
agreement about grammatical reminders is reached.”8 Given that the end results of  a 
particular conceptual investigation is often known in advance, and that what is of  
concern is not whether an individual’s language use makes sense to her, but that it makes  
sense according to the rules of  grammar regarding a particularly problematic area of  
language, there remains very little for the reader to contribute, once their maladapted 
grammatical condition has been successfully elicited. The participation of  the confused 
individual in this conception of  investigation is attenuated almost entirely to an enabling 
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7 Hacker & Bennett 2003, p383.
8 Kuusela 2008, p248.
role, as both the initial source of  confusion, and the “proof ” of  the aptness of  the 
grammatical rules used in its dissolution. 
 Contrastingly, and conceived of  as “essentially dialogic”, later Bakerian therapy 
offers the hope of  a more substantial role for the individual partaking in conceptual 
investigation in partnership with the Wittgensteinian philosopher. The reason for this 
interactive element of  philosophy, as we have already seen, can be attributed to Baker’s 
advocacy of  …
	
a highly unified account of  the method which Wittgenstein tried to demonstrate by 
examples. … There is a general strategy exhibited in all the various therapies, and the 
possibility of  mastering it and transferring it to new problems gives substance to the 
conviction that the correct treatment of  each problem casts light on the correct treatment 
of  all. 
The unity of  the method turns on the application to grammar and language of  the 
concept of  an aspect (and of  the related concepts of  seeing an aspect and being blind to 
such an aspect).9
As previously argued, perspicuous representation is best understood as an achievement 
term10 that applies to the successful application of  an alternate model or object to an 
individual’s rigidly held concept of  meaning, sensation, thought, language, etc., thereby 
making perspicuous to that individual a previously neglected aspect of  language use. 
Since perspicuous representation is an achievement term, successful therapeutic 
philosophy is to be tailored to the particular conceptions of  a troubled individual and 
since, therefore, perspicuous comparisons or analogies are not asserted due to their 
incontrovertibility (as a result of  their accurate tabulations of  the grammar of  the 
patient’s concept), the therapist instead is engaged in a more open form of  dialog. This 
is because the patient’s acknowledgement is the key criteria of  successful therapy, in that 
only an individual’s recognition of  her therapist’s portrayal can mark the diagnosis as 
being correct. In this manner, the later Baker attributes an important mechanism of  
therapy to the role of  the patient – their ongoing responses literally ‘make or break’ the 
investigation, and in this regard stands in stark contrast to the inflexibility that 
characterises the insistence of  his earlier reading. The aim of  therapy is to discover the 
appropriate key with which to unlock an individual’s acknowledgement, thereby 
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initiating the process of  conceptual clarification and resolution. Thus therapy is a “hit 
and miss process”11 of  diagnosis, whereby the therapist tests the waters through various 
proposed analogies and comparisons, seeking to uncover the unacknowledged pictures 
that are generating that particular patient’s mental cramps, obsessions and prejudices.12 
This reflexive attention to the problems of  the patient is why Baker describes the role of  
the philosopher as one demanding patience, imagination and creativity13. 
As the patient in this model, one confesses to the suitability of  a certain proposed 
analogy or account to one’s own ways of  thinking, or rejects that same account as 
inappropriate, and the therapist then responds by trying alternate models; therefore a 
variety of  patient responses are validated as relevant and important to the process of  
philosophy, and the argument will not continue in the same vain regardless of  the 
patient’s protestations precisely because the subject of  investigation are the patient’s own 
expressions. Despite this, the proposed comparative models are conceived of, 
constructed, and variegated by one’s therapeutic philosopher, no matter the fact that 
their efficacy is dependant on the benediction of  the confessing patient. In this limited 
sense, Baker can be placed in relative proximity to the interpretation he previously 
shared with his friend and colleague, Peter Hacker. Philosophy is posited as an applied 
art, substantiated and given purpose by its treatment of  an actual individual, but that 
treatment’s success, character and imaginative innovation still remain firmly in the 
therapist’s remit. While the role of  the patient greatly exceeds its equivalent in his earlier 
interpretation, it still subsists upon the far more philosophically profound role of  the 
therapist, and is dependant upon it in the hope of  achieving perspicuity. The subject of  
therapy is the particular confusion of  the patient, rather than some ‘grammar at large’, 
and so his interpretation of  the process is thought of  as “radically individualistic because 
it demands the active participation of  the ‘patient’ in a discussion. He must explain what 
he wants to say, how he wants to define expressions; he must acknowledge the pictures 
that influence him; he is invited to adopt novel ways of  ordering things; and so on.”14 In 
a sense, much of  the following chapter is concerned with demonstrating exactly why 
Baker’s use here of  the adjective ‘radically’ is somewhat misplaced when characterising 
his own exegetical position. 
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11 NA, p214, and here Baker’s account is presumably meant to echo the criss-cross, circling, multi-
perspectival nature of  Wittgenstein’s writing.
12 Ibid, p184.
13 Ibid, pp11, 149 &  291. Cf: Chapter VI’s revised notion of  the importance of  creativity.
14 Ibid, p181.
Consider that Wittgenstein stipulated that his readers need “to get down to the 
application of  our concepts” in order to find different, alleviating dimensions of  their 
possible employment.15 He constantly stresses that we should take responsibility for 
looking at and thinking about our use of  our words afresh,16 yet by Baker’s account the 
achievement of  a perspectival shift in the way one understands a certain part of  one’s 
own language use is caused by one’s therapist — not, oddly, by oneself. The question 
that seems quite natural to ask here is: ‘to what extent, if  any, is Wittgenstein’s reader 
required to partially fabricate the means of  their own perspectival comparison?’ 
In answering this question, and in substantiating why it is at all relevant, what 
can be found when one turns to the structure of  interactions presented in the 
Investigations for clarification? If  the completion of  such comparative tasks were clearly 
and visibly predetermined and presented by Wittgenstein, we should expect to witness 
common occurrences of  this sort: ‘look and see if  this model manipulates this 
conception so that your problem disappears’. This kind of  concrete example is certainly 
not impossible to find, (see, e.g., PI §341, §360) but it is uncommon in comparison to 
Wittgenstein’s more prevalent methods of  provoking perspicuous representations in his 
reader. The comparative scenarios17 that constitute a significant part of  the text are 
commonly underdetermined in structure, interrogative in form, and capable of  
sustaining multiple interpretations. It is to be argued that the contingent determinations, 
answers and interpretations provided by the reader in response to the incompleteness of  
such scenarios are the moments at which perspicuous representation is achieved, rather 
than in the tailored precision of  a scenario that forces the dawning of  a new aspect upon 
the reader. Hence his reader should not be surprised if  “there has emerged, not a single 
clear portrait, but a series of  competing and often wildly contradictory Wittgensteins.”18 
I posit that the following three accumulative characteristics are useful indicators of  the 
text’s investigative structure that are in danger of  being somewhat marginalised by 
Baker’s account of  perspicuous representation, and that their consideration should bear 
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15 PI p200.
16 Eg PI §66. “He has the great gift of  always seeing things as if  for the first time. But it shows, I think, 
how difficult collaborative work with him is, since he is always following up the inspiration of  the moment 
and demolishing what he has previously sketched out.” – Waismann, quoted in NA, p16.
17 If, contra Baker, such examples were not considered to constitute objects of  comparison, due to their 
lack of  synoptic surview of  rules of  grammar (cf: Hacker 2004, p328), then the following three 
characteristics are still relevant to a percentage of  the text of  the Investigations far greater in significance 
than those that could be taken to satisfy his particular definition of  objects of  comparison, and thus still 
represent a qualification to be considered seriously by those sympathetic to Hacker’s positions. 
18 Kahane, Kanterian & Kuusela, p2.
some greater part in deciding the manner in which the achievement of  perspicuity is 
advocated by the author.
i) Imaginative: We find in the Investigations over 180 direct requests for the reader to 
“think themselves into the skin”19 of  a peculiar comparative situation, along with 
countless other indirect examples of  Wittgenstein providing scenarios that are intended 
to prompt an imaginative response from the reader.20 The reader is asked to try21 to 
think in a certain way, to conduct experiments22 with the words they use, to suppose23 
radically odd conditions for language use, and to imagine24 games and contexts that alter 
the angle from which one views a subject.  We can label these imaginative prompts 
‘scenarios’ and assert (similarly to Baker, cf: NA pp24 & 29) that they make up the bulk 
of  what Wittgenstein referred to as “objects of  comparison”. This method can be 
broadly characterised as one of  prompting the person considering them into imagining 
alternate possibilities of  language use that are often non-factual, fictional or even 
absurd. 
For this reason, the imaginative role of  the reader is a key determinant of  
philosophy, with the act of  imagination that of  inventing possible ways a scenario can be 
applied or compared with one’s current understanding. This imaginative and therefore 
implicational role can be understood as a form of  ‘proof ’ of  a scenario’s applicability to 
that reader, in the resolution of  her philosophical problems.25 It would be a mistake, 
however, to consider imagination as an end in itself  – as if  the author desired proof  of  
whether his reader possessed the ‘capacity’ to imagine a particular factual or fictional 
state of  affairs – it is rather a means of  achieving a desired investigative goal. Such 
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19 MS 137, p136b: 1948.
20 One example from many would be: “For how can I go so far as to try to use language to get between 
pain and its expression?” (PI, §245)
21 e.g. PI, §§154, 161, 303, 335, 420, 624, ii, iii, p215.
22 e.g. PI, §§161, 166, 169, 510.
23 PI, §§33, 33, 34, 41, 52, 56, 57, 60, 62, 71, 72, 80, 86, 87, 88, 89, 139, 139, 141, 141, 145, 145, 146, 
151, 157, 159, 160, 160, 162, 163, 163, 167, 181, 184, 185, 200, 206, 256, 267, 270, 288, 293, 295, 318, 
328, 349, 350, 441, 451, 465, 509, 509, 512, 522, 540, 552 551, 584, 646, 648, 658, iii, iv ,v, vi, p182, 
p183, vii, p191, p214 & p228.
24 PI, §§9, 14, 21, 23, 31, 33, 41, 42, 44, 50, 53, 56, 60, 64, 77, 83, 84, 86, 87, 88, 106, 138, 143, 151, 160, 
166, 170, 172, 173, 179, 194, 195, 200, 207, 208, 216, 218, 232, 237, 243, 251, 258, 265, 270, 271, 279, 
282, 284, 293, 295, 310, 312, 323, 331, 346, 351, 367, 370, 386, 390, 391, 392, 393, 394, 398, 407, 409, 
430, 450, 493, 512, 522, 528, 536, 539, 554, 556, 577, 653, 657, 665, 666, 667 & 670.
25 cf: PI, p213.
requests aren’t “about a particular power of  my own imagination, in the way that ‘I can 
lift this stone’ is about the power of  my own muscles.”26 Instead, engaging the reader’s 
imagination is a key to changing their inclination or habits of  comparison, as the request 
to imagine a certain scenario is in part a request for the reader to experiment with the 
possible senses in which something can be sensibly represented, rather than a test of  a 
particular person’s imaginative skills.
Wittgenstein’s repeated requests for imaginative involvement with his text can 
therefore be understood as a means to a particular end: his reader’s achieving a series of 
aspectival shifts. By exploring the different patterns by which one can view a subject, 
such patterns can be recognized for what they are — habitual modes of  representation 
— rather than being stipulated as belonging to the subject of  enquiry itself.27 The 
particularity of  an individual’s conception is elicited and disclosed through her own 
contingent imaginative investigation and acceptance of  a particular scenario28 — hence  
grammatical investigation entails imaginative investigation.29 
 There are therefore many good reasons to pay attention to the importance of  
imagination in conceptual investigation, with Wittgenstein’s own repeated emphasis not 
being least of  these. If  “nothing is more important for teaching us to understand the 
concepts we have than constructing fictitious ones”,30 and if  we are encouraged to play 
out hundreds of  imaginary scenarios, and if  our interaction with them is considered by 
their author to be a method by which we might be brought to a perspicuous 
representation that is contingent upon our own particular language use, then the 
reader’s imagination can be considered a vital aspect in our understanding of  the later 
Wittgenstein’s methods. Interestingly, at one point in the Investigations, Wittgenstein asks 
himself, and his reader, where one hears such requests as “Imagine that …” in contexts 
other than the overtly philosophical ones he initiates himself, and responds thus: “We 
say, for example, to someone who has to play a theatrical part: “Here you must imagine 
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26 PG, p128.
27 “When I speak of  a pattern in my mental catalogue, or of  a sheath into which an object fits if  it is 
familiar, what I would like to say is that the sheath in my mind is, as it were, the “form of  imagining”, so 
that it isn’t possible for me to say of  a pattern that it is in my mind unless it really is there.—The pattern 
as it were retires into my mind, so that it is no longer presented to it as an object.” (PG, p180)
28 PI, §144.
29 For example, “The variety a thought experiment is of  course not an experiment at all. At bottom it is a 
grammatical investigation.” (PR, p52) And: “The sentence “I can imagine the transition”, like “this state 
of  affairs can be drawn”, connects the linguistic representation with another form of  representation; it is 
to be understood as a proposition of  grammar.” (PG, p128)
30 CV, p74.
that this man is in pain and is concealing it”—and now we give him no directions, do 
not tell him what he is actually to do… We now watch the actor who is imagining this 
situation.”31 Watching the response of  the actor (or oneself  in response to the author’s 
prompt) is the point of  the request – it is not a command where one is precisely told 
what is required of  one, or what the ‘correct’ response is in a given scenario. One 
passage in particular stands out as a compelling account of  the kind of  level of  
involvement that might be expected of  the reader when this requirement to imagine is 
invoked. It demonstrates how Wittgenstein conceived of  such an undertaking as an 
empowering process of  investigation, quite alien to the predetermined responses 
portrayed earlier: 
Let us ask now, not "Can there be such a thing?" but "What do we imagine?" So give free 
rein to your imagination. You can have things now just as you choose. You only need to say how 
you want them. So (just) make a verbal picture, illustrate it as you choose—by drawing, 
comparisons, etc.! Thus you can—as it were—prepare a blueprint.—And now there 
remains the question how to work from it.32
ii) Open-endedness: To this end, imaginative objects of  comparison often require the 
reader’s involvement in completing them. This requirement can take the form of  a 
dense network of  interrelated questions in which it is unclear that there is a “correct” 
answer in the author’s mind.33 There are scenarios in which certain aspects of  what is 
being described might strike the reader as incomplete, misleading, or symptomatic of  an 
as-yet unrevealed philosophical problem (e.g. §1’s “five red apples”34), or which need 
further work before we can see their purpose. (e.g. §24) The importance of  this 
dimension of  text is that by imagining and completing the tasks, the reader is wilfully 
deployed and involved in their own problem’s dissolution. The reader is left with a 
number of  choices to make about what is being discussed and how it fits into 
Wittgenstein’s previous and proceeding remarks. Through this response, and by these 
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31 PI §393.
32 Z §275, the first emphasis is mine.
33 E.g. “Describe the aroma of  coffee.—Why can't it be done? Do we lack the words? And for what are 
words lacking?—But how do we get the idea that such a description must after all be possible? Have you 
ever felt the lack of  such a description? Have you tried to describe the aroma and not succeeded?” (PI 
§610)
34 See Read and Hutchinson’s excellent analysis of  the incomplete surreality of  this particular scenario, in 
2005, p445.
decisions, the comparative scenarios inflate and become more intricate and concrete, 
according to the particular imaginative “blueprint” that is thereby designed. Thus by 
employing an underdetermined style of  comparison, and by leaving it to his reader to 
do a great deal of  work for themselves, Wittgenstein manages to elicit wilful, contingent 
interaction through a developmental process of  renegotiation and ambiguity. This is one 
particularly fruitful way of  doing greater justice to Baker’s comment that the text is 
“radically individualistic”.35 Inhabiting the scenarios prepared for the reader, and 
thereby “thinking one’s way into the skin” of  a different perspective, is a relevant aspect 
of  Wittgenstein’s comparative methods, one that is intimately tied to the open-ended 
structure of  the Investigations. The crucial premise here is that often the specific shift in 
perspective is not completely defined by the scenario that initiated the perspectival 
change, but is partially an achievement of  the investigation of  the reader. This entails 
that such scenarios’ applications are varied in completion according to the reader’s 
context, and thus that not only are perspicuous representations varied according to their 
particular reader, but the actual objects of comparison too are themselves underdetermined 
models that are intricated by their employment. We can stipulate therefore that objects 
of  comparison, and the perspicuous representation they are intended to incite, are both 
commonly imaginative and remain curtailed until taken up and imagined by a 
particular individual; only then, in this sense, do they qualify as such. 
We should not, therefore, treat as inconsequential the remark that “anything the 
reader can do for himself, leave it to the reader.”36 It is indicative of  a methodological 
commitment, namely that it is the performance of  the reader which fulfills the aims of  
the text. This constitutes a radically literal reading of  Wittgenstein’s famous remark that  
“[w]ork on philosophy is – as work in architecture frequently is – actually more of  a 
kind of  work on oneself. On one's own conception. On the way one sees things. (And 
what one demands of  them.)37 It is literal because it takes the remark as a face value 
qualification of  what Wittgenstein’s philosophy is intended to be, rather than seeking to 
hierarchically place it under, or make it dependant upon, far less explicit qualifications 
of  his notion of  philosophy (see §§2.2 & 2.3). 
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35 NA, p181.
36 MS 137, 25.12.1948.
37 P, p87.
iii) Incitive. 
It’s no accident that I’m using so many interrogative sentences in this book.38
The interrogative nature of  the Investigations is no mere foible of  style. During the 
Investigations the reader is posed over 1,450 explicit questions, done so in a manner 
whereby it is often far from clear how one is expected to answer them, whether one can 
expect to answer them at all, and even whether the voices that pose such questions can 
be considered reliable or not. Clearly this interrogative mode is a cornerstone of  
Wittgenstein’s later methods39. The success of  such an endeavour is dependent, then, 
upon contracting the reader in the resolution of  their particular conceptual problems, in 
the light cast by a series of  objects of  comparison. The active agent for change is the 
reader, and the manner by which the activity progresses involves the eliciting of  
comparisons in the resolution of  philosophical difficulty. This difficulty is one closely tied 
to Wittgenstein’s notion of  philosophy being a difficulty of  the will.40 “It is a difficulty 
which I can’t remove if  I try to make you see the problems. I can’t give you a startling 
solution which suddenly will remove all your difficulties. I can’t find one key which will 
unlock the door of  our safe.”41 
 The provision of  incomplete and imaginative scenarios is intended not to provide a 
complete set of  conceptual templates by which an individual might have their problems 
indubitably resolved. “They are only meant to enable the reader to shift for himself when 
he encounters conceptual difficulties.”42 Their intent is not so much predictive or 
exhaustive then, but incitive of  a performance that will hopefully occur after the reader’s 
encounter with the text. For the reader to achieve such a shift for themselves they are 
first required to perceive the deficiencies and distortions that may be part of  their 
particular conception, presumably as a prerequisite for undertaking such work: 
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39 “One could teach philosophy solely by asking questions.” (AWL, p97)
40 See Chapter III for a complete discussion of  the notion of  will and its role in grammatical investigation.
41 MS 153b, p30; also see Chapter III.
42 PI, p206, my emphasis.
I must be nothing more than the mirror in which my reader sees his own thinking with all 
its deformities & with this assistance can set it in order.43
 
Note that in this fragment, and in examples presented earlier, not only is the significant 
philosophical work tasked to the reader – namely the timely shifting of  perspective when 
one encounters conceptual difficulties, or the setting in order of  one’s own thoughts – 
but further, the perception of  the conceptual deformity that might incite such work is 
also to be achieved by the reader. Rather than making a series of  accusations, 
Wittgenstein’s role is to provide ‘assistive’ portrayals in which certain grammatical 
confusions are substantiated, giving his reader the opportunity to both recognise his own 
confusions, and see certain avenues of  investigation for their resolution. (The manner in 
which Wittgenstein wilfully depicts the interlocutor in order to portray confusion is the 
discussion we shall soon be turning to.) 
 Wittgenstein frequently rebuts a possible alternative to this model of  philosophy, 
where the demonstration and adoption of  static models of  comparison lead to a stable 
continuity of  a recognisable doctrine or school of  philosophy. He remarked that he 
should hope only for a most indirect effect upon his reader, he was far from certain that 
he wished for a continuation of  his work by others, seemed to perceive philosophy as 
ideally a process whereby one is stirred to think about a proposed subject for oneself, 
and held that philosophical positions should not be “arrived at by any process other than 
an honest and wholehearted strenuous endeavour to find out the truth for oneself.”44 As 
with all complex systems – philosophical or otherwise – a few small changes can result in 
that system outputting disproportionately large differences in outcome. I premise that 
neglecting the incitement of  the reader’s imagination, as elicited throughout a great 
many open-ended objects of  comparison, has led to a somewhat problematic emphasis 
in the therapeutic interpretation upon the role of  the therapist, and on the text of  the 
Investigations as a template for how to go about playing that role. In such a reading, I will 
argue, the role of  the interlocutor becomes substantively vital.
§2.2 The interlocutor 45 
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44 Gasking & Jackson 1967, p53.
45 I will, for the sake of  brevity, refer to the interlocutor in the singular. This does not reflect any exegetical 
assumption on my part.
There are a number of  reasons why Baker’s reading of  the interlocutorial voices in 
Wittgenstein’s later work is of  particular relevance here. Firstly, Baker’s interpretation 
treats conceptual investigation as an undertaking “essentially dialogic” in character. His 
claim that “Wittgenstein conceived of  philosophy primarily as a kind of  therapy”46 is 
therefore a literal one – philosophy is essentially dialogic in that it discursively treats the 
conceptual confusions of  an individual through a process of  hit and miss diagnoses, 
proposed analogies and shared grammatical investigations, even if  the patient is 
imaginary, oneself, or as we shall consider later, an idealised, fluid equivocation of  the 
two. We could therefore expect the dialogue in a text so interpreted to bear a great deal 
of  methodological weight as a demonstrative element, and thus to be a fruitful subject 
for critical appraisal. Similarly, such an interpretation is most likely to express a form of  
bias in its treatment of  dialogue, if  its purpose is to frame the entire text as pivotally 
dialogic and therefore instructive of  how to resolve someone’s confused and knotted 
thinking for them.47 Secondly, the earlier shift of  emphasis achieved in §2.1 is one based 
on exegesis and makes claims regarding the purpose, style, and inferred method of  the 
text it examines. Therefore if  it cannot account for the interlocutor in a satisfactory way, 
its explanatory force will be substantially weakened. Conversely, if  it can usefully give an 
account of  the device in a manner symmetric to those aspects earlier established, then 
there would seem, on the one hand, far less reason to posit the interlocutorial device as 
symptomatic of  the literally therapeutic intentions of  the text, and on the other, an 
opportunity to demonstrate the commensurability of  the general account established so 
far. Finally, if  a form of  misrepresentation of  the interlocutor is perpetrated in Baker’s 
interpretation, it will surely lead to an unwarranted emphasis and activity out of  kilter 
with the localised, acute aims of  the author of  the Investigations, thus being an example of 
the kind of  disproportionately large outcome caused by a limited oversight, as recently 
considered. 
The Investigations’ interlocutor is portrayed in Baker’s commentary as “the 
average member of  the audience of  Wittgenstein’s seminars at Cambridge”.48 It may be 
assumed that the nondescript identity of  the book’s interlocutor is a positive aspect of  
the device, in that by not designating a specific interlocutor, as for example Plato chose 
to do, Wittgenstein is able to present a generalised account of  the average positions, 
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47 see NA, pp149 & 218.
48 NA, p113.
objections, and ideas that a philosopher is likely to encounter, and be tempted by, in the 
process of  therapy. For Baker, Wittgenstein’s frequent employment of  double quotation 
marks “commonly pick[s] out … words of  an imaginary speaker in a dialogue, although 
the replies (Wittgenstein’s own?) occur without quotation-marks.”49 To this end, 
Wittgenstein is presented as seeking to bring to life a series of  tendencies, confusions or 
arguments that the reader is likely to meet with when practicing therapeutic philosophy, 
either on herself  or with her own ‘interlocutor’, by inventing and substantiating an 
imaginary speaker with which to demonstrate his therapeutic methods. This is done by 
means of  “an imaginary dialogue with an indefinite someone”,50 in which Wittgenstein 
“reigns in” the confused assertions of  an intelligent, but slightly naïve individual who, 
despite palpable difficulties, is keen to escape from the grammatical bear-traps she has 
put her foot in.51 Wittgenstein, then, is often taken to be demonstrating a method that 
might potentially be adopted and used by those who read his work – if  the interlocutor 
does represent an idealised dialogist of  some form, it is sensible for his reader to perceive 
such a voice as the expression of  a set of  predictions as to the quandaries that 
Wittgenstein considered us most likely to succumb to. 
While this reading may appear uncontroversial upon first inspection, its adoption 
entails a number of  definite characteristics for what Wittgenstein’s later project hoped to 
achieve, the methods it employed in pursuit of  its goals, and what the continuation of  
his methods – but practiced by other philosophers – might look like. For if  by our 
familiarity with the interlocutorial positions and responses we are able to identify the 
very same quandaries in ourselves, or more pertinently in others, then we might hope to 
‘do as Wittgenstein did’ and apply dialog therapy in a way similar to that found in the 
Investigations. We would essentially employ the interlocutorial voice as a modular set of  
templates or guidelines for this undertaking. By casting the interlocutor in this role, 
Baker assigns to Wittgenstein a complex set of  interconnected hypotheses that identifies 
philosophical disquiets and demonstrably explains how they can be predicted, diagnosed 
and relieved. What evidence is present for such an interpretation? Well, considering the 
purpose of  the interlocutor as “demonstrative” of  an ideal dialogic process might be 
considered sympathetic to references to method such as that found in §133. And 
Wittgenstein did indeed remark that a philosopher who never took part in discussion 
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50 NA, p127.
51 cf: NA, p113.
was analogous to a boxer who never stepped foot in the ring, thus possibly qualifying 
discussion as sine qua non for his methods of  philosophy – what looks to potentially be a 
short step from asserting, as Baker does, that philosophy is essentially dialogic. 
Treating the interlocutor as a direct demonstration of  how to proceed in the 
therapy of  others or oneself  leads to a position where it is read as Wittgenstein’s 
uncanny attempt to depict for the would-be therapist the imagined likely responses of  
those who suffer from philosophical confusion. Imagine – the interlocutor could be a 
‘layman’ with nascent tendencies, a philosopher of  science or the therapist herself, and 
the interlocutorial demonstration might have been authored twenty, forty, or sixty years 
previous to the event of  a particular disquiet or assertion it was intended to address, with 
the author of  course having never met this particular interlocutor, perhaps never even 
been party to their language or culture. If  we are certain we wish to conceive of  the 
interlocutor in this way, then we are left with the premise that Wittgenstein’s 
representations of  the typical/possible respondents to philosophical quandaries display a 
stable quality, quite independent of  a particular conceptual confusion’s owner. It is 
difficult to see how Baker’s account of  Wittgenstein’s notion of  the person-relative, 
radically individualistic nature of  philosophy accords with an assertion of  the 
interlocutor in a predictive or diagnostic way. For from such a position it looks as if  the 
success of  the Investigations, in a rather ironic turn, would hang upon the degree of  
universal application that can be accredited to the remarks and portrayals of  such 
dialogues, thus potentially resulting in the project of  conceptual investigation being 
dependent upon census for its claims of  efficacy. Failure to do so would make the text 
irrelevant through inaccuracy — for what would be the use in a device whose purpose 
was to ideally diagnose and rectify philosophical problems, yet failed to portray the 
problems it was meant to dissolve? 
If  the interlocutor were the predictive/demonstrative element of  the Investigations 
– the average member of  a philosophy seminar as it were – it would effectively represent 
Wittgenstein’s substantiation of  the role of  the patient, with the “Wittgensteinian” voice 
standing as the avatar for therapy. Yet in our previous reconceptualisation of  the role of  
the reader, three characteristics of  that role were identified and substantiated. Together, 
they presented a picture of  a process of  investigation remarkable in its demand upon the 
imagination and self-determination of  the person involved with it, and one radically 
heuristic in its aims. Either this picture is wholly incorrect, or the interlocutor-as-patient 
is, for they are divergent models of  how to encourage intellectual engagement. From 
those three characteristics, and from certain remarks made in writing and conversation 
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by Wittgenstein, we can justify an understanding of  his brand of  philosophy as not 
intended to be replicable, but stimulative and heterogeneous in effect52. The manner of  
stimulation his writing offered was not intended to be a stable system upon which a 
school could be founded53, but rather to be judged by its variable effects upon those who 
used it, and the changes it might bring about.54 It was sensitive to the time in which it 
was written, and might indeed appear to be banal or gibberish to people of  a later 
time,55 or even to those of  his own time who did not suffer from the same problems as 
he.56 Its author hoped it to have only the most indirect of  influences,57 and was acutely 
opposed to imitation, of  thoughts learnt, not discovered for oneself.58 Above all, we can 
say that Wittgenstein’s philosophy was intended to exemplify (and incite) a kind of  
working on one’s own conceptions, and what one expects from those conceptions, in a 
manner not limited to or predicted by its textual progenitor.59 As his student, Britton 
recalls,  
If  we took a book seriously, he would say, it ought to puzzle us so much that we would 
throw it across the room and think about the problems for ourselves.60 
In this light, it seems more sensible to understand the interlocutor as a method of  
expressing such a working on oneself, of  speaking forcefully of  the tendencies and 
shortcomings that the author found in his own thought, depicted in order to bring about 
a heterogeneous kind of  work in its readers; that is, to inspire, not inculcate. If  this is the 
more accurate treatment of  the interlocutorial device, then when we read his later work 
we are not reading Wittgenstein’s philosophy, contingently packaged in easily-digested, 
follow-my-lead dialogues, but rather witnessing Wittgenstein’s best attempt at giving 
voice to the wide scope of  grammatical confusions and anxieties that he himself  
struggled to emancipate himself  from, using dialogue analogously to give a developing, 
56
52 Cf: PI Preface.
53 Cf: MS 134, p143.
54 Cf: ibid & PI Preface.
55 CV, p43.
56 BB, pp58-9.
57 MS 134, 143: 13.
58 Cf: Gasking and Jackson, p53, Heller, p91, & PI, Preface.
59 P, §86.
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interactive voice to the character of  such problems. There is no predictive mechanism at 
work in Wittgenstein’s choice of  a certain interlocutorial objection or rejoinder, but an 
invitation to a joint investigation of  the permutations and misleading habits encouraged 
by particular conceptions: the interlocutor is his best descriptive account of  these 
possibilities and permutations. The central aim of  it would then be best understood as 
the portrayal of  “the state of  affairs before the contradiction is resolved.”61 It is not 
exclusively wayward,62 nor exclusively alius Wittgenstein,63 as could be expected from 
Baker’s interpretation: it is a patterned evocation of  thought, intended to give life to the 
civil status of  a philosophical contradiction, a device that again and again shows the 
ways in which things commonly turn out otherwise than foreseen.64 As both a record 
and the performance of  the temptations and confusions that Wittgenstein struggled 
with, the interlocutorial voices are the coins struck from every mistake.65
From the point of  view of  this reading we therefore do not witness so much a 
performance of  many characters, some confused, others clear-sighted, but rather a mind 
diagnosing and confronting its own actual and potential temptations, generalisations, 
anxieties, conceptions and unsubstantiated assertions.66 This self-work is not ‘merely’ 
stylistic, but integral to his proposed model of  philosophical investigation, for 
Wittgenstein maintained that “if  a false thought is so much as expressed boldly & clearly, 
a great deal has already been gained.”67
 It is helpful to remember, in conjunction with this characteristic of  his writing, 
Wittgenstein’s remark that “[n]early all my writings are private conversations with 
myself. Things that I say to myself  tête-á-tête.”68 While it is equally true that Wittgenstein 
commented of  his work that one should not busy oneself  with what presumably only 
applies to oneself,69 it is viable to suppose that the wide-scale applicability envisaged by 
many of  his interpreters, and thus the accompanying need for positing a method which 
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entails the possibility of  such application, is an exegetical theme not wholly native to his 
later works. In this way, a self-interrogative reading of  the Investigations’ interlocutor has 
an effect on how we perceive what it is that Wittgenstein is doing and advocating, 
bringing it more into line with his many comments regarding his methods’ unsuitability 
for wide-scale replication, while also, to a limited degree, contradicting Baker’s account. 
For Baker, “philosophical investigation must take the form of  a dialogue, whether the 
interlocutor be real (in a class in Cambridge) or imaginary (in the text of  the private 
language argument).”70 It is a clear illustration of  his commitment to a certain style of  
philosophy that, of  the above qualification that nearly all of  Wittgenstein’s writings are 
private conversations he had with himself, Baker takes as the pivotal nature of  
conceptual investigation that it is overwhelmingly discursive, rather than overwhelmingly self-
investigative. The first move extends a phrase (“conversation”) to include activity and 
participants that contradict Wittgenstein’s original qualification; the second constitutes a 
less problematic restatement of  this remark.  Therefore Baker’s treating these tête-á-tête 
remarks as “the record of  a discussion (real or imaginary) between a philosopher-
therapist and a patient undergoing ‘philosophical analysis’”71 is a suspect generalisation.
If  as stipulated here, the polyphonous72 nature of  the Investigations is an integral 
stylistic technique used to simultaneously portray self  investigation while inciting the 
reader to do likewise, then Baker’s methodological “must” is a misunderstanding – one 
which places non-dialogical work on oneself  as something subordinate to the larger set 
of  philosophical investigation, or at the very least, shifts attention away from such 
activity towards one founded on a generalisation. If  instead we choose to perceive the 
interlocutor as a textual technique, used to play out a series of  interlocking thoughts, 
and as a way of  recording and developing the ‘life’ of  the precipitate tendencies and 
anxieties Wittgenstein experienced over a sixteen-year period of  philosophical 
investigation, then consequently we find ourselves abruptly limited in regards to the 
ways we might feel comfortable employing the notion of  “interlocutor”. 
For example, Baker and many other commentators use the term “interlocutor” 
to refer to a participant in therapy, a method by which a person is brought to 
acknowledge and accept new aspects or comparisons which compromise the previous 
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pictures that captivated their way of  thinking73. Here the word “interlocutor” is used to 
describe an ideal or actual individual, engaged in therapeutic dialogue with the 
Wittgensteinian philosopher, whether “the interlocutor be real (in a class in Cambridge) 
or imaginary (in the text of  the private language argument).”74 Hutchinson and Read 
similarly remark that “perspicuity is accorded to the presentation that achieves the 
bringing to light of  new aspects which are freely accepted by one’s philosophical 
interlocutor.”75 Tthe interlocutor is qualified as just that person upon whom therapy is 
performed.76 From here the potential for equivocation becomes clear; namely a 
bifurcation between a series of  specific textual techniques used to sketch out the author’s 
personal disquiets, and the living, breathing person whom one is addressing from the 
adopted role of  philosophical therapist. For if  the interlocutor makes sense as a textual 
technique used by Wittgenstein to record his own temptations and problematic 
philosophical habits, there are limited justifications remaining for us to comprehend and 
interpret a different person through the lens of  these recordings. Why would it be useful 
to hold up Wittgenstein’s “album”, and try to discern the manner in which the sketches 
contained therein allow us to diagnose and treat other people? Even granting that it 
might well work in some cases, (in other words, a method far from general in effect), this 
practice still raises the following concerns.
An interlocutorial equivocation appears unjust to both Wittgenstein’s textual 
technique and the philosopher who sits before us. As already noted, if  one treats 
Wittgenstein’s voice as constituting the author’s pre-empting, or characterisation, of  the 
kinds of  confusions one is likely to run into in philosophy, his method starts to look more 
universal in intent and hence disrespectful of  the peculiarities of  a person’s contingent 
disquiet – or equally, their lack thereof  – that it may be used to try to diagnose and treat. 
Pre-emption also runs counter to the notion that Wittgenstein sought indirect effects 
from his work, sought to create no followers or teachers of  his work, and intended only 
the stimulation of  his reader’s thoughts, rather than the imposition of  his own, for it 
suggests a stable mode of  resolution for a stable type of  problem. The painful struggle to 
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square Wittgenstein’s work with his self-professed non-theoretical method runs through a 
great deal of  exegesis in the field, and in the light cast here stems from consideration of  
the method on display in the Investigations as being directly intended for the establishment 
and training of  a cadre of  philosophers who practice philosophy upon others as 
Wittgenstein apparently does, namely ‘therapeutically’, with the interlocutor acting as 
the crucial demonstrative element in our apprenticeship. The conversations of  one man 
with himself  become the template by which one adopts a discursive position in relation 
to other philosophers, and the voices that were meant to depict the temptations and 
developments of  their author now function as a pedagogical tool by which we learn 
philosophy as an interruptive therapeutic treatment of  diseased intellects. 
This equivocation equally seems to usher the “interlocutor” one engages with in 
discourse into a pre-configured characterisation of  a mistake or tendency (one that 
Wittgenstein experienced and investigated); the therapist apparently exercises her 
acquired ability to perceive her interlocutor’s orchestrating picture of  language beneath 
their complex and substantiated arguments, thus allowing the detail, research, 
explanative force and robustness of  their argument to be potentially accounted for as the 
signature symptoms of  a mind in the grip of  a picture. The therapist who would employ 
such a technique is in danger of  perceiving their interlocutor in a pre-determined way, 
mapping onto their problems a treatment to which they must either willingly undergo, 
or face a potential diagnosis of  captivation, denial or even worse, should the therapy 
prove ineffective, of  lacking philosophical problems.77 It is telling that this kind of  
activity would appear to be in direct opposition to a number of  caveats left by the 
author. When framing his work, Wittgenstein often reiterated that their effects were 
conditional upon a very specific type of  reader, in that his philosophy might only prove 
useful for those already in possession of  a similar style or spirit of  thought, uncommon 
in number, who demonstrate a kind of  rebelliousness or dissatisfaction.78 If  this notion 
of  philosophy’s condition of  suitability is related to its reader’s already established 
instinct for rebellion, and is only likely to be present in a few of  his readers, then why 
would we seek to square Wittgenstein’s interlocutorial technique as being predictive or 
demonstrative of  a wide range of  stable behaviour? 
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As suggested in 2.1, it looks more likely that we should not see his interlocutorial 
dialogues as intended to directly causally trigger a shift in his reader’s concepts or 
notions – the most we should want to say is that they are intended to incite the reader 
into being able to shift for themselves when they encounter conceptual difficulties, 
perhaps in a manner unforeseen by their author.79 It seems even more pressing that we 
should not see it as our duty to seek to causally trigger such a shift in others, acting as a 
kind of  proxy for Wittgenstein, by employing an equivocation in which a textual 
technique is taken as a stable divination of  what problem will occur and what technique 
will resolve it. It follows from this that any role of  “therapist” (if  we feel we must retain 
this reference to Investigations §133) should be enacted by the reader herself, having been 
successfully prompted into undertaking the succession of  questioning-tasks implied by 
the Investigations’ peculiar, unresolved, interlocutorial style.
We have now seen why the positing of  the interlocutor as a predictive element is 
not harmless. Emphasis upon the interlocutor as a dialectic medium, predictive tool or 
imaginary wayward philosopher deteriorates the emphasis that Wittgenstein placed 
upon philosophy as a kind of  work on oneself, instead leading to a situation in which 
talk-cures, diseases of  the mind, diagnosis and treatment are all established ways of  
describing his method, with therapy seriously considered as a task that needs to be 
performed upon the diseased concepts of  fellow faculty members. We will therefore 
provisionally reject Baker’s ‘oratio recta’ interpretation of  the array of  voices found in 
Investigations, and instead consider Wittgenstein’s dense spectrum of  suppositions, 
objections and questions as a set of  thematic devices intended to achieve his oft-stated 
aim. Namely, to aid his reader in learning to do philosophy in a new way, using himself  as  
a substantive model80 of  what this philosophy looks like in practice, so that the reader, 
having acknowledged, to some degree, the relevance of  these self-investigative accounts 
to their own conceptual habits, is stirred to set about working on their own conceptions 
of  how things are and what they expect from them. 
§2.3 The function of acknowledgement
There remains the question of  acknowledgement, its role in the therapeutic reading, 
and how such an incitive reading as the one presented here might make alternate sense 
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of  it. As the defining function of  the ‘patient’ role accompanying  that of  the 
Wittgensteinian philosopher, it is of  particular relevance to this chapter. It is also, as we 
shall see, an element so crucial to Baker’s interpretation that to neglect it would be to 
present a fractured, incomplete schema of  his therapeutic reading. This section will 
therefore examine acknowledgement as a criterion for therapy, challenging Baker’s 
interpretation of  who it is hoped for, and how it might be achieved. An alternate 
understanding of  Wittgenstein’s call for acknowledgement will be proposed, one that 
makes the process of  eliciting it coextensive with the contracting of  the reader in 
conceptual investigation, rather than positing it as the flag to be captured through 
insightful therapeutic manoeuvring. For Baker, the patient’s acknowledgement, of  the 
therapist’s proffered comparison or analogy as precisely that which unconsciously exerts 
a grip on her, acts as Baker’s criterion of  successful therapy81 and is deeply related to 
what can be said of  an individual’s confusions, and therefore what manner of  help can 
be proffered: 
There is no such thing as a grammatical rule of  my language which I am in no position to 
acknowledge or which holds in the teeth of  my sincerely refusing to acknowledge it.82
It therefore bears a great deal of  methodological weight, as both the key to an 
individual’s potential for change of  perspective, and the therapist’s remit and 
justification to continue in her therapy. Without it therapy cannot proceed, having no 
problem to perspectivally clarify. As the concern is thus solely with the patient’s 
grammar (regardless of  its potential similarity with other cases), there can be no external 
arbiter to attribute the successful portrayal of  concepts, other than by the patient’s 
verification. If  the patient refuses to acknowledge the therapist’s imputation as an 
accurate portrait, it is necessarily not so, and must be dropped, and the patient subjected 
to new attempts. Textually, Baker’s later work comes back again and again to the 
problem of  acknowledgement,83 and how Wittgenstein saw the task of  eliciting it from a 
diverse range of  imaginary interlocutors as his central role,84 with the Investigations 
functioning as a set of  case histories of  these attempts and their subsequent treatments, 
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similar in kind to that kept by a medical general practitioner.85 The main referent in this 
schema, and the source of  acknowledgement understood as a conditional element, is the 
following passage from BT p410:
Indeed we can only convict someone else of  a mistake if  he acknowledges that this really 
is the expression of  his feeling. // ...  if  he (really) acknowledges this expression as the 
correct expression of  his feeling.// For only if  he acknowledges it as such, is it the correct 
expression. (Psychoanalysis.)
What the other person acknowledges is the analogy I am proposing to him as the source 
of  his thought.
This passage is proposed as describing a key aspect of  philosophical therapy concerning 
the role that the confused individual must take in the resolution of  her own mistakes. 
Baker asserts that in an ideal case of  therapy, the therapist “sells”86 an analogy as the 
source of  an individual’s confusion and, by that person’s acknowledgement of  it as the 
correct expression of  her thought, their captivated concern with an analogy or picture 
can be broken. Thus acknowledgement promises a scheme by which one can 
understand how to progress in philosophy: by offering persuasive accounts of  potentially 
misleading conceptions that the patient is herself  unaware of, conceptions that subsist 
upon their unrecognised status for their impedimentary effect. There is clearly 
something right in this account, yet acknowledgement is not presented as relevant to the 
success of  a particular technique of  philosophical writing per se, but as the criterion for 
resolving all philosophical problems, as the bane of  such problems, which in themselves 
can only flourish in its absence.
The inspiration of  ‘our method’ is the idea that unacknowledged pictures generate mental 
cramps, obsessions, prejudices … As long as pictures or analogies are unconscious, we 
cannot be critical of, or even on our guard against, their influence. They exert tyranny over 
our thinking; they hold us in thrall; they produce mental cramps; in short they restrict our 
freedom of  intellectual movement.87 
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Philosophical problems have as their necessary condition an unacknowledged picture or 
concept of  how something must be (or cannot be), in that they are actually “generated” 
by these unacknowledged pictures and, without therapeutic intervention, their 
unacknowledged status makes philosophical problems indissoluble. The “blindness and 
prejudice” that constitute philosophical confusion “are cured only by acknowledging 
previous unrecognised possibilities.”88 It is therefore worth investigating whether Baker 
has mis-emphasised the role of  acknowledgement in a way similar to that of  the 
interlocutor. Immediately prior to the earlier passage from BT410, helping us here to re-
qualify it, is the following remark: 
One of  the most important tasks is to express all false thought processes so 
characteristically that the reader says, "Yes, that's exactly the way I meant it". To make a 
tracing of  the physiognomy of  every error.89 
 
It bears pointing out that the subject of  the sought acknowledgement is Wittgenstein’s  
reader, not some unspecified future beneficiary of  therapy, nor an imagined 
interlocutorial case study within the curative dialogue: so as a first movement towards  
reexamining acknowledgement, we can assert that when Wittgenstein raises the 
notion of  acknowledgement here he is specifically concerned with describing his 
intended relationship with, and effect upon, his reader. This is a pertinent fact, 
suggesting straightaway that if  Baker wishes to posit a fully-fledged model of  dialogic 
philosophical therapy as present in Wittgenstein’s text, with acknowledgement as its 
main criterion of  success, then there is work to be done in showing how this 
characteristic, outlined by the author as an aspect of  what he intends to achieve in 
relation to his reader, can be transferred, intact, to the ulterior setting of  conducting 
therapy upon a fellow philosopher. 
 There are, for example, characteristics of  reflection and consideration that differ 
markedly between the two modes of  investigation; namely of  working on one’s own 
with a text and involving oneself  in philosophical argument. This is a neglected 
theme, present on occasion in Wittgenstein’s writing – that of  the calm and quiet 
atmosphere (P 197) that is so conducive to doing good philosophical work. Indeed, 
the cut and thrust of  diagnosis, resistance, counter-diagnosis, and acknowledgement 
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is here rendered problematic for the slow, arboreal process of  attending to the quiet 
inquisitive voice: “The voice of  a philosophical thought is so soft that the noise of  
spoken words is enough to drown it and prevent it from being heard, if  one is 
questioned and has to speak.”90
Secondly, the project being described as that which leads to the reader’s 
acknowledgement is “a tracing of  the physiognomy of  every error”. As has been 
previously posited, the polyphonic voices in the Investigations are demonstrative of  
Wittgenstein’s own confusions, insights and conceptual self-work, and so seem 
satisfactory candidates for examples of  what this precise ‘tracing’ of  error might be. The 
aim of  this tracing (at least, the aim being discussed by Wittgenstein in this passage) is to 
lay bear certain possible thought processes so convincingly and characteristically that the 
reader is forcibly struck by any suitability that this description may have in regards to her 
own problematic conceptualisation. This is to build up a detailed portrait of  a mistake, 
fulfilling the dual functions of  inciting one’s reader’s developing participation, and 
providing a warning as to a potential problem that Wittgenstein has himself  struggled 
with. I posit that this requalification of  acknowledgement is absolutely key to 
understanding the purpose of  his philosophical methods, for it describes the relation he 
wanted to establish with those who employ his methods.
I wanted to put that picture before him, and his [acknowledgement] of  the picture 
consists in his now being inclined to regard a given case differently: that is, to compare it 
with this rather than that set of  pictures. I have changed his way of  looking at things.91
Here, then, acknowledgement is represented as consisting in the reader’s inclination to 
regard a problematic case differently, not in his willingness to accept the philosopher’s 
diagnosis as apt to his condition of  conceptual confusion. We can therefore propose 
two important qualifications: 1) acknowledgement is a task intended for 
Wittgenstein’s reader, and 2) the problems traced in order to achieve that task reflect 
those that Wittgenstein has found himself  extricated in.92 The interlocutor is not the 
party required to acknowledge a particular account, as one would expect if  it were 
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considered a guideline to therapeutic discourse, but rather, as already argued, a 
procedural tool employed by Wittgenstein to engage the reader in the task of  
acknowledging and substantiating different perspectives. This is in contradiction to 
Baker, who compounds the reader and the interlocutorial device into one 
acknowledging individual: Wittgenstein’s “tracing” is, for Baker, intended to make 
“his interlocutor aware of  a particular ‘physiognomy’ in the use of  our words.”93 … 
“Suggestions are made, but the interlocutor must acknowledge a picture if  it is to be 
the root of  his problem.”94 If  this chapter’s arguments are right, then this is a form of 
mistaken identity, where the only difference recognised between the patient and the 
interlocutor are their status as actual or ideal participants in therapy. And yet the 
polyphonic device used to characterise a philosophical confusion should surely not be 
treated as the actual intended beneficiary of  that same characterisation. The 
interlocutor instead represents the instrument used to record an ‘imprint’ of  the 
physiognomy to be traced.
To this end, Wittgenstein’s interlocutorial voices indulge their author’s bad habits, 
demonstrate disagreement with proposed resolutions, often to the point of  exasperation 
and repetition, or of  confusion as to which ‘voice’ is ‘correct’, forcing the reader to 
adjudicate in each case, to literally (as noted in the Investigation’s preface) “trouble” them 
to “think for themselves”. They are commonly noticeable in their truculent refusal to 
acknowledge alternate aspects, casting an almost satirical light upon this wilful 
truculence.95 Philosophical problems are raised up and animated by reasoning, as a 
shared form of  investigation “we” (here minimally understood as the author and his 
reader) are involved in, in which the reader is encouraged “to start to examine one thing 
after another methodically, and in peace and quiet; then I am willing to look with you 
and direct myself  with you as model in the method.”96 This directing of  himself  was not 
intended as exemplary, but on the contrary, as indicative of  the quandaries he had found 
himself  in, and the tendencies that perhaps still tempted his way of  thinking. Even if  the 
reader is only led to see Wittgenstein’s interlocutor as crazy, or completely stupefied, 
incapable of  seeing even see the simplest thing, then at the least she is still thereby 
brought to think the matter through in a new light.
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Acknowledgement seems closely related to this process of  depicting self-investigation in 
order to trigger an act of  self-investigation in one’s reader. Its eliciting appears to be a 
complex literary undertaking, rather than a dialogical one in the normal sense of  the 
word, in that the criteria for this method’s success seem to depend upon a prolonged 
layering of  descriptive detail, extended characterisation, and the implication of  the 
reader’s active acknowledgement and ensuing investigation.97 Rather than 
understanding it as the signature of  successful therapy, and therefore a licence to 
continue through providing alternate perspectival models in order to resolve a patient’s 
philosophical malady, acknowledgement can be sensibly seen as a less problematic side-
effect of  an active grammatical investigation, occurring as the reader is drawn into 
completing the series of  problematising scenarios and comparisons that constitute the 
bulk of  the Investigations. From this perspective, Wittgenstein’s attempts to elicit 
acknowledgement from his reader are an effect of  his scenarios’ success in engaging the 
reader’s imaginative involvement; if  they fail then by definition his reader did not 
acknowledge them as pertinent. 
It should be clear that by this reading acknowledgement remains a central element 
of  Wittgenstein’s later methods and that triggering such an achievement is likewise one 
of  its most important aims. But Baker chooses not only to treat this aspect as reflective of 
the ontic status of  the class of  philosophical problems, with much in common its 
Freudian counterpart,98 rather than of  an experimental method aimed at triggering a 
response in the reader, but also to emphasise the role of  the therapist in this 
achievement, arguably at the expense of  Wittgenstein’s own emphases. One need only 
compare the active agent in Baker’s and Wittgenstein’s writing to get a sense of  this 
discrepancy. For Baker, the therapist brings to an individual’s consciousness the influence 
of  pictures, and strives to directly combat them.99 Therapy is the application of  a strategy in 
which the therapist sells an account to the patient, whose acceptance is won from the 
individual, thereby confirming the correctness of  the therapist’s original diagnosis. 
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it is telling that the stylistic, imaginative, multivalent characteristics of  the Investigations appear, on this 
interpretation, to be integral to its methods (see Chapter III).
98 see, for example, NA note 20, p173: ‘I have been engaged for many years . . . in unravelling certain 
psychopathological structures. ... If  a pathological idea . . . can be traced back to the elements in the 
patient’s mental life from which it originated, it simultaneously crumbles away and the patient is freed 
from it’ (Freud, ‘The Method of  Interpreting Dreams’, Complete Works, vol. 4, p. 100).”  
99 NA, p187.
Misleading pictures are imputed to one’s interlocutor, which must be accepted as correct 
before further assistance is provided.100 For Baker, Wittgenstein’s Investigations makes most 
sense conceived of  as the notebooks of  a GP, in which he demonstrates upon imaginary 
individuals the method whereby one can “get the sufferer to renounce his grammatical 
prejudices”.101 His proposed model consistently posits the therapist as the one doing 
philosophically interesting work: first, the therapist’s insightful imputation, and the 
respondent’s confession, thence the therapist’s creative aspectival presentation leading to 
her respondent’s renunciation. When we turn to examples of  Wittgenstein’s direct 
commentary upon his own method we often, but certainly not always, find a quite 
different emphasis at work. He conceives of  the fundamental aim of  his job as to 
portray conceptual mistakes before they are resolved, thereby allowing the reader the 
opportunity to see their own ‘reflected’, and to thereafter, through this ‘assistance’, set 
these problems aright for themselves. To aid the reader by demonstrating for him a 
method by which he might more usefully search for a resolution. To enable the reader to 
shift for themselves when they encounter difficulty; to encourage a change of  activity in 
his reader, rather than a change of  belief  – indeed more generally to think and to look 
for themselves. As a preparatory task, which will help the reader to continue on their 
own. At the most – at his most rhetorical – to perhaps show a possible route out of  a 
problem that is embarrassing in its simplicity, when comprehended.102 There is an 
inherent avoidance, dislike or sense of  futility, in accusing or imputing the reader of  an 
error, as something (even if  correct in diagnosis) utterly futile in its intent.
My warnings are like the posters on the ticket offices at English railway stations “Is your 
journey really necessary?” (As if  anyone reading that would say to himself  “On second 
thoughts, no”) Quite different artillery is needed here from anything I am in a position to 
muster. Most likely I could still achieve an effect in that, above all, a whole lot of  garbage is 
written in response to my stimulus & that perhaps this provides the stimulus for something 
good. I ought always to hope only for the most indirect of  influences.103 
E.g. nothing more stupid than the chatter about cause & effect in history books; 
68
100 See NA, pp189, 187, 210, 220 & 261, respectively.
101 Ibid, p157.
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103 In this respect, consider Foucault’s remark on the “secondary” intentions that drive his purpose for 
writing: 'I don't write a book so that it will be the final word; I write a book so that other books are 
possible, not necessarily written by me'. (Foucault 1994a)
nothing more wrong-headed, more half-baked.—But who could put a stop to it by saying 
that?104  
 
This is an important and commonly overlooked qualification of  Wittgenstein’s hopes 
and aims for his methods, which states that any hope of  his philosophy having a direct 
effect upon an individual’s deeply held and problematic concepts is vain, half-baked, 
almost humorous to him; the “artillery” necessary to effect a change in the way we live 
and think cannot be constituted merely by a poster or a book’s decree, precisely because 
it is a change that can only be effected by the person whose will is implicated in and 
sustaining that problematic way of  seeing in the first place. The kind of  problem that 
Wittgenstein is concerned with might be clearly dealt with once acknowledged, but 
when approaching the resolution of  such problems in others, he is drawn to ask “who 
could put a stop to it by saying” what is confused in someone’s wilful conception? Yet 
putting a stop to it, by saying what it is, is considered the pivotal procedure in the 
therapeutic treatment of  dogmatic aspects. Thus, in a manner somewhat similar to his 
earlier position, Baker proposes a somewhat interventionist attempt to orchestrate a 
philosophical overcoming, in some greater or lesser degree of  discursive partnership 
with the individual herself, according to the period of  his writing, later and earlier 
respectively.105 
 Such a style is tailor-made to engage the imagination and intellect of  the reader by 
almost tricking them into challenging, noticing, accepting or denying a host of  
philosophical pictures. In this sense, if  the style that proceeds in this manner achieves its 
intended outcome, roping the reader into thinking for themselves, extending and 
breathing detail into one incomplete scenario or conversation after another, in a manner 
far from mimetic, then acknowledgement would be assured by, and synchronous with, 
their taking part in investigation. Acknowledgement ‘comes for free’ through the 
distension of  Wittgenstein’s philosophical scenarios and puzzles because, by their 
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105 There is, after all, a qualitative difference between one’s noticing for oneself  a change of  aspect, an 
incongruent detail upon closer inspection, or the point at which an analogy no longer does good work, 
and having it asserted to you by another. If  one manages to achieve a writing style in which one’s reader is 
often allowed to notice important details and limitations for herself, it is likely that she will automatically 
attribute the event to herself; it will be her investigation, her working out of  a scenario in a contingent 
manner; and that contingent precision unique to her completion of  the text would also insure a relevance 
to her particular grammatical confusions unlikely to be achieved through normal pedagogical means. As 
we shall see in the final chapter, there is another good reason to prefer such incitement over orchestration; 
it is fundamentally respectful of  the indeterminate innovation that characterises a person’s practices in 
language.
imaginative investigation, the reader comes to recognise them as relevant and intriguing, 
hence helping one to adopt a previously unconsidered aspect. As we shall soon see, 
Foucault is distrustful of  characterising his philosophy as a form of  teaching in a manner 
significantly symmetrical to the account laid out here:
I would reject this term "teaching"; such a term would reflect the character of  a work, of  
a systematic book that leads to a method that can be generalized, a method full of  positive 
directions, of  a body of  "teachings" for the readers. In my case it's another matter 
entirely: my books don't have this kind of  value. They function as invitations, as public 
gestures, for those who may want eventually to do the same thing, or something like it, or, 
in any case, who intend to slip into this kind of  experience.106
For both authors, as we shall see, this peculiarity can be directly related to a 
methodological motivation. Currently, the concept of  acknowledgement now stands 
rather modified by our reading, away from a general model of  the nature of  
philosophical problems and their resolution, towards a local model’s intended effect 
upon its reader. If  we were to insist upon the veracity of  Baker’s more ontic account of  
what must be plaguing the philosophical individual, the main task for the practicing 
therapist is to unlock an individual’s particular problem by presenting in a rather hit-or-
miss manner a series of  models, one of  which should cause self-awareness in the 
confused individual. 
It is perhaps finally worth noting that Baker’s qualification of  unacknowledged 
pictures exerting a thrall over their owners draws heavily upon §§112–5. In light of  the 
exegetical positions developed in this chapter, it is now a salient fact that these sections, 
so often called upon to provide therapeutic terminology are drawn from one of  the most 
conspicuously autobiographical passages in the Investigations. Wittgenstein is at license to 
speak so assuredly in his accusation of  a certain way of  thinking as deceptive and misled 
precisely because it is his own previous way of  thinking that is being convicted of  such 
cramped limitations. In part by employing two of  Baker’s principles of  exegesis107, 
minimalism and charity, we have arrived at a very different account of  
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particular, §4.3.
107 See §1.4.
acknowledgement, and more generally, of  the role to be played by the philosophically 
confused individual in her own relief.
Previously, the task of  varying objects of  comparison to suit the particular 
grammar of  the individual was performed by the therapist, demanding supernatural 
levels of  perception, imagination and sympathy on their part, in order that they might 
correctly divine the problems of  their perhaps-truculent patient. It is therefore my 
assertion that those problems in Baker’s account of  acknowledgement all stem from the 
precision required of  the therapist. Under the model here outlined, open-endedness 
allows for a degree of  innovative customisation according to each individual’s employment 
of  the text (and, therefore too, of  relevance to a far greater spectrum of  problems than 
that which would be achieved by a more precise set of  objects of  comparison). The 
problem of  eliciting acknowledgement is removed, as is the problem of  resistance as an 
intractable barrier and, assisted by Wittgenstein’s methods, the reader functions as a 
more efficient ‘therapist’ than that role postulated by Baker. Reformulated as part of  
what is left to the reader, this task can now be performed with far greater accuracy, with 
diagnostic variance occurring as a symptom of  the reader’s substantiation of  her 
aspectival comparisons. Further, that which is achieved by the reader can be expected to 
improve with practice, as the habits of  comparison and imagination become better 
formed. The aim of  conceptual investigation, then, can be understood not as is 
commonly considered the dissolution of  philosophical problems, but the inculcation of  
an ability to do so when one later encounters them afresh. Struggle is what  Wittgenstein 
seeks to incite, not a particular success: this is from whence the importance of  leaving as 
much to the reader as possible derives from. Contrastingly, Baker treats the skills learnt 
from Wittgenstein’s thus:
The only product of  the teaching is imparting a skill. … [Wittgenstein’s] case studies are 
of  interest in respect of  the methods exhibited in the treatment of  absolutely specific 
individual difficulties; what is demonstrated are procedures for untying the particular 
knots that someone has tied in his own thinking.108
The emphasis of  these procedures learnt by the therapist is placed firmly upon resolving 
someone’s troubles; they are to be replicated as a marvellous set of  tools by which to 
carry on Wittgenstein’s good work, employed upon one’s own interlocutors — be that 
someone imaginary, academic, or otherwise.
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This chapter’s exegesis suggests a programme significantly alternate to that given 
above, while remaining in deep debt to it’s basic methodological premises, as outlined in 
Chapter I. It has sought to draw emphasis back towards oneself  as the subject of  
philosophical work. Considered as a programme, the Investigations demonstrates an 
explicit desire to help its reader adopt a new style of  thought in which the habits that 
lead to confusion and dogmatism are prevented from gaining purchase through the 
development of  a new manner of  thinking and seeing. The struggle Wittgenstein 
referred to as being constitutive of  his philosophy expresses without doubt a demand 
extended through time: it is the demand for a recurrent commitment to a new way of  
thinking, a new way of  life. The therapy that Baker promises, even if  successful in spite 
of  the problems explored here, is an event, an achievement, an intervention in the life of 
its patient, and thus doesn’t fully satisfy the demand for philosophical struggle. How is 
the patient to acknowledge the sources of  her confusion once the therapy is finished? 
Where can she find a new object of  comparison with which to break her particular 
habitual way of  seeing, if  not provided by the philosopher? From whence can the new 
possibilities emerge with which to surround an expression that has the glamour of  
necessity, in order to reveal it as a fervently held contingency? And how is she to be 
saved from a regress into confusion? Having returned the exegetical emphasis to the 
reader’s responsibility, fresh ground emerges from which to interpret Wittgenstein’s 
struggle as a sustained wilful activity, persisting when the therapist has gone home, when 
the book sits back on its shelf, perhaps even informing the thousand judgements and 
expectations that occur within the welter of  our everyday life. 
To convince someone of  the truth, it is not enough to state it, but rather one must find the 
path from error to truth.109
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Chapter III
Difficulties of the Will
________________________
What role can thought play in what one does if  it is to be neither know-how nor pure 
theory? ... The answer: to give us strength to break the rules in the very act which brings 
them into play.1
 — Foucault, Interview in Nouvel Observateur no.934
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§3.1 Glock’s challenge and the question of style
The position we have worked to advance thus far is one that flies in the face of  much 
criticism, disagreeing, as it does, with that school of  interpretation which Baker himself  
was so pivotal in establishing before his aspectival turn. One of  its most prodigal 
members is Hans Johan Glock. In a recent volume commemorating the work of  Gordon 
Baker, Glock issued the following challenge:
[S]tylistic interpreters owe us a clear and well-argued account of  what philosophical 
substance (concerning problems, arguments or insights) is lost by rephrasing Wittgenstein’s  
thought in a more conventional manner. Barring such an account, this kind of  paraphrase 
is not just legitimate but imperative.2
To take Glock up on his challenge, and to set about “a clear and well-argued account” 
regarding the irreducible importance of  Wittgenstein’s later style of  writing to his 
philosophical arguments and insights, is now a task worth pursuing for two reasons. The 
previous chapter and the current one both seek to ascertain the relationship between 
characteristics of  Wittgenstein’s writing and its philosophical purpose. Glock’s challenge 
therefore provides an opportunity to repudiate a common imputation made as to the 
unfortunate ‘drag-factor’ that his style represents by means of  an exampled set of  
counter-arguments. Secondly, in explaining why the project of  rephrasing Wittgenstein’s 
remarks would have a negative impact upon their philosophical efficacy, we are 
presented with the opportunity to close-read the text in the pursuit of  clarity as to 
possible reasons why Wittgenstein did expend so much labour over his style of  
presentation. The stylistic characteristic that will concern the first part of  the chapter is 
that of  what I shall term Wittgenstein’s ‘schemes of  interruption’; his arrangement of  
text so as to both resemble and elicit the timely interruption of  philosophical confusion. 
This chapter aims to do so in a ‘positive’ manner – that is, to examine elements of  his 
style in relation to both a number of  the author’s inter-related remarks, and the position 
established in Chapter II, so as to give a helpful reading of  what such a style is 
concerned to achieve, how many of  its characteristics jibe well with Wittgenstein’s 
explicit claims as to the required methods of  his philosophy, and what would be lost if, as  
Glock so suggests, his arguments were to be refashioned in a more regulated and 
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coherent manner. Glock’s position is not novel, and in conclusion we will consider a 
counter argument, authored by Hilmy, whose excellent exegesis perhaps represents the 
most considered and detailed exponent of  the ‘revisionary’ exegetical position he shares 
with Glock. Earlier evaluations of  Wittgenstein’s philosophy are in sympathy with 
Glock’s appeal for revision too, such as the following, made by his friend, contemporary 
and collaborator, Freidrich Waismann: 
He has the great gift of  always seeing things as if  for the first time. But it shows, I think, 
how difficult collaborative work with him is, since he is always following up the inspiration 
of  the moment and demolishing what he has previously sketched out.3
This chapter will argue that to treat Wittgenstein’s style of  thought solely as a ‘natural’ 
gift (or as Waismann intimates, something of  a curse) of  the faculty of  the kind of  man 
Wittgenstein was, is to quarantine that style as a discrete aspect of  a certain persona, 
rather than a methodological ethos emerging from a set of  philosophical practices. From 
there, it would follow that Wittgenstein’s style of  writing, rather than being another tool 
of  the philosopher’s methodology, is similarly and solely a reflection of  this 
anachronistic quality of  the man. Since in both his writing and his thought the effect of  
this anachronistic ‘demolishing’ and ‘criss-crossing’ style can sensibly be judged to be 
detrimental to the task of  doing philosophy in a clear and programmatic manner, it can 
supposedly be considered as of  only biographical interest, or perhaps of  interest to the 
literary scholar, or at best, charitably, as a unique, admirable sugar coating with which to 
help the substantive philosophical medicine go down.4 This tendency is clearly present 
here in Waismann’s frustration at his attempts at collaborative work with Wittgenstein, 
just as it is clear in the contemporary revisionary position as posited by Glock and 
Hilmy. There are patent reasons why this reading has strong support. Wittgenstein was 
an enigmatic character, full of  foibles that might puzzle any who read the many 
biographical accounts of  the man, lending circumstance to a dismissive reading of  his 
style. More importantly, there is a strong exegetic payoff  from adopting this position, 
that of  application. The ideas, examples and arguments that populate the Investigations 
have had a pronounced critical effect upon many of  the central issues of  academic 
philosophy. The ‘private language argument’, for example, is capable of  raising novel 
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problems in a range of  ethical, cognitive and epistemic fields. Removed from their 
polyphonic setting, formalised and restated as a series of  arguments, they have already 
played a substantial role in shaping much of  our contemporary philosophy, for good or 
for ill (according to your commentator of  choice). If  we accept the fecundity of  
Wittgensteinian exegesis, and in particular the contribution of  figures such as PMS 
Hacker to fields as diverse as neuroscience, linguistics and logic, then it is clear that we 
would do well to avoid making a strict interdiction regarding the ‘correct’ and ‘incorrect’ 
ways of  reading Wittgenstein, or risk the danger of  self-contradiction with our earlier 
account of  the ‘open-ended’ characteristic of  Wittgenstein’s philosophy.  
 However, this does not dismiss our initial concern as trivial, for the important 
additional qualification of  fidelity remains. The novel employment of  elements of  
Wittgenstein’s philosophical texts, notes and lectures in a rewarding avenue of  critique is  
commendable, but if  that avenue claims close fidelity to the original text, and by doing 
so questions the legitimacy of  much of  the other elements of  Wittgenstein’s philosophy 
that disagree, then a sensible response is to provide a coherent reading of  the relevance 
of  those elements to the task of  comprehending and practicing the methods, as 
advocated by their inventor. It is partially in the interest of  fidelity, then, and in taking 
Wittgenstein at his own word, that there follows a series of  interconnected investigations 
into traits of  his philosophical writing style. 
In a relatively early remark, a few note-pages prior to his infamous stipulation of  
philosophy as a kind of  work on oneself, Wittgenstein reflected upon the relative 
importance of  the will in undertaking philosophical investigation. It still has a rather 
unorthodox ring to it even when read for the twentieth time, as it expresses a startling 
analysis of  the relative importance of  the ‘will’ and ‘intellect’ in overcoming 
philosophical confusion:
Tolstoy: the meaning (importance) of  something lies in its being something everyone can 
understand. That is both true & false. What makes the object hard to understand--if  it's 
significant, important--is not that you have to be instructed in abstruse matters in order to 
understand it, but the antithesis between understanding the object & what most people 
want to see. Because of  this precisely what is most obvious may be what is most difficult 
to understand. It is not a difficulty for the intellect but one for the will that has to be 
overcome.
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	Someone who teaches philosophy nowadays gives his pupil foods, not because they are to 
his taste, but in order to change his taste.5
This chapter will concern itself  with evidencing the manner in which Wittgenstein’s style 
was directly informed by his advocacy of  “overcoming” difficulties of  the will as a 
constitutive task of  philosophy. As will soon become evident, the latter aphorism 
regarding ‘feeding’ students of  philosophy in order to change their ‘taste’ is not only 
contiguous with the former remark itself, but also important in our understanding of  
Wittgenstein’s style of  philosophy and the objectives he sought to achieve. The end 
result will be an account of  this activity that results in many of  the characteristics of  
Wittgenstein’s work attributed by Waismann and Glock as anachronistic elements being 
reconsidered, rather, as both products and exemplars of  the methods of  philosophy as 
advocated by Wittgenstein. Thus this chapter offers a close reading of  text with the aim 
being a reversal of  the core assumptions regarding the relationship of  method and style 
found in the revisionary challenge to Wittgensteinian philosophy. Firstly, a novel 
interpretation of  a common, recurring set of  characteristics identifiable in Wittgenstein’s 
later writing will be analysed and treated under the rubric of  ‘schemes of  interruption’.6 
This emerging position asserts that Wittgenstein’s stated intention – that of  influencing 
the actions and considerations of  his reader – is directly related to such schemes and 
that, as such, they demonstrate an intended synergetic relationship, with the interruptive 
depiction of  the interaction between alternate philosophical expressions intended to 
portray and elicit such activity as an exemplar of  what philosophical investigation 
should achieve. This interpretation will then be related to a substantive account of  
Wittgenstein’s notion of  a ‘difficulty of  the will’ and posited as being emergent from this 
concern, as well as indicative of  the extent to which Wittgenstein considered it to be 
significant. Finally, Hilmy’s refutation of  the possible relevance of  this interpretation (or 
any other that is concerned with Wittgenstein’s textual style as substantive in relation to 
his methods) will be addressed and dismissed as ultimately ineffectual. 
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6 I use the term ‘scheme’ because the stylistic feature under consideration is not dissimilar to the rhetorical 
notion of  a scheme, namely a figure of  speech that alters the ordinary or expected patterns of  a text in 
order to achieve a specific persuasive effect upon its reader. See also Pichler 2007, for his advancement of  
a closely related understanding of  the Investigations as being littered with what he calls “skandalon (Greek for 
‘stumbling block’), because they make the reader stumble, pause, and ask certain questions.” (Pichler 
2007, p127)
§3.2 Interruption, or “— it need not be so”7
The cadence of  the Investigations is punctuated with a peculiar movement. Rare is the 
line of  argument that sustains for long without soon meeting an interjection, whether 
profoundly considered or apparently banal. Amongst these interchanges there can be 
identified an iterated theme. Consider the following example: 
"But if  the concept 'game' is uncircumscribed like that, you don't really know what you 
mean by a 'game'."——When I give the description: "The ground was quite covered with 
plants"—do you want to say I don't know what I am talking about until I can give a 
definition of  a plant?8
Typically, moments in the text such as this have been understood as being examples of  a 
pedagogical mannerism,9 and this seems broadly true. There are more specific 
components at work that require closer scrutiny, however. In §70, as in so many other 
sections we will consider, a secondary challenge is made to the author’s initial line of  
thought, occurring in a very specific manner. In this particular section the concern is 
animated by a question as to the virtue of  family resemblance, specifically that such a 
concept seems incapable, by definition, of  providing the semblance of  the precision one 
might expect when defining a word’s meaning. An interruptive element responds to this 
question, in this particular instance, with an analogical example of  an expression in 
which a similar concern does not seem relevant; in the new comparative example it does 
not contribute to, but rather compromises, the understanding of  the given expression, 
“the ground was quite covered with plants”. 
 The first line of  thought might be considered broadly ‘philosophical’ – abstract and 
concerned with the generality of  a concept as a watermark of  its efficacy. The 
interruptive line introduces an example of  an expression that demonstrates that if  such 
a similar demand were made upon the given analogical example, the result would 
clearly be asinine. The reader is then left to pore over the analogical comparison, spot 
the elements that are being compared, and conclude on these grounds whether the 
analogy is fair or misleading; merely amusing or conceptually revelatory. The general 
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effect might charitably be: we witness the author’s portrayal of  an interruption to a way 
of  expressing himself  that, through a timely counter-example, leads to an understanding 
of  the precision of  his words as no longer necessarily obligatory. We can thereby clearly 
note a tactical element to the interruption, in which the intention of  the initial line is 
tempered by its repositioning within a newly-imagined context. Moreover it seems that 
the tactic involves emphasising a distinction between the philosophical (pre-)
determination of  an expression and its everyday employment; something of  a common 
theme in many such examples of  interruption. Next, consider the frequency with which 
such remarks and appeals occur in the Investigations. Here are only a few examples in 
which a philosophical determination is stopped in its tracks by a demand for a 
qualification as to the possibilities of  its employment:
§296 — Only whom are we informing of  this? And on what occasion?
§327  — Well, don't you ever think? Can't you observe yourself  and see what is going 
on? You do not have to wait for it as for an astronomical event and then perhaps make 
your observation in a hurry.
§278  — Certainly: what use of  the proposition are you thinking of ?
§47  — Asking ‘Is this object composite?’ outside a particular language-game is like 
what a boy once did, who had to say whether the verbs in certain sentences were in the 
active or passive voice, and who racked his brains over the question whether the verb "to 
sleep" meant something active or passive.
§68: ‘—It need not be so.’
§48 — I do not know what else you would have me call ‘the simples’, what would be 
more natural in this language-game.
The ‘topics’ of  these sections vary wildly over relatively short periods of  text, yet their 
method of  interruption is consistent in its appearance. Typographically, they are 
normally prefaced by a single or double en-rule and respond to an initial voice 
presented in quotation marks. In idiom, they are discursive, informal and convivial – if  
often a little teacherly in the manner of  their comment or challenge. In timing, they 
nearly always occur at a moment of  supposed peril, where the potential for taking a 
misturning, or continuing a line of  reasoning in a grammatically skewed manner, is 
made apparent to the reader. Such interruption always employs an initial voice or 
concern as driven to make a given assertion, and commonly responds before that 
assertion has time to develop or elaborate, typically challenging a conditional element of 
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the initial assertion through a variety of  techniques. These techniques are not reducible 
merely to counter-examples, as would be hoped if  one sought to revise them in Glockian 
fashion. They comprise, for example; questions, maxims, rhetorical devices, humour, 
bald challenge, agreement through disambiguation, appeal to experience and, as we saw 
in §70, counter-examples. The conglomeration of  such a wide collection of  figures in 
Wittgenstein’s writing under the rubric of  ‘schemes of  interruption’ is thus one I make 
in relation to the timing they demonstrate in relation to an initial philosophical position, 
their typographic presentation, and their idiom; their differences are evidently numerous 
yet they routinely occur within a strict stylistic scheme. 
 When isolated like this as a concern, Wittgenstein’s writing demonstrates a very 
persistent way of  framing philosophical problems and their dissolution, with 
innumerable10 examples of  this interruptive style signalling a remarkable continuity in 
Wittgenstein’s later philosophy. As we shall now see, by understanding these 
interruptions’ persistence as indicative of  the author’s demand for a recurrent 
commitment to new ways of  thinking through a struggle with those already established, 
this stylistic facet appears of  far greater import than if  they were taken solely as the 
author’s reliance upon, or penchant for, the impact or turn of  phrase that such 
interruptions allow. I will now argue that, as a complex form of  philosophical 
punctuation, this style is intended as a means to explore and transform the conceptual 
space in which one expresses one’s ideas of  how one thinks, understands and behaves, 
and thus is of  significant importance for Wittgenstein’s unique notion of  philosophy. 
 Having considered the provocative nature of  Wittgenstein’s writing in Chapter II, our 
focus here is upon the rhythm and timing demonstrated by such provocations. The 
previous seven remarks are all examples of  interruptions occurring in response to an 
attempt to set out a definition or general account of  the field of  problems that occupy 
the author. They are the manner of  his most common response to the confusions that 
generate the need for philosophical investigation. “An unsuitable type of  expression is a 
sure means of  remaining in a state of  confusion. It as it were bars the way out”,11 and 
Wittgenstein’s main methods of  overcoming such ‘barring’ expressions can be 
demonstrated to be routinely interruptive in nature. Taken in relation to its reader, it 
seems sensible that the purpose of  such a consistent element is not only to provide specific 
counter-examples, objections and challenges, but to encourage a pattern of  response as 
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an activity12. By ‘pattern of  response’ I mean a form of  incremental training or habit 
that installs – first through demonstration, then through the incitement of  novel 
employment – a predilection for spotting and interrupting what might otherwise pass as 
the unproblematic use of  an expression. To break up, as it were, language in use and to 
formulate the grammar of  the given expression in imaginative ways that help attenuate 
the likelihood of  philosophical confusion. Or again, to install in the reader a wariness 
when employing certain expressions, so that it becomes quite natural to adopt a 
grammatically critical relation to one’s own language. It is important to note how often 
Wittgenstein’s interruptions to the interlocutorial voice focus upon the conditions by which 
that voice goes about formulating a question, rather than an answer to the question so 
posed. This might be a request for the context in which such a question would likely 
occur or a challenge to the manner in which a contributing word or phrase is being 
employed. Thus the style of  activity being demonstrated and encouraged in such 
examples is closely tied to the conditional objections being offered. If  this is correct, then 
it seems that interruption is a common facet of  Wittgenstein's method, due to the timing 
that must be employed to avoid philosophical confusion, being dependent as it is upon 
establishing a critical investigation at the root, or beginning, or likely occurrence of  that 
confusion, rather than in their being answered ‘straight up’. The apt assembly of  
reminders is a feature of  Wittgenstein’s method that has received a great deal of  
attention, yet the actual timing by which one must deploy such reminders is in 
comparison something of  a a neglected feature. For it is clearly articulated in many of  
his remarks in an urgent appeal to “[r]emind yourself  at the right time when doing 
philosophy”13 of  certain practices, models, or grammatical remarks. “When you are 
tempted to make general metaphysical statements, ask yourself  (always): What case am I 
actually thinking of ?”14 A certain question “most easily arises if  we are preoccupied 
with cases” that sympathetically reflect upon a simile in our language, for example when 
“there are things flowing by us,—as logs of  wood float down a river. ... We then use this 
situation as a simile for all happening in time and even embody the simile in our 
language, as when we say that ‘the present event passes by’ (a log passes by).”15
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13 PPO, pp167-9.
14 Ibid, p171.
15 BB, p107.
To get clear about philosophical problems, it is useful to become conscious of  the 
apparently unimportant details of  the particular situation in which we are inclined to 
make a certain metaphysical assertion. Thus we may be tempted to say "Only this is really 
seen" when we stare at unchanging surroundings, whereas we may not at all be tempted 
to say this when we look about us while walking.16 
Wittgenstein’s presentation of  a confusion’s occasion sensitivity can be extended, from 
these cases, where he draws explicit attention to it, to a more general appreciation of  his 
cadence. His schemes of  interruption are quintessentially designed to portray a response 
to the lived utterance of  a problematic expression, caught in the act, as it were. This is to 
posit style as performatively demonstrative, and thus an irreducible aspect of  the means 
of  philosophy – namely the dissolution of  philosophical confusion. Viewed as a 
technique reinforced through varietal repetition, the interruptive voice thereby teaches a 
method by which to undertake a practical and timely reordering of  one’s habits of  
thought. It is practical because, viewed recursively over a period of  reading, the text 
prompts one to learn a set of  methods by which one might continue to operate once 
bereft of  the text’s interjections, examples and comments. In this limited sense, the varied 
topics of  philosophical investigation are exemplary but inessential – the pattern and 
habits of  sharp-sightedness and response to the troublesome things one is liable to utter 
are also a coherent philosophical objective of  the text. The aim of  writing in such a 
manner is therefore not doctrinal but agonistic. The struggle there displayed is intended 
to incite an activity in its reader, but more than that, it is intended to incite new habits of 
reflection that persist inventively, beyond the given examples. Wittgenstein’s style is a 
patterned response to this concern, best expressed by the author himself:
A teacher who can show good, or indeed astounding results while he is teaching, is still 
not on that account a good teacher, for it may be that, while his pupils are under his 
immediate influence, he raises them to a level which is not natural to them, without 
developing their own capacities for work at this level, so that they immediately decline 
again once the teacher leaves the schoolroom. Perhaps this holds for me; I have thought 
about this. (When Mahler was himself  conducting, his private performances were 
excellent; the orchestra seemed to collapse at once if  he was not conducting it himself.)17
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Wittgenstein’s style depicts the temporal unfolding and resolution of  philosophical 
problems, often following alternate permutations, because his conception of  the practice 
of  philosophy is one that extends into the everyday life and times of  its practitioner, 
away from the influence of  its teacher. There, only the novelly developed capacities of  
his reader can determine whether she succeeds or collapses back into confusion through 
the re-adoption of  abidingly aspect-informed forms of  expression. Given proper 
attention, this characteristic of  his style coherently expresses a specific model of  
interruption that is intended to encourage the development of  a symmetrically specific 
set of  capacities in his students and readers. 
 The sustained iteration of  interruptive tasks and dialogues on display in the 
Investigations is certainly not a shortcut in effort or style on their author’s behalf  – we can 
be anecdotally and biographically sure of  the obsessive effort that he put into their 
writing and incessant rewriting – but a demonstration of  the self-interrogative methods 
necessary to achieve the goals Wittgenstein persists in presenting as crucial to the task of 
emancipation from philosophical confusion.  The examples Wittgenstein offers us “point 
beyond” their current employment; not necessarily in their content (which may well hit 
or miss their target of  relevance to the reader), but in their philosophical style. They aim 
at altering not only the way an individual understands a given subject, but their way of  
looking at and thinking about things per se:18 
If  one doesn't want to SOLVE philosophical problems why doesn't one give up dealing with 
them. For solving them means changing one's point of  view, the old way of  thinking. And if  
you don't want that, then you should consider the problems unsolvable.19
There is accordance, then, between Wittgenstein’s common style of  interruption and his  
repeated plea as to the pervasive aims philosophy should set about achieving. We 
previously accounted for the interlocutor as a method of  expressing the undertaking of  
work on oneself, of  speaking forcefully of  the tendencies and shortcomings that the 
author found in his own thought, depicted to in order to bring about a related 
experience in its reader. The interruptive cadence of  the text reflects what such work 
looks like in practice. This practice – namely of  cultivating certain interjectory 
techniques, through variance in a participatory scheme of  critical investigation – can be 
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judged a crucial element of  Wittgenstein’s philosophy, both by his interruptive 
exhortations 20 and in their obverse explications.21 Providing “tips” in order to help 
inform his reader’s “experiences” away and apart from the ad hoc instances to be found 
in the Investigations is clearly legible as an explicit aim of  his later work.22
“Writing the right style means, setting the carriage precisely on the rails. … We are 
only going to set you straight on the track, if  your carriage stands on the rails 
crookedly; driving is something we shall leave you to do by yourself.”23
Philosophy is not a description of  language usage, and yet one can learn it by 
constantly attending to all the expressions of  life in the language.24
The self-correcting activity encouraged through Wittgenstein’s interruptive 
philosophical style has the aim of  cultivating a constant habit of  attentiveness to the 
expressions of  life in our language and a sharp-sightedness to these problems that are 
hard to perceive because they concern that which is common to every day of  our life;25 
our expressions, our judgements, how and what we want to say. Attentiveness to and 
awareness of  one’s own tendencies of  expression are central to grammatical 
investigation, and imply a certain ethos in one’s relationship to oneself. We can now start 
to respond, perhaps incompletely but certainly with some force, to Glock’s challenge. 
Certain elements of  Wittgenstein’s style demonstrate a set of  techniques by which the 
author seeks to illicit an alteration in the behaviour of  his reader. It presents his remarks 
in such a way that they rouse the reader to think for themselves in the detailed service of 
giving a description of  the modes of  expression they find in their own language, and 
that of  those around them. It is in the training, incitement, comparative tools and 
interruptive patterning on display in Wittgenstein’s style that one can make sense of  the 
difficulty of  the will and its primary importance in resolving philosophical problems. 
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21 E.g. “The way to solve the problem you see in your life is to live in a way that will make what is 
problematic disappear. The fact that life is problematic means that your life does not fit life's shape. So you 
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27.8.1937) 
22 See PI, p227.
23 MS 117, p225: 2.3.1940 & p237: 6.3.1940.
24 LWPP I, p121, my emphasis.
25 cf: MS 118, p113r: 24.9.1937.
So far we have examined a prevalent stylistic in the later writing of  Wittgenstein that 
seems to make certain claims upon the behaviour of  its reader that are unconventional 
in their demand. Because of  this account, Wittgenstein’s notion of  treating his 
Investigations as a workbook rather than a hermetic text now appears to extend beyond 
explicitly corresponding sections such as §27 and §182, instead permeating the majority 
of  the text through the stimulation of  an interruptive attentiveness to one’s own habits 
of  expression in light of  the author’s own projects, with the end intention being the 
production of  a kind of  perspicuity which makes it possible – desirable, even – to make 
significant changes in our ways of  conceiving, and attentive enough to do so in response 
to the problems it identifies in its own behaviour. Sections such as our initial example of  
§70 are not necessarily exhausted by the arguments, in the academic mode, that can be 
divined in them, and their aim similarly isn’t solely the refutation of  a given philosophical 
problem.26 It is also to stimulate a form of  conceptual and expressive repositioning 
which causes the kinds of  problems that are involved in the way his reader expresses 
herself  to cease, and therefore the way she lives to be drastically altered. This is an 
explicit concern for Wittgenstein — in order to solve philosophical problems “you have 
to start thinking about these things in a new way”, and “the new way of  thinking is what 
is so hard to establish” — so while much of  the argument here so far rests upon a 
relatively narrow treatment of  the text, there should be little doubt that Wittgenstein was  
motivated by the question of  whether his work would manage to imprint a persistent 
change upon his readers and pupils. We have advanced an account of  the importance of 
interruption to the aim of  stimulating a new way of  thinking and speaking as a 
substantive (but certainly not exhaustive,) aim in Wittgenstein’s philosophical writing. We 
have yet to examine why Wittgenstein employs such unique methods in his philosophical 
style, why he worried regarding how lasting his model of  philosophy would prove to be, 
once he was no longer “conducting the orchestra”,27  and why he deemed such a radical 
style of  writing to be a necessary facet of  his philosophy. His notion of  difficulties of  the 
will and their relationship to philosophy are, I argue, the key to this examination. 
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modern era, and Wittgenstein was an academic working in a centre of  tremendous activity in that 
discipline for over twenty years.  
27 See quoted MS 122, p190c: 13.1.1940, on p82.
 As we have seen, in this conception of  philosophy, its practice demands certain skills 
be developed by the reader, and if  she is to succeed in applying his method in pursuit of  
the confusions present in her own life, then they must be deeply learnt, to actually 
change the way she thinks and speaks. This learning isn’t an easy process, as Wittgenstein 
sees it, and neither is the performance that follows. Yet as he makes clear, the 
undertaking is not made difficult because of  a requirement for recondite knowledge, or 
due to its complexity:
People have sometimes said to me they cannot make any judgement about this or that 
because they have never learnt philosophy. This is irritating nonsense, it is being assumed 
that philosophy is some sort of  science. And people speak of  it as they might speak of  
medicine. — What one can say, however, is that people who have never carried out an 
investigation of  a philosophical sort, like most mathematicians for instance, are not 
equipped with the right optical instruments for that sort of  investigation or scrutiny. 
Almost, as someone who is not used to searching in the forest for berries will not find any 
because his eye has not been sharpened for such things & he does not know where you 
have to be particularly on the lookout for them. Similarly someone unpracticed in 
philosophy passes by all the spots where difficulties lie hidden under the grass, while 
someone with practice pauses & senses that there is a difficulty here, even though he does not yet see 
it.28
Examining Wittgenstein’s analogy, we can infer that it posits certain preconditions 
inherent to successful philosophical inquiry, tantamount to sharp sightedness and 
acquisition of  “the right optical instruments”. These preconditions are presented as 
habitual, in that one must be pre-prepared to pay special attention when in territory 
where one’s words are particularly fraught with the possibility of  confusion. Practice 
entails apt caution, an ability to search and identify the moments that Wittgenstein 
insists lead to philosophical difficulties. If  one is restricted in one’s possible examinations 
of  expression to what one ‘catches’ in time then, due to their familiarity and common 
appearance, most sources of  confusion will go undetected. Conversely, if  one is trained 
to be willing to cease in one’s train of  thought and expression, problems become clear as  
one’s attention adjusts to the task. Wittgenstein is keen to stress that there is nothing very 
special in this account of  this ability – it is depicted in a way broadly equivalent to other 
skills one picks up through exercise and practice, and Wittgenstein intimates that it is 
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indicative of  a misunderstanding to express surprise at this account, presumably due to 
the deep ‘profundity’ often expected in any tasked assigned as philosophical in nature. 
This account is further related to the modal, conditional elements of  Wittgenstein’s 
method. In Chapter I we examined the strong reading made available by the later Baker 
for conceiving of  grammatical rules as codified and non-exhaustive “snap-shots” of  
meaning, as opposed to being conditional upon theses regarding the necessary 
characteristics of  language. The upshot of  this convincing conception of  grammatical 
rules and their investigation is the need to remain alert to the possible treatment of  such 
rules as exhaustive or necessary to an investigation.
 It is arguable that this methodological non-contiguity of  Wittgenstein’s philosophy is 
a factor that leads to his placing a strong emphasis upon the will, for the questions, 
qualifications and challenges posed to an individual regarding the use of  their words are 
“essentially person-relative, and [centre] on the dynamics of  somebody’s
thinking, not on the geometry of  thoughts.”29 The philosophical experience depicted 
should not be generalised as a method for uncovering the conclusive, exhaustive or 
exclusive meanings of  those words. Therefore no procedural shortcut is available and, 
given the piecemeal and therefore unending tasks in front of  anyone undertaking this 
kind of  grammatical investigation, an implied challenge is one regarding the task of  
finding the will to continue with such an undertaking. In the literary structure of  his 
work, in his explicit remarks and in the above reflection upon the resolution required for 
the tasks at hand, difficulties of  the will, as conceived of  by Wittgenstein, seem crucially 
related to the role played by our expressions and our relation to them in his philosophy. 
This is the subject to which we now turn.
§3.3  Difficulties of the will
Chapter I considered the grammatical method of  Wittgenstein’s philosophy and in line 
with Baker we settled upon grammatical investigation as a means to codify alternate 
aspects of  meanings. This method’s aim was presented as the eventual alteration of  an 
aspect, with this recoordination leading to the cessation of  dogmatic insistence in one’s 
modes of  expression. In this account, grammatical examples are designed to be 
employed strategically in the service of  providing alternate perspectives upon concepts 
which Wittgenstein took to be particularly likely to “drag one along” into confusion. 
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This kind of  confusion was therefore presented as being caused by the dogmatic 
assertion of  one abided aspect of  a complex, overlapping pattern of  uses made of  a 
word, with the exemplary case being considered as essential, underlying, necessary, and 
therefore deeply explanative. 
This is a concern we will turn to again now, because, as we shall see, 
Wittgenstein considered the task of  grammatical investigation to be exponentially 
complicated by one’s attachment to, and reliance upon, one’s preferred modes of  
representation. Firstly, consider, as Kuusela details below, how a tendency recurrently 
portrayed in Wittgenstein’s investigation is the assumption of  a form of  representation 
as being constitutive of  the subject being represented: 
When the mode of  presentation is (mis)understood as a truth, the philosopher is, 
as it were, driven by the dynamics of  the situation to state dogmatically that the 
characterisation must hold for all propositions. Thus what is a defining feature of  
her mode of  presentation is claimed to be a necessary feature of  her object of  
investigation. Wittgenstein writes: ‘now everything which holds of  the model will 
be asserted of  the object of  the examination; & asserted: it must always be … This 
is the origin of  a kind of  dogmatism.’30
Wittgenstein records himself  as having been certain that he perceived a state of  affairs 
of  the highest generality, represented by a model that promised the deepest kind of  
explanatory efficacy, and he employed a host of  different ways of  characterising this 
condition of  philosophical confusion. His most well known idiom is his account of  how 
he thought himself  to be tracing the outline of  a thing's nature over and over again, 
while he was in fact merely “tracing the frame” through which he insisted upon looking 
at it.31 Another theme which he employed on more than one occasion was of  this kind 
of  attribution as an “optical illusion [by which] we appear to see within the thing what is  
marked on our spectacles”.32 There is his more literal account of  how one predicates of  
the subject what lies in the method of  its representation,33 the consideration of  how an 
explanatory preconception can act as a “filter” that admits into view only a tiny number 
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of  the possible descriptions one might otherwise adopt,34 and the related notion of  such 
dogmatic adherence acting as a “brake” upon one’s freedom of  thought.35 It is relevant 
for our purposes to note that inherent in all of  these accounts of  filters, frames, 
projections, brakes and spectacles, is a substantive role for such preferred modes of  
representation; they are a way of  making sense of  a complex field in an abbreviated 
approximation, thus making that field comprehensible and simpler to navigate,36 at the 
price of  attenuating alternate possible aspects of  a given centre of  variation. They are 
not stupid prejudgements37 precisely because they substantively relate to perceived 
solutions and explanations of  the highly complex concepts relative to one’s conception 
of  language, thought, mind, meaning, etc. The depiction of  this habitual orchestration, 
as well as the direct references made to it above, occupied a great deal of  Wittgenstein’s 
effort, and integrally involves his notion of  a difficulty of  the will.  
 This is partially because, in normal light, the approximating legibility that is 
conferred by seeing one’s preferred model of  representation as constitutive of  the 
subject of  inquiry appears as overwhelmingly beneficial to its employer; it is preferred 
precisely because of  its efficacy. It admits the possibility of  elegant38 accounts, and it is 
partly these accounts’ elegance that occludes their simultaneous contribution towards 
the philosophical confusion that accompanies the subject of  inquiry. This is a conflict 
central to Wittgenstein’s conception of  difficulties of  the will: what one takes for a gift is 
instead a problem that one has to solve.39 Hence philosophical investigation gives rise to 
difficulties of  the will in a quite painful way, challenging the preferred, habitual modes of 
presentation that one previously conceived of  as fundamental, efficacious and 
revelatory40. If  one takes all individual words in language to name objects, 
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instead its suitability can be shown to depend upon the subject of  investigation at hand (see §6.1).
37 “One cannot guess how a word functions. One has to look at its use and learn from that. But the 
difficulty is to remove the prejudice which stands in the way of  doing this. It is not a stupid prejudice.” 
(PI §340)
38 “Elegance” is meant in the sense of  demonstrable symmetry and simplicity in one’s explanation. Again, 
see §6.1 for a discussion and resolution of  the apparent discordance between naturalistic elegance and 
Wittgensteinian justice.
39 MS 127 35v: 4.4.1943.
40 Hence, “[o]ne of  the greatest impediments for philosophy is the expectation of  new, deep//unheard of//
elucidations.” (P, p12, my emphasis)
 or all sensations to be private41, this projection of  one’s representation onto the subject 
of  enquiry seems to allow one a certain certitude and elegance in how one operates with 
those concepts, and hence the installation of  a mode of  representation as a universal 
aspect permits profound readings to be made of  otherwise too-complex phenomena. 
More specifically, treating an aspect of  our understanding as constitutive of  the subject 
itself  inters a stability in our conceptions, making their employer context insensitive; we 
no longer need to be “on the lookout”, nor to “pause to check” to see how our words 
operate in accordance to the contexts of  our use, for we have grasped the invariant 
essence of  a subject.42 Wittgenstein is adamant in his advice to his reader regarding the 
renewed endeavour required to learn new habits, to pay closer attention to the details of 
how one operates in one’s expressions, precisely in order to counteract the effect of  such 
insensitivity. The solution to the mistake Wittgenstein imputes himself  of  having fallen 
into seems, from this perspective, to necessitate the dismantling of  “everything 
interesting, that is, all that is great and important”, an interfering and ascetic task that 
seems contrary to one’s accrued intellectual achievements: “[t]he edifice of  your pride 
has to be dismantled. And that means dreadful work.”43 
 In seeking to substantiate this account, one does not have to look far for a 
portrayal of  such difficulties. When Wittgenstein admits to being tempted to persist in 
using a particular expression, to assert an alluringly universal explanation, or to treat 
a word’s variegated meanings as more simple than is made evident through 
consideration,44 he is demonstrating cases of  how he wants to conceive of  his own 
language use. Likewise, his interlocutorial schemes – either marked in quotations or 
implicit in the interactional style of  his text – commonly portray what Wittgenstein is 
tempted to express, occurring in relation to his undertaking a given philosophical 
investigation, be that temptation speculative,45 skeptical,46 assertive47 or contrary48 in 
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44 E.g. PI §§39, 20 & 182 respectively.
45 E.g. §193 “’If  we know the machine, everything else, that is its movement, seems to be already 
completely determined.’”
46 E.g. §68 "But then the use of  the word is unregulated, the 'game' we play with it is unregulated."
47 E.g. §187 "’But I already knew, at the time when I gave the order, that he ought to write 1002 after 
1000.’"
48 E.g. §520 “But surely that is arbitrary!”
formula. Therefore, far from being an outlying, contingent concern in understanding 
Wittgenstein’s conception of  philosophy, difficulties of  the will prove, upon 
examination, to be absolutely central to that task. This exegetical position is 
complementary to Wittgenstein’s own remarks on the subject: true, the reordering of  
concepts, the remembrance of  how one normally uses a word in achievement of  
perspicuity, and the invention of  new schemes for comparative purposes all feature 
heavily in his definitions of  the activity of  philosophy, for example: 
The most important aspects of  the case are not accessible to me because I do not have a 
perspicuous view of  the possibilities. … Look at it in a new way, through a new scheme.//
Make a different kind of  comparison!49
Yet the achievement of  perspicuity through successful comparisons is contingent upon 
addressing one’s difficulties of  the will, in respect to the entrenched manner in which we 
persist in projecting certain characteristics of  our representation as necessary and 
constitutive of  the subject of  inquiry. The task of  ordering our concepts is forestalled by 
the way we want things to be. Making a different kind of  comparison, achieving a new 
way of  looking, through a new scheme, supposes an ability to interrupt and to relent 
from an already established scheme, thereby making alternative cases “accessible”. Until 
this wilful problem is addressed, there can be no possibility of  a perspicuous view or an 
alleviating description because the task of  ordering concepts is forestalled by the 
habitual, systematic (§143) way we want to see them. “The philosophical problem is an 
awareness of  disorder in our concepts, and can be solved by ordering them”,50 yet such 
reordering presupposes that one is capable of  treating one’s claims of  necessity, or 
‘projections’, as contingent or merely representational. “It can be difficult not to use an 
expression, just as it is difficult to hold back tears, or an outburst of  anger”,51 and it is 
this difficulty that prompts his unique style of  solution. 
It is important to note that Wittgenstein at no point seems to posit the will as a 
psychological mechanism or capacity, as something perhaps roughly extensive with the 
considerations of  two of  his favourite authors, Schopenhauer and Nietzsche. If  it were 
so, Wittgenstein’s remarks and methods could be considered broadly veridical, as claims 
regarding the hidden nature of  the mind and of  philosophy. This of  course would be 
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out of  step with the grammatical strategy outlined in Chapter I. Instead, as Cavell does 
below, we can comfortably conceive of  Wittgenstein’s concern with the will as a method 
of  expressing a conviction and ethos in his approach to the task of  philosophical 
investigation.   
I am not thinking of  the will as a kind of  strength which I may have more or less 
of, but as a perspective which I may or may not be able to take upon myself. So 
one may say that the will is not a phenomenon but an attitude toward 
phenomena.52
The will, as interpreted here, is an attitudinal consideration. A difficulty of  the will is a 
difficulty in our attitude towards a phenomenon, related to our expectation, habit 
and desire for a universal conception of  a given complex concept, at the expense of  
more particular descriptions. Changing one’s attitude is therefore a conditional 
requirement upon which Wittgenstein’s account of  the practice of  philosophy turns; 
attention to and resolution of  what one wants and what one expects one’s expressions 
and concepts to do. Just as it is important to note that the will is an attitudinal 
philosophical concern, rather than a veridical one, so too must we note that it is the 
practitioner’s fascination itself, rather than its expression per se, that is the target of  the 
philosophical scenarios, questions, games and dialogues that populate Wittgenstein’s 
later compositions. Hence it is quite sensible why Wittgenstein qualifies philosophy as 
unconcerned with the reformulation or improvement of  language, but with the habits 
and expectations that accompany its expression53. It is not our language that needs 
revision, but our tendencies and hopes when employing it, for “philosophy, as we use 
the word, is a fight against the fascination which forms of  expression exert upon us.”54 
We saw earlier how adopting a certain aspect is voluntary, in that one can drop one 
way of  seeing in favour of  another. We also saw how differing aspects were not 
necessarily accumulative, in that one way of  seeing competes with, and “transiently 
excludes”55 another. Because of  these features, abiding by or dropping a certain 
aspect is deeply tied into difficulties of  the will. Indeed, we can say that “Seeing an 
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aspect and imagining are subject to the will. There is such an order as ‘Imagine this’, 
and also: ‘Now see the figure like this’; but not: ‘Now see this leaf  green’.”56 
It may well be objected that, instead of  the attitudinal and voluntaristic picture 
depicted here, Wittgenstein rather treats certain characteristics of  our language as the 
cause of  philosophical confusion. Doesn’t he state that “[t]he problems arising through a 
misinterpretation of  our forms of  language have the character of  depth. They are deep 
disquietudes; their roots are as deep in us as the forms of  our language and their 
significance is as great as the importance of  our language”? That philosophical 
problems have remained in a certain sense unchanged due to constancies in the form of  
language since the time of  Plato? Well yes, yet the idea of  confusion being somehow 
rooted in a “language” in this monolithic and normative conception seems quite out of  
sync with Wittgenstein’s own accounts, and with our conclusions in previous chapters. In 
the above passage from the Investigations, the problems were as deep in us as the forms of  
our language, not depicted as being identical with such forms, but rather as supervening 
upon them. A cursory survey of  Wittgenstein’s use of  the term “root” is most revealing:
 “The root of  this muddle is the confusing use of  the word 'object'.”:57  “There is a 
tendency rooted in our usual forms of  expression”:58 “Which form [one] prefers, and 
whether [one] has a preference at all, often depends on general, deeply rooted, 
tendencies of  [one’s] thinking.”:59 “By being educated in a technique, we are also 
educated to have a way of  looking at the matter which is just as firmly rooted as that 
technique.”:60 “Grasping the difficulty in its depth is what is hard. ... It has to be pulled 
out by the root; & that means, you have to start thinking about these things in a new 
way.”61 In all of  the above examples, the “deep-rootedness” of  a philosophical problem 
is associated specifically with the use & tendency of  a particular aspect, accompanying, 
rather than equating, the form of  expression by which one is drawn into uttering deeper  
and deeper confusion. The philosopher is tasked, then, with critically interrupting and 
investigating her own fascinations and compulsions of  expression, rather than 
adjudicating over a pernicious and static form of  language. To be clear: Wittgenstein 
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most certainly does seem to hold that language possesses characteristics that commonly 
lead to certain forms of  conceptual confusion being dramatically more likely to occur 
than others, and this is not here being disputed as a substantial element of  his account, it 
is rather being asserted that his investigations are tendential rather than linguistically 
interdictive in intent. This is an important point, relevant to what has so far been said 
and what will now be considered regarding difficulties of  the will. 
 
Just such a tendential approach regularly occurs in Wittgenstein’s ‘civil’ depictions of  the 
lives of  philosophical problems, as examined here and in C2. These depictions, through 
their variance, are not concerned with imputing a specific form of  representation that is 
at fault – although certain forms are more likely in his diagnosis to result in confusion – 
but instead with an insistent attitude expressed towards what ought to be the case, with 
“what ought to be” being orchestrated by various interchanging, discriminatory 
conceptions. The transformative experience of  challenging and then overcoming this 
attitude is precisely what is personified through Wittgenstein’s schemes of  interruption.
 Difficulties of  the will are problematic in this account of  philosophy because they 
are equivalent to an insistence in conception, and it is insistence that wars with one’s 
curiosity for those differences Wittgenstein wants to draw our attention to. A difficulty 
of  the will in Wittgenstein’s conception of  philosophy excludes the possibility of  
attaining a perspicuous new order in one’s conceptions, due to an insistent habitual 
ways of  perceiving a subject. A concern with such attitudinal filters, held to the 
detriment of  philosophical investigation, is a significant motivation in Wittgenstein’s 
manner of  structuring his philosophical remarks. It is one reason why he takes such 
great pains in achieving a high fidelity in his characterisation of  philosophical 
confusion through those things he is tempted to say, why he favors an interactional 
portrayal of  such confusions, and why schemes of  interruption feature so markedly in 
the Investigations. The questions, interjections, portrayals and pacing of  his text both 
reflect and encourage the task of  addressing those difficulties of  the will that assert 
restrictive conditions upon the range of  concepts we are capable of  considering, and 
are willing to employ. Wittgenstein’s interruptive style reflects the methodological 
demands that his conception of  philosophical problems gives rise to, with an 
intended synergy between his portrayals and his reader’s subsequent behaviour. His 
intent to stimulate philosophical investigation is expressed and effected to a significant 
degree in the structure and schemes of  his style of  writing. An interruptive 
experience in language use is intended to incite one to shift perspective in relation to 
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a given subject, thereby noticing differences, similarities and connections, through an 
interaction with the models provided. As we have argued, Wittgenstein’s models are 
notably open-ended, their presentation characterised by an incitive attitude towards 
their reader, and possessed of  a structure intended to portray the interruption and 
modification of  an aspectival avowal that is posited as a precondition of  philosophical 
confusion.62 Hence, Wittgenstein’s schemes of  interruption are concerned with 
combating difficulties of  the will, and inattention to his style of  writing means 
inattention to one of  the key qualifications of  his notion of  philosophy. Schemes of  
interruption signal his attempt at assistive portrayals, by which the reader gains the 
chance to see their own congruent habits mirrored, and their timing demonstrates 
how one can succeed in employing Wittgenstein’s conception of  the task of  
philosophy. As Wittgenstein repeatedly stresses, the aim of  his philosophy is not to 
teach anything in the normal sense, nor to impart a set of  beliefs or arguments, but 
instead represents an attempt to persuade the reader to do something, to stimulate 
them to act in a new way that is likely to be contrary to their pre-established habits 
and attitudes.63 
What I should like to get you to do is (not to agree with me in particular opinions but) to 
investigate the matter in the right way. To notice the interesting kind of  things (i.e. things 
that will serve as keys if  you use them properly.) … I don’t try to make you believe 
something you don’t believe, but to make you do something you won’t do.64  
We have reached a point where Glock’s revisionary challenge has been met to a 
satisfactory degree, in a manner that yields a nuanced account of  the interaction 
between a conception of  the difficulty of  the will involved in philosophical investigation, 
and a peculiar structure of  text that reflects a novel manner of  both documenting and 
inculcating a commitment to struggle against philosophical confusion. The base 
structure of  the justificatory argument looks something like the following:
 Wittgenstein states consistently that he wants to encourage a change of  behaviour in 
his students and readers’ thoughts, rather than the adoption of  a specific opinion or 
argument. He states that such changes are to be related to one’s expectations, desires 
and attention to one’s own expressions, and depend upon an alteration in accordance. 
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This explicit concern led to an impact upon his style of  philosophical writing, given that 
it can be shown that its purpose, beginning as early as 1931, was to achieve the above 
aims. As demonstrated, Wittgenstein’s style does indeed express a pattern of  
investigation that serves to interrupt problematic expression as it occurs, as detailed in 
this chapter. This pattern has been demonstrated to be relevant to Wittgenstein’s explicit 
aim in his philosophical writing, and one must suppose a gross coincidence in order to 
account for this synergy in a way that insists upon his style as irrelevant or detrimental to 
his philosophical methods and aims. Therefore an incitive reading of  his later writings is 
a justified and useful addition to exegesis, made in agreement with his later writings and 
therefore, pace Glock, Wittgenstein’s style is of  direct methodological interest.
 Through attention to demonstrable patterns in his later writing’s style, to the author’s 
remarks regarding his aims in writing philosophy, and to his conception of  the role of  
the will in the solution of  philosophical difficulties, we have arrived at a portrayal of  
Wittgenstein’s philosophy that makes a methodological boon of  the relation discernible 
between his attribution of  the character of  philosophical problems, his intended 
resolution of  them, and a set of  discrete characteristics prevalent in the structure and 
timing of  his writing.
§3.4 The revisionist counter argument
While Glock’s challenge has thus been met, there is an argument posited by Hilmy that 
actively seeks to impute this chapter (and a sizable section of  the last too) as 
misconstruing the true nature of  Wittgenstein’s stylistic features, while supporting 
Glock’s main claim as to the frivolity of  laying any exegetical weight upon facets of  
Wittgenstein’s style. In his book, The Later Wittgenstein, Hilmy argues against an exegetical 
position roughly analogous to the one detailed here, labeling it, somewhat uncharitably, 
as the “conspiracy theory” – presumably because in his judgement, such a theory posits 
Wittgenstein as conspiring to ‘covertly’ provoke a response from his reader.65 His target 
is substantially different to the interpretation given here, but its argument can be equally 
applied and is thus insensitive to fine-grain differences. 
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there are numerous explicit remarks that detail Wittgenstein’s intentions to effect a change in his reader’s 
actions and manners of  thought through his writing and teaching, his consideration of  how his text 
should demonstrate synergy with his reader’s activity, and his concern as to how persistent the effect of  his 
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“The [conspiracy] theory is roughly that Wittgenstein’s method was deliberately to write 
in what has been called a ‘non-linear’ manner for the therapeutic goal of  getting the 
reader to learn to ‘cope’ for himself  philosophically.”66
Hilmy offers two main objections against “what otherwise would be a plausible theory.” 
“Firstly, most of  what Wittgenstein wrote was initially written for himself  – that it was 
written in notebooks as a personal record of  his own struggles with philosophical 
problems.”67 This objection treats Wittgenstein’s remark as to the tete-a-tete nature of  his 
work in its literal sense, just as we did in Chapter II, yet it does so as a means to qualify 
both the entirety of  Wittgenstein’s later writing and the author’s intentions in producing 
it, as strictly autobiographical. However, this objection does not admit of  the possibility 
of  an intentional synergy, as discussed in this chapter, in Wittgenstein’s writing, yet we 
know from one of  Wittgenstein’s most well-known remarks 68 that the express intention 
for his writing was just that: to achieve an interaction between his own ‘assistive’ 
portrayals and the cued revisionary philosophical work of  his reader. Further, it cannot 
sensibly be claimed by Hilmy that this strategy is unprecedented: rhetorically speaking, 
this kind of  display – in which an agonistic exchange takes place in an attempt to sway 
one’s reader or listener – can be traced back to antiquity, to the rhetorical method of  
eliciting response known as inter se pugnantia.69 Something similar can be said to be 
present in Plato’s dialogues, whose depictions of  philosophical problems are known to 
have been well considered by Wittgenstein, with his life-long interest in the strategy and 
elegance of  the writings of  Kraus and Nestroy equally indicating an active interest in 
satirical prose and its typical depiction of  shortcomings in the hope of  stimulating, 
shocking, or shaming the reader into change. There are therefore both known 
precedents and clear motives for Wittgenstein to be said to be doing something 
analogous, in the manner qualified here, in his own writing.  
 Be that as it may, it should be noted that Hilmy is not making unqualified 
accusations; his position is derived in part from Wittgenstein’s own remarks; he offers 
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69 “Fighting amongst themselves”.
one quotation in particular in support of  this “private” account of  Wittgenstein’s 
records:
“I have no right to offer for publication a book in which simply the difficulties which I 
perceived are expressed ad repeated over and over again. These difficulties are indeed of  
interest for me who was stuck in them, but not necessarily for humanity (others). They are 
peculiarities of  my thinking, necessitated by my development. They belong, so to speak, in 
a diary, not a book.”70
We will return shortly to the efficacy of  basing one’s exegesis upon the “most 
despondent” self-reflections of  an author. First, the obvious question that arises is: ‘did 
Wittgenstein, then, conceive of  his later writing as solely, discretely, of  interest only to 
himself ?’71  The answer to this question depends upon which fragment of  Wittgenstein’s 
self-analysis one takes as exemplary, or revelatory of  a universal quality, of  
Wittgenstein’s work. One can quite clearly take alternate quotes that project a different 
light upon the author’s consideration of  the importance of  his own writing: 
“When I solve philosophical problems I have a feeling as though I had done something of 
utmost importance for all of  humanity [and] don’t think that these matters appears so 
immensely important to me (or shall I say are so important to me) because they plague 
me.”72
“Do not trouble yourself  with what is, presumably, only of  interest to yourself ”73
The similarity between the tete-a-tete style of  many of  Wittgenstein’s notes and their 
polished form also raises some interesting problems for Hilmy. Was Wittgenstein 
preparing for publication of  a diary, then? Did he conceive of  the precipitation of  his 
investigations, and their agonistic portrayal, as of  no interest or relevance to his 
professed aims to stimulate and persuade the reader? Why the radical disjunction 
between his stated aims and their precipitate’s regular and consistent stylistic features? 
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What characteristics, if  not those explored in this chapter and the previous one, do 
correspond to the descriptors that litter his notes regarding the role of  his writing? 
Hilmy’s error seems to be his treatment of  the text as possessing only a singular role, to 
the exclusion of  its other dimensions, and yet these dimensions have been recurrently 
documented as wholly intended. Why does Hilmy claim that it is implausible to conceive 
of  Wittgenstein’s style in his presentation of  his own philosophical experiences as 
synergetic with the stimulus of  a related experience for his reader? Was this effect, so 
desired by the author, merely professed, remaining ineffectual due to a lack of  
proficiency, then? Apparently, this is precisely the position adopted by Hilmy. 
 Hilmy’s reading of  the text in support of  this position is as diligent here as elsewhere 
in his book. He assembles a number of  remarks made by Wittgenstein in which the 
author attributes his own style of  writing as betraying a form of  incompetence;74 as 
being inevitable given the limited nature of  the “equipment” he had at his disposal in 
writing prose;75 and as a failure of  strength, where a suitable exertion would have 
resulted in a complete, formal and linear treatise quite unlike the form of  writing we 
find in the Investigations.76 Apparently, Wittgenstein “wrote in a non-linear manner 
because this was a stylistic idiosyncrasy of  his which he could not overcome to his 
satisfaction, however much he tried.”77 Therefore Hilmy concludes that any argument 
that assigns philosophical relevance to an entirely accidental, unintentional, even 
debilitative, style of  writing, is necessarily vacuous. What is actually needed, Hilmy 
contends, is to see beyond this style, towards those elements that survive the chronic 
“shortcoming” of  Wittgenstein’s style.
 This second objection supposes Wittgenstein’s more self-deprecating, confessional 
remarks to be equally worthwhile in their account of  his writing as the more method-
explanatory remarks considered in this chapter. If  we accept this exegetical supposition, 
treating Wittgenstein as necessarily being a reliable reporter at all times, the problem 
then becomes the qualitative differentiation between remarks that are ‘desirable’, 
because they support Hilmy’s preferred reading, and remarks that are equally recurrent 
in their attitude towards Wittgenstein work, but display characteristics that are either 
contradictory with that preferred position or appear altogether absurd. For example, are 
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we equally entitled to help ourselves to the conclusion that Wittgenstein’s work is, as a 
whole, almost entirely worthless? That he displays no genius in his work? Or that his 
Jewish heritage is as detrimental to his work’s potentiality as is his “faulty equipment” 
and stylistic “incompetence”? It is pertinent that Hilmy is unwilling to accept the 
veracity of  Wittgenstein’s confessions in this regard78, whilst simultaneously relying 
heavily upon qualitatively similar remarks in his argument.
 There is also an obvious concern in this supposition of  such disconsolate remarks as 
universally veridic of  Wittgenstein’s later writing; Hilmy’s indictment along such lines is 
willfully negligent of  the characteristics of  that style that are clearly contiguous with their 
professed aims, as documented in this chapter. It is a treatment that seeks to 
uncharitably impute to his later work the qualifications made of  it at the weakest, most 
pessimistic moments of  its author’s reflections. The reading given here can by contrast 
be considered as ‘optimistic’ about Wittgenstein’s achievements in philosophical prose, 
and hence it attributes greater importance to those remarks that express intriguing and 
original characteristics of  his writing, contiguous with other remarks made regarding the 
aim of  such writing, rather than contiguous with those morose reflections that also 
punctuate his diaries that record only a fear of  failure, unoriginality and limitation. This 
is not a naive optimism, but a reading strategy intended to avoid conclusions that are 
based solely on psychological assumptions regarding the philosopher, rather than his 
work. As Janik & Toulmin succinctly put it,
To grope after the ultimate source of  Wittgenstein’s deepest intellectual attitudes in his 
personal temperament and makeup would, very likely, betray us into unprofitable and 
irrelevant speculations. (As he says to Engelmann in a letter written from England, in the 
summer of  1925: ‘How could I expect you to understand me, when I barely understand 
myself !’)”79
It seems likely that Wittgenstein did indeed fear irrelevance and unoriginality, yet 
whether these fears were proportionate to his authorship remains to be judged by that 
person he was so commonly concerned with, whose opinion and response to his work 
was of  utmost importance to him; his reader. The success of  the process that animated 
Wittgenstein’s notion of  philosophical activity, of  which he struggled to precipitate in his 
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readers, is to be judged by the criteria thereby defined, rather than by the moments of  
doubt and distress that are common to Wittgenstein’s reflections. 
 Even so, despite all these concerns, one might be tempted to accede to Hilmy’s 
insistence that Wittgenstein didn’t modify the structure, pace and iteration of  his writing 
in order to affect and aid his reader’s own philosophical undertakings, and that his 
‘stylistic idiosyncrasy’ was an unmitigated burden which impaired an otherwise great 
mind’s output. In such a position, it is still exegetically necessary to acknowledge the fact 
that his “unmediated” remarks – understood as Hilmy does – being discretely 
autobiographical in character and effect, might well lead to the kind of  philosophical 
incitement discussed here regardless, seeing how they are a diary or sketchbook of  his 
undertakings, authored with great skill and consideration.80 If  one admits this, then the 
differentiation between the two positions recedes to the point of  banality. The only 
difference between an ‘accidental’ and an ‘authored’ incitive style would be one that 
rests upon a judgement to do with Wittgenstein’s abilities as a philosopher, teacher and 
writer, and more generally, whether he was perceptive enough to interleaf  the explicit 
philosophical aims of  his methods into the considered presentation of  those methods. Of 
course Wittgenstein had these considerations, and of  course he would have at least 
attempted to modulate his style to articulate his philosophy to better achieve his aims. To 
suppose otherwise is to impute a gross limitation to Wittgenstein’s intelligence, quite 
incongruous with his literary interests, his taste, his authorship, and his achievements. 
That, over the course of  a twenty-year period, Wittgenstein expressed doubts as to 
whether his writing was of  any worth, was a product solely of  his deficiencies, or was 
capable of  achieving what it set out to do, is not altogether surprising. What is surprising 
is that Hilmy might seek to use these moments as incontrovertible proof  that 
Wittgenstein’s style of  writing is of  absolutely no relevance to his philosophical method 
and aims. 
 Finally, Hilmy relies upon pure coincidence in accounting for the synergy 
documented in this chapter: he claims that although one might readily concede that “his  
remarks lend themselves to teaching philosophy, there is no suggestion that this is what 
he had conspired to do in writing them.”81 Hilmy further admits there is a “strategy 
behind the drafting of  the Philosophical Investigations” which he takes “to convey a way of  
thinking, a method of  doing philosophy, rather than [to] disseminate philosophical 
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truths or doctrines.”82 It seems highly incongruous for Hilmy to be perfectly comfortable 
when attributing to Wittgenstein’s work a hidden strategy, one concerned with the 
conveyance of  a manner of  thinking, while also denying that the style of  this work – that 
is, such characteristics as its pace, structure, use of  questions and timing, as well as its 
polyphonic characterisation of  philosophical difficulties – might have some role to play 
in the achievement of  such a strategy. Is this hidden strategy, then, so anaemic, or 
alternately so devious, that it does not impact the text’s characteristics at all? Are we to 
believe that this text’s composition is structured in a way that achieves these aims purely 
by coincidence? By subconscious mishap? And are we to believe this solely on the 
evidence of  remarks made by Wittgenstein regarding his own shortcomings? 
Instead, I posit the aptness of  an account of  style and method which directly informs 
what we take his method to constitute. The disruption of  the procedures that make up 
one’s life is clearly entailed by this reading; that familiar irritation that accompanies the 
occasion of  one’s personal belongings being uprooted and reordered according to 
preferences other than one’s own, is made relative to the notion of  difficulties of  the will. 
It is clearer now that the success of  adopting a new manner of  thinking supervenes 
upon one’s ability to undermine those willful characteristics that collocate set ways in 
our understanding. It is now no surprise, then, that Wittgenstein’s style of  authorship 
should strike his reader as perplexing, if it were to be taken as irrelevant to his 
transformative concerns:
I am like a piano teacher. I am trying to teach a style of  thinking, a technique – not a 
subject matter. If  you hear me playing just a bit, you’d think it was awful – just noise, 
discordant notes. You would think it was a poor performance, but it is not a performance 
at all.83
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Chapter IV
Interference and Invention: Foucault’s Fictive Method
_________________________________________
I should like you to say: "Yes, it's true, you can imagine that too, that might happen 
too!"—But was I trying to draw someone's attention to the fact that he is capable of  
imagining that?——I wanted to put that picture before him, and his acceptance of  the 
picture consists in his now being inclined to regard a given case differently: that is, to 
compare it with this rather than that set of  pictures. I have changed his way of  looking at 
things.
 — Ludwig Wittgenstein, Philosophical Investigations §144
Nothing is more important for teaching us to understand the concepts we have than 
constructing fictitious ones.
 — Wittgenstein, Culture and Value1
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This chapter marks an obvious shift of  subject, being concerned with establishing a 
particular reading of  the later philosophical methods of  Michel Foucault. The reason 
for this shift is to establish and qualify the kind sympathy that exists between his and that 
of  Wittgenstein’s, and the complementary nature of  their two methods’ approach to the 
solution of  a certain type of  problem, leading to their integrated application in Chapters 
V & VI. There is of  course a shared lineage between these two philosophers, with both 
men being influenced in particular by the works of  Schopenhauer and Nietzsche. Yet 
the approach adopted here instead compares the operative aims of  their philosophies, 
rather than seeking to claim common-ground solely in terms of  constituent influences. 
 I will argue that, once Foucault’s intention of  creating fictional experiences by which 
to problematise a variety of  his reader’s conceptions has been established, a number of  
direct methodological similarities emerge. This may well sound like startling news to a 
reader accustomed to one but not the other of  these philosophers’ work, or perhaps 
even to one familiar with both. One territory where this shared method is relatively 
explicit is in the construction and presentation of  models specifically chosen and created 
to compromise their reader’s previously unproblematic conception of  a field of  inquiry, 
and the complicated relation to the evidence that such models employ. Another relates 
to the status of  such models; evidence will be given for the suitability of  applying an 
aspectival reading, in sympathy with Chapter I, with both methods resulting in a form of 
philosophical writing that function as work-books by which the reader is expected to 
experiment, rather than ex-cathedra treatises, and as such both imply a peculiar 
relationship to their reader. Yet another relates to the intended effect of  such methods, 
namely the dissolution of  the hold which a generalised account may exert upon the 
imagination, judgement and, therefore, actions of  an individual, in favour of  a more 
occasion-sensitive habit of  thought. Similarly to the previous chapter’s concluding 
position, Foucault’s method will be shown to place an emphasis of  responsibility on the 
reader, demanding the experience of  reconsidering their own actions – how they 
respond to and conceive of  their “cultural universe”2 – in light of  such models. Both 
philosophers share a concern with the formative nature of  one’s conceptions upon the 
life one experiences, the relationship between one’s conceptions and one’s related 
behaviour, and the irremediable status of  problems that arise from such conceptions, if  
one is unwilling or incapable of  also altering the habits iterated in one’s experience. The 
dissolution of  the conditions that require a certain question to be asked, rather than the 
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answering of  said questions, will be posited as the net effect of  both methods of  work on 
oneself,3 as will the consideration of  philosophy as a discipline that problematises certain 
generalised classifications through the use of  models that demonstrate their contingency 
upon singular context (a theme taken up in Chapter V). To this end, a substantial 
reading will be offered regarding the treatment of  Foucault’s later texts – with Discipline 
and Punish taken as the exemplar – that focuses upon his ascription of  his own work as 
fictive, and this ascription’s similarity to a number of  historiographical theorists. The 
aim of  his methods will be shown to be primarily the problematisation of  a field of  
experience through the presentation of  alternate modes of  intelligibility, which 
compromise the conceptual unities they are designed to compete with.
 I will briefly argue that Foucault’s philosophy has two distinct fields of  exegesis which 
share characteristics with those investigated in Chapter I. Gordon Baker’s game-
changing shift from veridical claims regarding the status of  Wittgenstein’s grammatical 
remarks, towards an aspectival reading as to the nature of  his method is significantly 
similar to the school of  interpretation identifiable in Foucaultian exegesis. A summation 
of  the second school will demonstrate alternate notions of  the purpose and process of  
Foucault’s philosophical method, and will come to much the same conclusion as the 
later Baker did in Chapter I: a preference for the aspectival reading on the basis of  both 
fidelity to the author’s own remarks, and the consistency in the position that such a 
reading yields, in opposition to problematic disparities that emerge if  one follows a 
veridical model of  interpretation. It will thereby be demonstrated that the majority of  
criticism aimed at Foucault are supplemental to a veridical reading, and thus operate 
under a misunderstanding of  the status of  his work.  
 By this stage a set of  characteristics convergent with Wittgenstein’s own methods 
should have become recognisable to the reader, and therefore available for pursuit in 
Chapter V, and so the chapter closes with a summary of  Foucault’s method that allows 
us to heed the symmetry between the two methods’ aims. In the final chapter I argue 
that this symmetry enables their complementary employment, while also explaining the 
close agreement in both thinker’s concepts regarding the task of  philosophy; namely to 
problematise familiar conceptions in order encourage a type of  perspicuity that curbs 
certain tendencies of  dogmatic thought.
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§4.1 History and narrative
Foucault is often treated as a duplicitous and unreliable source when exegetes attempt to 
determine the status of  his work. This is due no doubt in part to his common use of  
anonymity, to him famously destabilising the unity in the notions of  author and oeuvre, 
the non-contiguous styles and terms to be found in his different works, and of  course the 
complexity of  his philosophy. Despite his explicit and consistent denials, Foucault is 
commonly located within either the Marxist or structuralist traditions that were at their 
apex in mid- to late-20th century French cultural theory and philosophy. This results in 
a reading clearly inconsistent with Foucault’s self-ascriptions. We can usefully conceive of 
such sets of  readings as falling under a greater set, here labelled ‘the veridical reading’, 
and this broad set of  interpretations includes theorists who are both critical of, and in 
agreement with, Foucault’s supposed method. The reason for here collecting a number 
of  divergent interpretations under one heading is their shared premise as to the status of 
the claims being made by Foucault in works such as Discipline and Punish4. That is to say, 
those interpretations subsumed under this heading presume Foucault’s various models to 
represent historical causal explanation in a manner broadly convergent with other 
enquires such as structuralism and academic history. Foucault is commonly understood 
in the veridical interpretation as a historian, a structuralist, a social theorist, a Marxist or 
a nihilistic philosopher. The commonality in all these readings is in their attribution of  
Foucault’s texts as offering a series of  correct, truth-attaining (or more caustically, truth-
attempting) accounts which, due to their stark difference from previous historical accounts, 
underline an academical bias in those discourses they war with. If  such a status were 
accepted then it validly follows that Foucault’s own “historical analyses cannot be 
exempt from the standard assessment of  such studies”5.
 One of  the most common subsets of  the veridical reading locates his method firmly 
within the structuralist tradition; in Merquior’s book-long attack (1985) on the methods 
of  Michel Foucault, for example, he is presented as a ‘good’6 or a ‘maverick’7 
structuralist, who is guilty of  committing three major methodological mistakes. Firstly, 
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the veridical criticisms and my responses generalise quite acceptably across his later works. Indeed, 
according to some theorists, something similar unifies his entire body of  work (cf: O’Leary 2010).
5 Merquior 1985, p150.
6 Ibid, p88.
7 Ibid, p11.
Foucault’s histories render their subjects in a manner which strongly disagrees with the 
“master historians”8 of  the 20th century, an august group, in which Merquior includes 
Pieter Spierenburg, Jean Léonard, Lawrence Stone, Franco Venturi and Arthur Lovejoy. 
This explanatory incompatibility with their work is taken to cast serious aspersions on 
the fidelity of  Foucault’s accounts. Secondly, Foucault apparently exhibits a bias in 
omitting pertinent evidence and events: Léonard accuses Foucault of  failing “to stress 
enough the religious origin and motivation of  many a technique of  drill or rite of  
exclusion belonging to his catalogue of  disciplines”, while Merqiour despairs that he 
“could find no quotes from the Emile or from Pestalozzi in Discipline and Punish.”9 Even 
Loius McNay, whose own work is indebted to Foucault’s, similarly remarks that “some 
critics have rightly argued that the construction of  the subject cannot simply be 
explained through reference to bodily experiences” and therefore “Foucault emphasises 
too heavily the effects of  a corporeally-centred disciplinary power.”10 Thirdly and finally, 
Foucault is accused of  a tendency towards circular reasoning; his conclusions are already 
present at their beginning due to his bad habit of  “ideological pre-interpretation”.11  
 I argue that the predilection for this exegetical tendency, and its subsequent angles of  
criticism, are unwarranted when there clearly exists, as there does, a far more suitable 
set of  philosophers and critical theorists with which to compare and comprehend his 
work, according to a common theme in Foucault’s self-ascriptions. This theme is of  
direct relevance to his PhD supervisor, George Canguilhem, his colleague and close 
friend Paul Veyne, other theorists such as White, Chartier, Jenkins, certain historians 
whose work Foucault showed great respect for,12 such as Braudel and Le Roy Lauderie, 
and, by extending this common denominator only slightly, to Tolstoy and even to 
Wittgenstein himself. The persistent denominator is a conception of  historical causal 
explanation of  the past as substantively narrational and consequently in some sense 
unavoidably fictive. This understanding of  the fictive element of  history can be shown 
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11 Cf: Williams 1981. Oddly, there is little agreement between veridical readers upon exactly what Foucault 
is pre-committed to. Merquior himself  diagnoses a form of  nihilistic anarchism: “[Foucault] was the 
founding father of  our Kathedranihilismus.” (p160)
 
12 This is a contestable account. For three well argued and well acquainted, yet partly opposing depictions 
of  Foucault’s relations with his contemporaries in the Annales school and other historians, see Veyne 2010 
& Rajchman 1988 (pp102-3), and the excellent Dosse 1998.
to be central to Foucault’s work; indeed I argue that without its acknowledgement and 
consideration, gross misreading of  that work can ensue. Locally, in respect to our 
current interests, it is equally true that without this consideration, any claim of  there 
being a methodological sympathy between his work and that of  Wittgenstein remains 
somewhat tenuous.
         In what way can history be considered fictional? There are two broad fields of  
argument in support of  the ascription; one that relies upon apparent characteristics of  
the past as a potential field of  enquiry, and one that relies upon what narrational, sine 
qua non characteristics can be attributed to the discipline of  history. Some of  the main 
premises of  these arguments were coherently argued as early as 1869, in a series of  
theoretical asides that punctuate Tolstoy’s Napoleonic narrative in War and Peace. 
Tolstoy’s critique is remarkably prescient, and can be broadly understood along three 
lines. Firstly, and most importantly, the past is a field of  inquiry that is causally limitless 
and thus enables a multiplicity of  alternate systems of  explanation:
[A]n incalculable number of  causes present themselves. The deeper we delve in search of  
these causes the more of  them we find; and each separate cause or whole series of  causes 
appears to us equally valid in itself  and equally false by its insignificance compared to the 
magnitude of  the events, and by its impotence — apart from the cooperation of  all the 
other coincident causes — to occasion the event.  To us, the wish or objection of  this or 
that French corporal to serve a second term appears as much a cause as Napoleon's 
refusal to withdraw his troops beyond the Vistula and to restore the duchy of  Oldenburg; 
for had he not wished to serve, and had a second, a third, and a thousandth corporal and 
private also refused, there would have been so many less men in Napoleon's army and the 
war could not have occurred.13
Thus Tolstoy posits the past as being irremediably composite, suited to innumerable 
causal accounts which, only when combined in toto in a single account (a quite clearly 
absurd condition for an historical inquiry), could hope to exhaust the causes of  an event. 
When Tolstoy examined the Napoleonic histories, what he found was the preferencing 
of  particular individuals, themes and trends as hierarchically more important causal 
explanations, over and above less glamorous, worse documented, more complex and 
obscure candidates, according to the perspective adopted by the given historian.
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 Secondly, the combinatorial effect of  numerous histories, each preferencing alternate 
systems of  causal explanation, results in history revealing its deeply contested status, in 
stark difference to the truth claims that their historians hope for them to bear. “As soon 
as historians of  different nationalities and tendencies begin to describe the same event, 
the replies they give immediately lose all meaning, for [such causal forces are] 
understood by them all not only differently but often in quite contradictory ways.” Thus 
history taken as a broad discourse is self-compromising, as each account preferences 
alternate causal organisations from an innumerable field, each arriving at wildly varying 
accounts and thus “mutually destroying one another's positions”.14 
 Thirdly, the process of  disproving an history is, unless it clearly falsifies records or 
invents historical accounts, fraught by its reliance upon other histories to do the 
disproving. The first two criticisms clearly apply equally to any verifying account as 
much as that one under scrutiny. As soon as one moves from the “incalculable series of  
causes” that present themselves towards the imposition of  a definite and limiting casual 
history, one has also imposed a preferential system of  organisation upon the past that 
outputs a system of  explanation that is as dependent upon the force of  its exposition and 
its place within its discipline as it is upon its explicative power. Histories from different 
countries and periods express differing accounts according to the conditions under 
which they were written, the causalities they preference, and are therefore destructively, 
constantly contested, and thus unstable as a means of  falsification in comparison to 
naturalistic methodology, leaving the field debilitated by its limited means of  
falsification. Therefore differing histories demonstrate alternate positions from which to 
understand past events, as much as they represent truthfully causal accounts. 
 So much for a Tolstoyan critique of  history. Critics more contemporary to Foucault 
take a different tack, one that is however compatible with Tolstoy’s argument. Their 
interest focuses upon the nature of  the historical narrative by which casual accounts 
occur, rather than an idea of  the past as indeterminable; perhaps the most well-known 
of  these critics are Paul Ricoeur and Hayden White.15 Briefly speaking – for the deep 
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15 However Tolstoy does give a distinct reason for the fictive status of  history, relative to those accounts 
given by Foucault’s contemporaries: 
“The first method of  history is to take an arbitrarily selected series of  continuous events and examine it 
apart from others, though there is and can be no beginning to any event, for one event always flows 
uninterruptedly from another. The second method is to consider the actions of  some one man - a king or 
a commander - as equivalent to the sum of  many individual wills; whereas the sum of  individual wills is 
never expressed by the activity of  a single historic personage.” (2007, Book 11, Chapter 1)
intricacies of  their arguments’ various incarnations are not directly relevant to our 
concerns here – the role of  a narrative in a given history is that of  coherence won 
through attention to preferenced detail and its assimilation within a causal sequence. An 
historical narrative "grasps together" and integrates into one whole and complete story 
multiple and scattered events, thereby organising the intelligible signification attached to 
the narrative taken as a whole. In the process, preferred vehicles are designated and then 
manipulated as the unifying casual units of  significance; such agents upon the stage are 
commonly leaders, goals, cultural motifs, motivations, interactions, capacities, sudden 
reversals, zeitgeists, destinies, national character, greatness, ineluctable force or, failing all 
else, sheer chance. Typically, these narrative vehicles are synecdochic16 in nature, in that 
that stand in proxy for complex fields of  past events, that do not readily or simply yield 
to singular historical explanation, and thus require generalised approximation. As 
Chartier remarks,
All history, even the least ‘narrative’, even the most structural, is always constructed 
according to the same formulas that govern the production of  narratives. The entities that 
historians manipulate (society, classes, mentalities, etc) are ‘quasi characters’ implicitly 
endowed with the properties of  the singular heroes and the ordinary individuals who 
make up the collectivities designated by the abstract categories.17
In addition to this causal nomothesis, historical narratives must paraphrase events, in 
that ‘[t]ime is foreshortened, details selected and highlighted, action concentrated, 
relations simplified” with such invention occurring not to alter the events but rather to 
give them meaning.18 Omission and emphasis, the pace at which a timescale is 
represented, and rigid designation of  a history’s limits of  interest all serve to render it 
sensible as a discrete field of  knowledge. As Tolstoy saw in 1869, such narratives allow 
multiple alternate schemes of  signification and causal apportioning, by editing, 
compressing and arranging a series of  events, derived from historical documentation, to 
cohere a pattern significantly organised according to one’s unifying principles of  
narration; progressive, Marxist, feminist, neoliberal, humanist, etc. The sum of  this 
critique is not that the documental evidence employed in historical accounts is false or 
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historiographical argument.
17 1997, p26.
18 Lowenthal 1985, p218.
flawed, but that the narratives in which they are placed assimilate this evidence in 
coherent casual systems whose sum expression is not so much an exhaustive history – 
their technical means prohibit such an aim – but instead a narrative which resignifies a 
field of  phenomena, or redesignates which of  those phenomena are particularly worthy 
of  explanatory attention. Thus the historical author serves to collocate the sets of  
coordinates by which one comprehends its given field of  inquiry.
 This critical position is clearly related to one taken in Wittgenstein’s reflections upon 
causality in historical accounts: “What is insidious about the [historical] causal approach 
is that it leads one to say: ‘Of  course, that's how it has to happen’. Whereas one ought to 
say: It may have happened like that, and in many other ways.”19 … “[There is] nothing 
more stupid than the chatter about cause & effect in history books; nothing more wrong-
headed, more half-baked. — But who could put a stop to it by saying that?20 Foucault 
clearly saw the same deep problem in causal historical accounts as did Wittgenstein, and 
resolved “to discard the preconception according to which history without causality 
would not be history.”21 His compositions are an attempt to problematise given fields of  
experience through alternate narrational modes of  presentation, in order that their 
reader is led to see the dogmatism of  their previous commitment towards something 
necessarily being the case because of  its causal linkage in a historical narrative, and thus 
to admit that the received accounts of  how we arrived at where we are are already 
committed to a particular form of  nomothesis. As we shall see, Foucault’s method differs 
from most of  those historians and historiographers mentioned above in regard to his 
conscious play upon the fictive status of  his work, using narratives to drive his 
transformative philosophical method. It therefore differs from that of  authors such as 
White and Ricoeur in its explicit aim. On his critical understanding, historical narrative 
is a codified form of  unity, present in a means of  representation, rather than in the 
highly complex phenomenon being so represented, and its purpose is to create a fixed 
model by which to envisage this multivalent and undisclosed past.
Michel Foucault’s work is reflexively fictional, then, its purpose very specific. His account 
of  his own methods as characteristically fictive is one that he repeats often,22 and which 
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reflections upon the constitutive nature of  narrative in historical accounts.
20 MS 134 143: 13-14.4 1947.
21 DE I, p607.
22 E.g. cf: 1989a, p213, 1989b, p301 or 1991c.
thereby delimits his philosophical method so starkly, that it makes it a characterisation 
rare in both the stability and the conditionality of  its self-ascription, and therefore of  
importance to any would-be reader. It is true that the conception of  historical accounts 
as irremediably narrational is central to a crisis that has deeply impacted upon history as  
a discipline, but Foucault’s purpose was not necessarily concerned with provoking this 
crisis. As we shall see, Foucault’s method is quite unique to those of  his forerunners, 
namely in its invention and application of  reflexively fictive history in the service of  
emancipatory programs that sought to provide a form of  experiential ‘interference’ in 
the manner in which a person employs generalising conceptions and classifications in 
their judgement. 
 As we have already seen, Foucault’s account of  his work as fictive can be made sense 
of  as a qualification of  the manner in which the historical events that constitute them 
are ordered and arranged in order to establish a causal narrative between their 
occurrence. From his lecture, The Order of Discourse, through to his final interviews, 
Foucault speaks of  the role of  fiction in establishing the coherence and regime necessary 
for the production of  his critical genealogy:
I am not merely a historian. I am not a novelist. What I do is a kind of  historical fiction. 
In a sense I know very well that what I say is not true. A historian could say of  what I’ve 
said, “That’s not true.” . . . What I am trying to do is provoke an interference between our 
reality and the knowledge of  our past history. If  I succeed, this will have real effects in our 
present history. My hope is that my books become true after they have been written—not 
before . . . I hope that the truth of  my books is in the future.23
 
When Foucault imagines, in the above text, a historian reporting on what he has written 
“that’s not true” he is certainly not acceding in regards to the particular events that his 
work documents24 but instead to the narrational telos by which they are coordinated. 
Likewise, fiction is clearly not meant as a pejorative term – Foucault is making no 
confession – but instead recognises the imposition of  an arrangement of  selected events 
in service to a particular descriptive end and, therefore, a preferenced perspective. 
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Kreuznach, are they myths? – the pilgrimage of  the insane to Larchant, Gournay, Besangon, Geehl, are 
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myth?” (Foucault 1978, p58)
Foucault’s ‘historical fiction’ is a self-conscious imposition upon elements acquired 
through archival research, in pursuit of  a narrative that is coherent enough to achieve 
the aim of  the problematisation of  its subject. The role of  he who produces such narratives 
is therefore as “he who implants, into the troublesome language of  fiction, its unities, its 
coherence, its links with reality.”25 The purpose of  his ‘history’, then, is the imposition of 
a particular narrative upon a set of  past events, made in pursuit of  destabilising effects 
as a defining mode of  a philosophical practice. 
 Foucault was much taken with the work of  those of  his peers who demonstrated that 
new forms of  history were possible once narrative was rendered as its explicit, malleable 
method. For example, the innovative approach of  Braudel, in his genesis of  the method 
of  longue durée – history on a vast, almost geographical scale, that emphasises change that 
is so slow and incremental that it is otherwise imperceptible. In such works as The 
Mediterranean, Braudel (1996) expands the perspective of  his narrative to its maximum 
resolution, in his attempt to prove that history can do more than ‘study walled gardens.’ 
This work contrasts with Emmanuel Le Roy Ladurie’s works, such as Carnaval de Romans 
and Montaillou – ‘micro-histories’ that compound their narrative time frame to a brief  
point taking in a single location.  An alternate furcation of  scale occurs in the work of  
Georges Lefebvre’s ‘histories from below’, a method by which the perspective of  the 
disenfranchised takes precedence over that of  the traditional locus for history; the great 
and the good individuals who wield power and authority. At each extreme, the virtues of 
modifying the traditional historical narrative scheme becomes clear: influence over the 
range that a history traverses, the forms of  arguments and perspectives that are made 
viable and, tacitly, the effect exerted upon a reader’s scheme of  understanding a field of  
events. In each case a set of  considerations is omitted in favour of  emphasis upon a set 
of  alternate quasi-characters, certain themes are treated in the abstract, if  at all, and 
others are concretised through attention to description, detail and evidence. If  any three 
of  these narrative schemes – long durée, micro-history or history from below – were 
applied to the alternate topics chosen by Braudel, Le Roy Laudurie and Lefebvre, 
radically different work would emerge. Foucault was impressed with such histories; they 
demonstrated the sense in his consideration that “[f]iction is the regime of  the narrative, 
or rather the various regimes according to which it is recounted.”26
113
25 Foucault 1986, p153, (remark made in discussion of  the notion of  the author function).
26 Foucault 1966, p149.
 Foucault’s own method intends to establish an interference in the connection between 
one’s current conceptions in a field of  experience and the objective historical fictions 
that underpin and assure those conceptions. His “fictive kind of  conceptual history”27 is 
composed so as to arrange historical events in a way that provokes the reader into a 
sustained reconsideration of  any relative concerns in their field of  experience, as they 
appear in her own thought, providing her with a series of  comparative and competing 
narratives that destabilise the purported naturalness of  a class of  notions. Foucault’s 
method is “a re-ordering of  documents so that they shed their inertness and become a 
sort of  measurable activity; this re-ordering, or re-orienting of  texts from the past takes a 
maximum of  intellectual and scholarly energy.”28  By the choices and comparisons 
Foucault makes, new modes of  intelligibility are available, new similarities and 
continuities, new groupings under novel characteristics. The overall effect of  this 
reassignment and regrouping is one of  ‘disremembrance’29 in that the highly generalised 
concepts that populate much historical discourse are laid against new accounts, making 
evident the fictive status of  both the original and the new narrative, and inviting 
radically new potential methods of  appraisal. As Ian Hacking remarked, Foucault “was 
adept at reorganizing past events in order to rethink the present. He engagingly turned 
familiar truisms into doubt or chaos.”30
 The status of  his histories is therefore that of  a kind of  simulacrum of  their 
essentialist competitors — dopplegangers that, like their mythical counterparts, appear 
similar in form yet act so differently as to be quite disturbing to anyone familiar with the 
original subject of  their mimicry. In much the same way that ‘red is darker than pink’ 
can be a true grammatical remark without necessarily entailing its employment within a 
veridical grammatical method, it is key here to see why Foucault’s fictive method doesn’t 
negate the veracity of  the details it employs, being assembled as they are from events 
drawn from empirical documents, archives and treatises. Hence, far from the 
restructuring of  or contribution to an ongoing historical discourse, an aspectival reading 
of  Foucault’s method’s purpose can perhaps be sufficiently summarised as ‘the 
problematisation of  a field of  experience by the fictive employment of  historical 
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elements’.31 We can now say what the fictive employment of  historical elements 
constitutes; the codification of  past events, through arrangement, compression, 
comparison and characterisation, drawn from a field of  events too innumerable to 
otherwise causally conceive of, in the service of  the establishment of  a narrative of  the 
emergence of  a given condition over time, that destabilises certain concepts presently in 
circulation. “Foucault has no intention of  grasping the event-fact ‘as it actually 
occurred.’ Rather, he writes a “history of  the present” that, in effect, seeks to diagnose 
and suggest alternative avenues of  behavior, or at least their possibility.”32
By turning to Discipline and Punish, perhaps Foucault’s most celebrated work, we can 
clearly make out the reflexive employment of  narrative as a codified unity, situated in 
the provocative means of  its representation, rather than in the phenomenon that is 
being represented. As Wittgenstein earlier remarked, it would not be enough to simply 
say that ‘received concepts of  justice, law and progress are conditional upon a dogmatic 
nomothetic set of  assumptions’, and thereby hope the reader somehow treats this 
remarks as sensible and revelatory. Foucault’s great achievement was to elaborate a 
method whereby a set of  detailed examples are shown to be congruent – not through 
outright criticism or synecdochical truth-claims, but through the creation of  new 
narrative that leads its user into conceiving of  the phenomenon according to a new 
code, and therefore to bring about a switch in their habits of  conceiving. For Foucault, 
this has the important effect of  providing new perspectives by which to view the 
phenomenon that are substitutable for the original model “without yielding to any of  
them as if  they were sovereign requirements”;33 thus acknowledging their own 
conditional status and thereby avoiding the entailment of  new dogma. Indeed, Foucault 
is most explicit in his rendering, providing the reader with four rules that will determine 
the narrative dimensions and priorities of  Discipline and Punish:34 
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explanatory power, failing to comprehend to what end the elements that constitute that work have been 
assembled. Before progressing to a series of  examples to help elucidate this claim, it will prove most useful 
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32 Flynn 2005, p45.
33 In Morey 1992, p125.
34 cf: DP, pp.22–4 for the original unabridged ruleset. 
1. 	Do not concentrate the study of  punitive mechanisms on their 'repressive' effects 
alone, but situate them in the series of  their positive effects, even if  they seem marginal 
at first sight.
2. 	Attempt to analyse punitive methods not simply as consequences of  legislation or as 
indicators of  social structures, but as techniques possessing their own specificity. 
3. 	Instead of  treating the history of  penal law and the history of  the human sciences as 
two separate series who overlap, see whether there is not some common matrix.
4.  Try to study the metamorphosis of  punitive methods on the basis of  a political 
technology of  the body in which might be read a common history of  power relations.
The most obvious thing that strikes one on reading this ruleset is that they constitute a 
tactic of  representation,35 an explicit statement of  preference and attention and, thereby, 
an implicit denial of  his work’s veridical completeness. Foucault intends to analyse x as a 
kind of  y, to focus on neglected avenues, to describe his fields of  inquiry using new 
systems of  organisation. The above four rules overtly express the methods by which 
Foucault will decide the manner in which his narrative will progress, and there are many 
stylistic examples of  this strategy at work. The book opens with one of  its most striking 
comparisons; that of  Damiens the Regicide’s gruesome public torture and eventual 
execution in 1757, and, eighty years later, Leon Faucher’s highly regimented rules for 
the House of  Young Prisoners in Paris, both rendered in disturbing detail. Legible in the 
first two models offered in Discipline and Punish is a direct challenge to the reader; how do 
you account for the disparity between these two penal techniques? What can explain 
their radical metamorphosis at a distance of  80 years from each other? The 
compression of  a time period for effect, the alterity of  the mechanisms described, and 
the problematic effect these presentations create are signatures of  Foucault’s style of  
envisaging the punitive society. 
 We could consider any number of  elements in Foucault’s carceral narrative as a 
clarifying example, but one that will suit our purpose is his problematisation of  the 
humanist account of  the reasons for the reform of  public execution.36 The opening 
move in the this account describes the manner in which the body of  the condemned 
man, prior to reform, was required to emblazon his crime by such means as public 
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confession and the wearing of  signs that explain his deed: “in him, on him, the sentence 
had to be legible for all.”37 Likewise, the particular punishment was modulated in order 
to signify the crime that brought its punishment upon him. In Damiens’ case, the dagger 
with which he attempted regicide was burnt into the hand that made the attempt, using 
sulphur and brands. “The body has produced and reproduced the truth of  the crime – 
or rather it constitutes the element which, through a whole set of  rituals and trials, 
confesses that the crime took place.”38 Yet while the punishment applied to the body of  
the condemned was to be symmetrical in form to the crime, it was often overwhelmingly 
asymmetrical in its level of  violence, with the condemned body often being utterly 
destroyed, with this destruction of  the body sometimes continuing even after its death. 
The next premise is key to Foucault’s rendering, and explains this gruesome asymmetry; 
“Besides its immediate victim, the crime attacks the sovereign: it attacks him personally, 
since the law represents the will of  the sovereign; it attacks him physically, since the force 
of  the law is the force of  the prince.”39 
 This is pivotal because in serving as an explanatory function as to the status of  the act 
of  punishment, it allows the perspective of  the sovereign exposing its power in a public 
display of  massive violence, as a means to achieve recompense for the grievance done 
against it by the condemned man: “It is a ceremonial by which a momentarily injured 
sovereignty is reconstituted.”40 Clearly the ceremony must be public, or the signification 
of  the display of  strength would not circulate among its intended population, providing 
no warning and no display of  what occurs to those who crossed swords with the 
sovereign’s law. Here emerges a deep flaw in punishment as a technique – the crowd that 
attended the spectacle of  the scaffold did so “not simply to witness the sufferings of  the 
condemned or to excite the anger of  the executioner: it was also to hear an individual 
who had nothing more to lose curse the judges, the laws, the government and 
religion.”41 The marriage of  an individual now beyond the fear of  punishment (as it will 
soon be delivered in a most gruesome way no matter what their immediate actions,) with 
a crowd of  onlookers who were eager to hear the blasphemies, denunciations and last-
minute truths in the offing, was one aspect of  the instability of  such a ceremony. 
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Another was the very real possibility that the crowd might attempt to overturn the 
sovereign’s legal mechanism, through trying to kill the condemned man on sight, or by 
championing and emancipating the condemned man due to a perceived injustice in 
either the bestowal, or botched performance, of  the punishment. “In these executions, 
which ought to show only the terrorizing power of  the prince, there was a whole aspect 
of  the carnival, in which rules were inverted, authority mocked and criminals 
transformed into heroes.”42 Therefore, instead of  a demonstration of  the total power of  
sovereignty, in which the injured prince is reconstituted by obliterating the offending 
lawbreaker, “the crowd could intervene, physically: enter by force into the punitive 
mechanism and  redistribute its effects”,43 thus rendering the intended significance of  
the ceremony in its inverse.
 Very well; but what is the point in all this detail? How does it constitute a ‘history of  
the present’, or ‘the problematisation of  a field of  experience’, or an ‘irreducibly 
aspectival philosophical method’, as I have previously claimed? What effect is it 
supposed to have? By constructing this (rigorous and plausible) narrative, Foucault 
provides the reader with a convincing alternate casual explanation of  the drive towards 
the reform of  public torture and execution into the carceral and disciplinary systems he 
goes on to describe. The “silent thought” he anticipates of  his reader is that the reason 
for this reform should be attributed to a vocal and heroically humanistic element within 
an increasingly enlightened society baulking at, and eventually overthrowing, a clearly 
barbaric set of  practices. By providing a feasible yet highly controversial alternate 
account of  the reasons for reform as instead being based on efficacy of  technique, 
Foucault places a question-mark deep inside any received progressive account the reader 
might harbour. To be clear, Foucault does not deny the presence of  such reformist 
movements or their humanist rhetoric, for to do so would not only be clearly counter-
evidential, but would also represent an attempt to replace, rather than compromise, this 
causal system of  intelligibility. He instead strategically employs an alternate model by 
which to conceive of  the evolution of  punitive systems into their current state.44 This 
account helps us to give the meaning of  the following reference to the ‘build-up of  
evidence’, and the aim of  compromising its effect upon the reader:
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My role – and that is too emphatic a word – is to show people that they are much freer 
than they feel, that people accept as truth, as evidence, some themes which have been 
built up at a certain moment during history, and that this so-called evidence can be 
criticised and destroyed.45
§4.2 Problematising a field of experience
‘Problematisation’ for Foucault entails a change in terms of  how one intentionally orders 
one’s attention; which elements of  one’s experience appear as important, or minimally, 
noticeable and coherent as something worthy of  critical appraisal. It is the focussing of  
attention on a field that may previously have seemed unproblematic. Fields of  
experience so chosen as subjects of  problematisation by Foucault are most commonly 
conceived as natural, essential, universal, etc, if  they are considered at all; their ‘there-
ness’ makes them poor choices for reflection, resisting critical attention.46 As McGushin 
puts it,
A problematization is the process by which an aspect of  reality, of  one’s world, one’s 
experience, is brought into focus as a problem in need of  a response. Through a 
problematization “people begin to take care of  something . . . they become anxious about 
this or that.” (DT 48) This caring-about-something is a way of  disclosing the world in 
light of  a problem and is therefore a response to that problem.47
Problematisation is an important undertaking for Foucault because he conceives of  it as 
a precondition for subsequent critical appraisal: “for a domain of  action, a behavior, to 
enter the field of  thought, it is necessary for a certain number of  factors to have made it 
uncertain, to have made it lose its familiarity, or to have provoked a certain number of  
difficulties around it.”48 The defamiliarisation of  the practice of  carceral practices, for 
example, is a precondition for its sustained critical appraisal, itself  necessary for an 
alteration in one’s expressions and actions in regards to the concepts of  criminality, 
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disciplinary techniques, surveillance and justice. It is important to note when qualifying 
this term that the achievement of  a given problematisation occurs despite one’s 
familiarity with a subject, and so problematisation is not solely a concern with 
destabilising the familiar and inert status of  its subject, but also with the habits by which 
one may have allowed familiarity to foster a critical de-sensitivity — in this respect, the 
purpose of  such activity is “not to show the invisible, but to show the extent to which the 
invisibility of  the visible is invisible.”49 Therefore to problematise a field for someone is 
to change their relation to it by provoking an activity of  thought and reflection 
regarding it, which might not have occurred otherwise. Hence, Owen remarks that given 
problematisations “refer to the specific ways in which a topic is constituted as an issue 
for reflection and action within particular systems of  judgment.”50 Once designated 
anew, the individual not only admits of  the possibility of  seeing a part of  the world in a 
new light, but is drawn to do so, through curiosity, by a form of  reconsideration that 
would appear radical to their previous system of  evaluation, given light, as it was, by a 
differing set of  problematisations. Events might occur and ‘bounce off ’ of  one, hardly 
registering, until one has an interest in, and a new mode in which to express, a particular 
topic. Yet this supposed process is complicated by one’s involvement in, and reliance 
upon, preferred modes of  comprehension regarding, e.g. mental health, sexuality, 
justice, normativity, etc. For if  one is committed to the employment of  these generalised 
concepts in one’s discriminations of  identity, or even stronger, if  one physically, 
financially or mentally benefits from that ongoing discrimination, then such 
problematisation is liable to provoke complex and disagreeable responses. Finally, we 
must note that problematisation, as Foucault uses the term, denotes the means by which 
individuals confront their existence via a series of  choices, rather than those 
representations that led to that confrontation: problematisation is a type of  thought, 
rather than a mode of  representation in itself.
 For such radical reappraisal to occur, for Foucault, one must partake in a special kind 
of  experience, and, while such investigation makes use of  ‘true’ documents, they do so 
not in order to reveal an exhaustive set of  veridical facets that are to be relied upon as 
invariants by which to orchestrate one’s knowledge. Instead, they are intended to 
provoke “an experience that might permit an alteration, a transformation, of  the 
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relationship we have with ourselves and our cultural universe”.51 We can be quite 
precise in our account of  what Foucault intends such an experience to be, for it consists 
of  a dual event in the reader’s experience: 
This experience that permits us to single out certain mechanisms (for example, 
imprisonment, penalization, etc.) and at the same time to separate ourselves from them by 
perceiving them in a totally different form, must be one and the same experience.52
The experience that Foucault is trying to elicit consists of  his drawing one’s attention to 
a specific topic by means of  representing it in such a way that a totally new way of  
understanding it is made possible. The models that populate his work are intended to 
function as systems that dislocate one from habitual ways of  seeing, so that one’s 
attention becomes available as a viable field of  reorchestration. This “procedure” of  
inciting a self-effect, referred to by Foucault through his particular use of  the word 
‘experience’, is central to all of  his work.53 Foucault’s procedural assumption, then, is 
that these relationships we have with ourselves are determinate of  how we conceive of  
the world: a self  is made a subject, Foucault suggests, out of  habitual modes of  
classifying one’s own behaviour and that of  others. Let us follow Ian Hacking here, and 
be a little more precise in our description; Foucault’s method is a means of  critically 
examining the ways in which “our practices of  naming interact with the things that we 
name.” Hacking coins the term ‘looping effect’ in this regard, 
that is, the interactions between people, on the one hand, and ways of  classifying people 
and their behavior on the other. Being seen to be a certain kind of  person, or to do a 
certain kind of  act, may affect someone. A new or modified mode of  classification may 
systematically affect the people who are so classified, or the people themselves may rebel 
against the knowers, the classifiers, the science that classifies them. Such interactions may 
lead to changes in the people who are classified, and hence in what is known about them. 
That is what I call a feedback effect. Now I am adding a further parameter. Inventing or 
molding a new kind, a new classification, of  people or of  behavior may create new ways 
to be a person, new choices to make, for good or evil. There are new descriptions, and 
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hence new actions under a description. It is not that people change, substantively, but that 
as a point of  logic new opportunities for action are open to them.54
Thus Foucault, via Hacking, provides a precise model by which to understand the 
importance of  conceptual work on oneself: the schemas by which we ascribe definitions 
and judgements can alter the de re characteristics of  the way in which people classify 
themselves. This is why only the systems of  classification and representation that are 
employed to comprehend human behaviour, identity and action, are the chosen fields 
Foucault is concerned with problematising, rather than, say, the physical sciences, where 
(barring Heisenberg’s interpretation of  quantum mechanics!) there is no looping effect. 
Hacking’s term is a useful handle to employ when struggling to grasp the remit and 
purpose of  Foucault’s methods. When combined with an understanding of  the 
narrational and interpretive status of  much of  the history upon which these concepts 
are based, the possibility for the emergence of  dogma becomes quite evident. When the 
subject is human behaviour, nomothetic de dicto inflects de re in a feedback loop. 
Judgements inform the interactions in which they occur by determining the coordinates 
by which one perceives an act as necessarily falling under or outside a certain class; 
classifications which rely upon totalising concepts of  their subject; concepts whose tacit 
evidence claims a status that its fictive nature cannot justify; a nature that is not 
reflexively recognised; and a lack of  recognition that entails dogmatism. Dogma in this 
sense has a distinctly consequential sense to it; it is the stability and normativity of  those 
ascriptions made on the basis of  looping effects described as truthful, rather than 
habitual: necessary, rather than aspectival.
“[T]hese games are not imposed on the subject from the outside according to a necessary 
causality or structural determination. They open up a field of  experience in which the 
subject and the object are both constituted only under certain simultaneous conditions, 
but in which they are constantly modified in relation to each other, and so they modify 
this field of  experience itself.”55
In two recent works (2009 and 2010) Timothy O’Leary makes explicit a bivalence in 
Foucault’s use of  this term ‘experience’ that had drawn little attention, at least in 
anglophone readings, and is particularly relevant to our current definitional discussion. 
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This bivalence is actually part of  the French language — expérience means both 
experience and experiment. O’Leary bases around this term a reading of  Foucault’s 
method, in sympathy to that outlined here, in which he insists that “we can read 
Foucault’s work, almost in its entirety, as an attempt – admittedly comprising revisions 
and dead-ends – to provide the conceptual tools both for understanding an 
experience ... and for helping us to transform it through an engaged and experimental 
practice.”56 Foucault’s aim, as attested to in his interview entitled “How an 'Experience-
Book' is Born”, was to produce a series of  experience/experiment-books, designed to be 
models by which the reader experiments in a radically alternate form of  experiencing 
elements of  her life, with each text acting “like so many traps, questions, challenges, or 
whatever you want to call them”.57 So, this is a concept of  a kind of  experience that is 
an exceptional, perhaps unexpected, occurrence from which one emerges in some way 
changed.58  And this is to be expected, given the reordering of  representations by which 
new opportunities for action are opened. 
§4.3 Statement of methodological parallelism 
[My work] does not have the function of  a proof. It exists as a sort of  prelude, to explore 
the keyboard, sketch out the themes and see how people react. … I am well aware that I 
have never written anything but fictions. I do not mean to say, however, that the truth is 
therefore absent.”59
We can summarise certain key characteristics that can be derived from this account of  
Foucault’s philosophical method, and thereby prove the potential for this method to 
operate in a manner complementary to that advanced in the first half  of  this thesis. 
Firstly, we can assert, in line with Owen, a very close parallel between the two 
philosophical aims of  achieving a ‘switch in aspect’ and a ‘dislocatory field of  
experience’. This assertion does not entail a constitutive theoretical principle, but it is 
rather, as we shall see, reducible to a methodological parallelism, with both authors 
positing the incitement of  such conceptual reorchestration as a unifying condition for 
their philosophical practice. A similar parallel exists in the means employed to achieve 
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such a ‘switch’: both practice an application of  invented models of  comparison, and 
systems of  expression, that seek to cause a revisionary experience by which dogmatic 
assertion can be forsaken in favour of  a new, less strictured manner of  conception. The 
materials employed in this method are analogical too – they are often ‘facts’ that are 
truthful in some sense, but their purpose is not the ascertainment of  truth, but rather the 
elucidation of  fresh possibilities, with such possibilities playing the role of  dislocatory 
investigations into how things might be other than we previously considered. Hence the 
status of  both Wittgenstein and Foucault’s remarks is one that must be understood as 
being dependent upon this ‘dislocatory’ effect; they do not stand separate to the 
consequences they intend to have upon the thought of  their reader, and can only be 
sensibly located within a series of  modular studies intended to problematise certain 
dogmatic conceptions through the generation of  alternate, competing narratives and 
descriptions. 
Hence, just as with Baker’s reading of  Wittgenstein’s employment of  the term ‘aspect’, 
this dislocatory ‘experience’ Foucault seeks to elicit “is neither true nor false: it is always 
a fiction, something constructed, which exists only after it has been made, not before; it 
isn't something that is ‘true,’ but it has been a reality.”60 It, in some sense, lies outside the 
games of  truth and fabrication. 
 There is a further methodological parallel when considering the generation of  these 
investigations. In similarity to the position advanced in Chapter II, Foucault asserts that 
“there is no book that I've written without there having been, at least in part, a direct 
personal experience.”61 The problematisation and transformation of  Foucault’s own 
fields of  experience are what are recorded in his genealogical investigations; as with 
Wittgenstein’s assistive portrayals of  the civil status of  those philosophical confusions 
that most animated him, Foucault’s investigations “function as invitations, as public 
gestures, for those who may want eventually to do the same thing, or something like it, 
or, in any case, who intend to slip into this kind of  experience.”62 This special kind of  
experience is driven, “not to discover what is hidden, but to make visible precisely what 
is visible, that is to say, to make evident what is so close,”63 and this because “the aspects 
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of  things that are most important for us are hidden because of  their simplicity and 
familiarity. (One is unable to notice something because it is always before one’s eyes.)”64 
 Given these telling parallels, it should be of  little surprise if  both authors insist that 
such aspectival and dislocatory practices are not predicated upon theoretical accounts. 
For both methods, “there does not exist a theoretical background which is continuous 
and systematic.”65 Because of  this, as argued in Chapter II, neither method can be 
adequately described  as a form of  teaching, for “such a term would reflect the character 
of  a work, of  a systematic book that leads to a method that can be generalized, a 
method full of  positive directions, of  a body of  ‘teachings’ for the readers. In my case it's  
another matter entirely: my books don't have this kind of  value.”66 Instead of  being a 
teacher, a theorist or a philosopher, Foucault conceived his role as being “an 
experimenter, in the sense that I write in order to change myself  and in order to no 
longer think the same thing as before.”67
 It is clear from these remarks that Foucault wrote in order to change himself, to no 
longer think what he was thinking before, yet while the accrual of  such dislocatory 
methods clearly do not equate to a generalisable set of  teachings, this attempt to get free 
from those aspects that occupied him was by no means an hermetic undertaking. “This 
work of  changing one’s own thought and that of  others seems to me to be the reason for 
being an intellectual.”68 The method by which Foucault detaches both himself  and his 
reader from certain practices and habits of  thought, is the central procedure of  the 
method that he took to be his calling.69 This much might perhaps strike one as 
unexceptional, for many authors dream of  forcing such an effect upon their reader. The 
procedure by which this way of  altering one’s way of  seeing cannot, however, by both 
Foucault and Wittgenstein’s insistence, consist in eliciting a set response from their 
reading partner: “if  the intellectual starts playing once again the role that he has played 
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for a hundred and fifty years – that of  prophet in relation to what “must” be, to what 
"must take place" – these effects of  domination will return and we shall have other 
ideologies, functioning in the same way.”70 Instead, in a manner that closely mirrors 
Wittgenstein’s, Foucault’s method is predicated upon the notion that for “a domain of  
action, a behavior, to enter the field of  thought, it is necessary for a certain number of  
factors to have made it uncertain, to have made it lose its familiarity, or to have provoked 
a certain number of  difficulties around it.”71 At every turn we do well to recall that a 
model which intends to trigger transformative effects upon one’s aspects of  seeing, does 
not foreclose by stipulating exactly what kind of  change will occur, what new order of  
arranging one’s own way of  seeing will be orchestrated. “Thus I don't construct a 
general method of  definitive value for myself  or for others. What I write does not 
prescribe anything, neither to myself  nor to others. At most, its character is 
instrumental.”72
Foucault is vehement that “[e]veryone has their own way of  changing, or, what amounts 
to the same thing, of  perceiving that everything changes. In this matter, nothing is more 
arrogant than trying to dictate to others.”73 Thus, contra Merquior, Foucault’s method is 
concerned, with Wittgenstein’s, neither with the bounding nor the denial of  those 
realms of  sense one can feasibly operate within. Foucault explicitly aligns himself  
against such interdiction, observing that “there are ideological traffic police around, and 
we can hear their whistles blast: go left, go right, here, later, get moving, not now” – and 
only his more myopic exegetes fail to recognise that Foucault himself  equated 
interdictory “injunctions” with a kind of  intellectual “abuse”,74 precisely because they 
foreclose the tasks of  reevaluation, curiosity, and innovation and, instead, proffer a 
method of  mimicry. Therefore, because, for Foucault, his books are experiences/
experiments, and because “an experience is something that one comes out of  
transformed”, then he is best considered as “an experimenter, not a theorist.”75 As 
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Nilson remarks, Foucault’s method “does not produce truths and certainties, but is a 
strategy of  resistance.”76 
 As well as establishing a striking form of  parallelism, this chapter’s reading enables us 
to take the rare step of  actually taking Foucault at his word when he describes the status 
of  his studies as not having the function of  a proof, theory, nor doctrine77, but instead 
solely as a critical practice which thought brings to bear on itself, in an endeavour to 
think differently.78 Crucial to this reading is his interest in the way we form judgements, 
and ascribe membership of  an occurrence as belonging to a generalisable unified 
concept, as this is the site for the ‘reaction’ that his ‘themes’ are aimed at. As we shall see 
in the following chapter, Foucault’s task is to fragment this membership, to make an act 
of  generalised ascription a ‘fraught’ one by the provision of  alternate viable models with 
which to inform those judgements. Further, his method renders these acts of  designation 
both explicit, “mak[ing] evident what is so close, so immediate, so intimately linked to 
us”, and contentious due to their complex and interactional implications. By this 
propagation of  alternate models, Foucault provides different codifications as to-hand 
‘reminders’ for the reader, in order that they can effect the imaginative application of  
these modes of  intelligibility to their own experiences and thus “give us strength to break 
the rules in the very act which brings them into play.”79 Again, in similarity with 
Wittgenstein’s method, as read in Chapter III, the models which Foucault provides are 
not intended to supplant the reader’s current avowals - instead, the intent is to provoke 
the desire to “[r]eject all theory and all forms of  general discourse.”80 This is because 
just supplanting them will not be enough; it is instead the style of  thought, which 
demands a determinate and exclusive aspect to take precedence, that is to be 
problematised. That is why Foucault insisted, in much the same way as Wittgenstein, 
that “this need for theory is still part of  the system we reject.”81
 Finally, the task of  such problematisation – and the hope for subsequent reevaluation 
and work on oneself  – proceeds along highly deflationary lines that seek to remove a 
compulsion or limit upon one’s conceptions, via the shifting of  the reader’s modes of  
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representation and signification, rather than by directly responding to the dogma that 
previously coordinated those general concepts. Hence Foucault’s method is a complex 
one that inscribes conflicting casual accounts into a previously mundane field of  our 
experience, and by this inscription seeks to reconfigure the aspect by which we evaluate 
it, thereby altering the range of  questions that we feel compelled to ask.
“What is the answer to the question? The problem. How is the problem resolved? By 
displacing the question. … We must think problematically rather than question and 
answer dialectically.”82
Because this philosophical method is concerned with defamiliarising the accustomed, re-
coordinating the habits of  attention and the ‘emancipation of  thought from what it 
silently thinks’, the body of  work built up by Foucault in his fictive philosophical practice 
is not to be considered as veridical, accumulative or theoretical. Instead the method that 
it demonstrates
has to be conceived as an attitude, an ethos, a philosophical life in which the critique of  
what we are is at one and the same time the historical analysis of  the limits that are 
imposed on us and an experiment with the possibility of  going beyond them.83
Thus Foucault’s ideal of  philosophy is one premised upon flexibility in representation, 
the rearrangement of  detail to present examples in order to trigger the imaginative 
adjustment of  a reader’s previously-static habits of  judgement. It is also premised upon 
our willful desire to take part in such struggles. "I am going to describe certain aspects of  
the contemporary world and its governmentality; this course will not tell you what you 
should do or what you have to fight against, but it will give you a map; thus it will tell 
you: if  you want to attack in such-and-such a direction, well, here there is a knot of  
resistance and there a possible passage."84 The tools to achieve this effect are the 
contemplation and exploration of  alternate models or accounts, constructed from 
historical elements, that undercut any notion one might have of  one’s dogmatic aspect 
being natural, logically necessary or maximally generalisable. While the rhetorical 
method is radically different, and the elements which his models assemble are historical 
128
82 1980, pp185–6.
83 Foucault 1991b, p50.
84 In Veyne 2010, pp6-7.
rather than grammatical, it is implied by this conception of  method that Foucault’s 
writing was conceived of  by its author as as a ‘tool’ book, rather than an ex-cathedra 
treatise, in a manner close to Wittgenstein’s: Foucault clearly “writes for users, not 
readers.”85 The defamiliarisation triggered by his philosophy is intended to impair the 
concepts and institutions he problematises, thereby rendering their functioning 
problematic, not just their conception; Foucault would be disappointed if  his works were 
to remain, in his reader’s hands, solely as abstract critique: “I would like my books to 
be ... Molotov cocktails, or minefields; I would like them to self-destruct after use, like 
fireworks.”86
 We saw earlier that other models of  interpretation are available in reading Foucault. 
A major fault-line between different readings relates to the status of  his text, with two 
sides made sensible from the many readings it runs through. Yet we have seen that, 
predicated as it is upon both a complex appreciation of  the fictive nature of  causal 
historical accounts, and a concern to present a form of  philosophy that comprises a set 
of  techniques by which their user modifies their attention to and assumption about a 
series of  generalising claims that emerge from those accounts, Foucault’s method doesn’t 
match up too well with these assumptions. 
 A reading of  Foucault that renders his work as a series of  veridical claims thereby 
makes his method massively self-contradictory. For Foucault to recognise the irreducibly 
narrational character of  history, to ascribe a fictive status to his own work, and to then 
proceed to author, e.g., the true yet hidden history of  the prison, in a manner which 
flagrantly neglected these characteristics in his philosophical practice, would render his 
work trivially false, embarrassingly so. Instead, by means of  an aspectival reading, the 
three veridical criticisms made earlier transform into mere descriptions of  a 
philosophical method. An overwhelming explanatory incompatibility with the accounts 
of  other historians, a bias to omit certain evidence, and ideological pre-interpretation; 
all three qualifications of  his work can now be seen as rather misunderstood references 
to facets of  an anti-dogmatic philosophic method. We have seen that such 
incompatibility is certainly to be expected, but not along lines of  supplanting dogma, as 
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“Foucault did not attack the choices of  others, but the rationalizations that they added 
to their choices. A genealogical criticism does not say, ‘I am right and the others are 
mistaken,’ but only, ‘the others are wrong to claim that they are right.”87 Likewise, the 
charge of  omitting pertinent features from his genealogical models falls flat because it 
misunderstands the method it accuses. These models are not intended to be exhaustive, 
nor accumulatively veridical. Each is written as an “opening”, to prompt an 
underdetermined and transformative experience in which the reader is convinced to 
relent in their avowal of  a certain way of  understanding, by means of  adopting a fresh 
way of  seeing; one whose event Foucault anticipates, but whose nature is left to the 
innovative means of  his reader.
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Chapter V
Generality, Totality and Anti-dogmatic Method
________________________________________________ 
Now I don't say that this is not possible. Only, putting it in this way immediately shows 
you that it need not happen. This, by the way, illustrates the method of  philosophy.
 — Wittgenstein, The Blue Book 1
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Philosophy is not to be concerned with a kind of  conceptual disqualification, as a means 
of  homing in upon the correct model from the remaining contenders, but instead with 
modifying one’s style of  attention. It is not its place to say “this is not possible” – instead, 
to be successful in its task, previously elided aspects should snap into focus, whilst 
statements formally considered indispensable are rendered as contingent, incapable of  
cohering every case within their single rubric. Obversely, the previously adhered to way 
of  seeing is not to be treated as a sin to be forgotten, but instead acknowledged as one 
optional aspect among many: “The ideal loses none of  its dignity”, said Wittgenstein, “if 
it is posited as the principle determining the form of  one's approach.”2 This conceptual 
shift is to be achieved through the invention of  new notations and models with which to 
attend to a field of  experience, proving the previous system to be both optional and 
newly evaluable in light of  one’s new mode of  presentation. Following this treatment, 
both philosophical methods under investigation are conceived of  as undertakings that 
situate oneself  as the site of  a personal critical practice and, in so situating, seek to apply 
a series of  arguments, perspectives and inceptive models in the relief  of  certain 
conceptual avowals.3 This class of  philosophical method demands that the reader acts 
upon themselves – as Foucault put it, “to monitor, test, improve, and transform”4 
themselves. 
 As it stands, this description – developed over the past four chapters – is far too 
broad, as it could be used to denote a too-wide set of  philosophies – perhaps Socrates or 
Seneca, for instance, would have recognised parts of  this account as relevant to 
philosophy as they conceived of  it. Certainly, Foucault and Wittgenstein’s techniques of  
work on oneself  could indeed be presented as occurring at an intersection with stoic or 
socratic practice. Foucault’s later work demonstrated both respect and curiosity towards 
these models of  philosophy; he read them as expressing a deep concern with the task of  
epimeleia heautou (or ‘care of  the self ’), and thus as providing a bountiful set of  
comparative models by which to clarify our current practices through comparison. 
Wittgenstein, meanwhile, commented both upon his utter infuriation with Plato’s 
132
2 Wittgenstein, in Kuusela 2008, p127.
3 In this chapter and the next I often make reference to Foucault’s or Wittgenstein’s “notation”. I use this 
term to denote the particular and differing range of  “arguments, perspectives and inceptive models” that 
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Socrates, and a continuity in their questioning method of  philosophy5 – “One might say 
that the subject we are dealing with is one of  the heirs of  the subject which used to be 
called ‘philosophy.’”6 However, for our interests it would prove most unsatisfying to leave 
it there, to render Wittgenstein, Seneca, Foucault and Plato as members of  a shared 
discipline, for apart from anything else, there are clear differences at play in their 
concepts of  what work on oneself  constitutes. In addressing this differentiation, this 
chapter will advance a form of  dogmatism concerning conceptual unity as a shared 
problematic between the two methods, one that leads to our two philosophical methods 
being easily differentiated from others, precisely as being antidogmatic in purpose.
 Therefore we will also be concerned with answering the question of  why it is that the 
philosophical methods of  Wittgenstein and Foucault exhibit those particular parallel 
methodological features that have emerged so far in this thesis. To this end, the first two 
sections of  this chapter consider in turn the differing ways in which the problem of  
dogmatism is presented, and thereby clarify a concern with a type of  conceptual unity 
that is at the heart of  both models of  philosophy. The final section will advance two 
entailments that can be seen as essential to both methods, and therefore of  great 
importance in our understanding of  both philosophies. In conclusion, both philosophies 
will be considered “partisan” in their response to those supposedly self-evident concepts, 
in that both are committed to disabusing them of  their apparent exclusivity, thereby 
altering the manner in which their reader conceives of  phenomena that previously fell 
under their purview. This parallel will be shown to derive from an apprehension towards  
the effects that generality and totality in one’s conceptions exert upon one’s judgements, 
attentions and diagnoses, rather than from their somehow being wrong ‘in principle’. 
Both philosophers’ works are marked au fond by this justification of  method by the effects  
of  dogmatism, and we will examine these concerns in detail in the final third of  this 
chapter, positing two broad categories of  dogmatic effect that concerned both Foucault 
and Wittgenstein, albeit in different ways.
 Certain themes established in earlier chapters will be of  immediate relevance here. 
Both methods have been shown to demonstrate a demand for a heightened sensitivity to 
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alternate possibilities of  description, instigated by those models, scenarios, narratives 
and counter-examples that are their methodological signature. Further, I have already 
argued that the operative status of  these comparative elements is dependent upon their 
successfully functioning within a given method, rather than deriving their purpose or 
value from any objectively veridical account one might seek to assemble from their 
discrepant parts. Instead, they have been presented as concerned with struggling against 
affective tendencies of  thought that lead to an impoverished set of  conceptions 
regarding language-in-use, the potential for an individual’s self-determination, and the 
manner in which we judge and describe other massively complex and dynamic human 
phenomena.7 As we shall see in the next chapter, the competing models and descriptions 
that populate the writings of  both philosophers are intended to trigger an innovative 
attendance to the context of  one’s acts, by disproving for oneself  the necessity, 
naturalness or generality of  those concepts that might otherwise be unproblematically 
informing those acts. In this respect, both methods are concerned not only with 
triggering a switch in particular aspects, but at a more basic level, with dispelling a 
craving for a certain type of  conceptual unity. 
 Another, more procedural, way of  seeing the importance of  clarifying the notion of  
dogmatism is this: at certain points in previous chapters, notably II and III, a somewhat 
underdetermined notion of  dogma has been leaned upon in order to frame discussions 
on the will and its relation to inceptive philosophical method. This subject now demands 
greater consideration, if  we are to throw any light on why both our methods 
demonstrate parallels in their treatment of  their key problematic – and their decisions as 
to what philosophy should be doing, in order to address it. For Wittgenstein, it is best 
described as a problem concerned with generality; for Foucault, (in part,) with totality. 
§5.1 Wittgenstein and a ‘craving for generality’
In Chapter I we encountered an idea of  generality as characteristic of  a style of  
philosophy whose shortcomings inform both Wittgenstein’s later methods, and the 
interpretation of  those methods by Wittgensteinian thinkers such as Baker, Cavell and 
Kuusela. Specifically, his non-contiguous, non-accruable ‘freeze-frame’ grammatical 
models were shown to be chosen according to his concern with assisting an individual 
with the task of  dispelling their philosophical confusions, rather than with charting an 
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invariant characteristic of  a field of  language itself.8 It was Wittgenstein’s point that, 
given the innumerable, fluctuating characteristics of  language in use, the desire to 
sustain a total generality in our representation, “once and for all; and independent of  
any future experience”,9 is one derived from a dogmatically-maintained way of  seeing 
that does an injustice to those cases we suppose as falling under our generalisations. At 
key passages in his writing, most noticeably in PI §115 and BB p18–20, the desire for such 
generality is cast as a tendency that should be of  central concern his reader’s 
investigation into the operative tendencies of  their own conceptions. This tendency was 
presented as one of  the targets of  what I referred to in Chapter III as Wittgenstein’s 
‘schemes of  interruption’. 
 Wittgenstein states that a “craving for generality is the resultant of  a number of  
tendencies connected with particular philosophical confusions.” We will therefore 
examine three of  these tendencies of  thought, and examine how a commitment to a 
model’s maximal applicability, or an uncritical type of  avowal of  a kind of  expression 
can be understood as resulting in a form of  tendential conceptual invariance. What is 
meant by this is that such thinking is tied to a deeply-rooted tendency towards favouring 
concepts that maximise the range of  cases they apply to, in order to achieve a purview 
of  cases capable of  legitimating a kind of  static representation. The cost, Wittgenstein 
suggests, is one paid in terms of  our decreased attention to the local context and 
contingencies of  a concept’s spatio-temporal use. It is in the disjunction between what 
we expect and wish these generalised expressions to do, and those contextual instances 
that are thereby obviated from our attention, that a sense of  injustice emerges in 
Wittgenstein’s portrayal of  this confusion:
“The object of  comparison, the object from which this way of  looking at things is derived, 
has to be given to us, so that injustices won’t constantly flow into the discussion. For 
everything that holds true for the archetype is now being claimed for the object under 
examination: and it is claimed that “it always has to . . .”. This comes from wanting to 
give the characteristics of  the archetype a foothold in the investigation. We conflate the 
archetype and the object, and then we have to dogmatically attribute to the object what 
should be ascribed only to the archetype.10
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Let us consider a few examples of  how this account emerges in Wittgenstein’s remarks. 
The Investigations is littered with problematic moments that might be taken as utterances 
of  this form of  dogmatism, by which we project a conceptual unity onto our objects of  
inquiry. From a plethora of  examples, we can, e.g., see how in §14 we are asked to 
imagine someone exclaiming that “All tools serve to modify something” (with this 
conceptual misstep being immediately problematised by Wittgenstein’s double 
interruption: “– And what is modified by the rule, the glue-pot, the nails?”, and then, 
“—Would anything be gained by this assimilation of  expressions?”). In §59, we are 
presented with another utterance of  a generalisation – “‘A name signifies only what is an 
element of  reality.’ – but this time this expression is supposed in some sense to indicate a 
“particular picture which we want to use.”11 Lastly, in a manner pertinent to our current 
parallel reading, we can also consider Norman Malcolm’s account of  Wittgenstein’s 
lasting disapproval of  one of  his remarks as providing us with a neat example of  how 
the notion of  such conceptual unity might inform our thoughts in a more quotidian 
setting. Wittgenstein and Malcolm were walking together when they observed a 
newspaper billboard that announced that the Germans had accused the British 
government of  an attempt to assassinate Hitler. Malcolm remarked that such an act 
would be impossible because “the British were too civilized and decent to attempt 
anything so underhand, and ... such an act was incompatible with the British 'national 
character'.”12 Wittgenstein was dismayed by Malcolm’s remark, and he stewed on it for 
five years before writing the following in a letter to his friend:
Whenever I thought of  you I couldn't help thinking of  a particular incident which seemed 
to me very important. . . . you made a remark about 'national character' that shocked me 
by its primitiveness. I then thought: what is the use of  studying philosophy if  all that it 
does for you is to enable you to talk with some plausibility about some abstruse questions 
of  logic, etc., & if  it does not improve your thinking about the important questions of  
everyday life, if  it does not make you more conscientious than any ... journalist in the use 
of  the DANGEROUS phrases such people use for their own ends.13
I take this remark to be relevant, and apt for inclusion alongside those two examples 
taken from Wittgenstein’s Investigations, because Malcolm’s utterance seems to match a 
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number of  the criteria that Wittgenstein provides as to what a craving for generality 
emerges from. Let us now examine what those criteria are. First, such a tendency 
exhibits a treatment of  concepts as including in their composition a unifying essential 
feature, in which all instances that fall under that concept partake: hence goodness might be 
understood as essentially distinguished by the welfare of  others, politics by the 
governance of  them (or Malcolm’s Britishness by the inscrutable adherence to fair play). 
Conversely, any case falling under a given concept must not harbour certain disqualifying 
characteristics; perhaps taking pleasure in domination, or governance of  no more than 
oneself, would function as characteristics that might be conceived of  as barring a case 
from being good or political, respectively. It is the task of  identifying and testing these 
essential features that has traditionally been taken up by the practice of  classical 
philosophy in its various incarnations. These unifying properties are typically derived 
from a ‘prototype’ or ‘exemplary’ case; a favoured instance that makes explicit that 
property considered as a constant in any case that falls under the concept in question, 
and are thus made to “stand at the apex”14 of  any investigation into any subject that falls 
under the conception that is constituted by the exemplary. The act of  the good 
samaritan, and the demos of  ancient Athens, might function as exemplars in our earlier 
two examples. In one’s craving for generality, such cases will provide the means for 
comprehending a much wider class of  cases than those singularities that stand at the 
apex of  our conception. 
 Secondly, therefore, the employment of  a preferenced model or prototype seems to 
license a subsequent method whereby a derived similitude can lead to a reductionism in 
one’s explanation in search of  elegance and unity, as demonstrated in our three earlier 
examples. “Philosophers constantly see the method of  science before their eyes, and are 
irresistibly tempted to ask and answer questions in the way science does. This tendency 
is the real source of  metaphysics, and leads the philosopher into complete darkness.”15 It 
is because this predilection for reductive methods of  conceiving of  language-in-use (and 
people-in-action) is at odds with the irreducibly complex interactional-effects, that 
Wittgenstein takes issue with them. Specifically, from this reductive preference springs 
the consequent “contempt for the particular case”;16 such cases not only offer little 
explanatory power when abstracted away from the contexts of  their occurrence, but 
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may threaten to interfere with our conceptual unity, thereby limiting the range of  
abstracted generality apparently available. Hence Wittgenstein presents the unifying 
similitude that is perceived between one’s exemplary ideal and the cases it is projected 
onto as both a result of, and a continuing guarantee for, a “one-sided diet”17 in the 
examples one is willing to contemplate. 
 Thirdly, as we saw in Chapter III, the problem of  dogmatic thought can be 
significantly framed as a problem of  the will: we are inclined to see certain cases as 
prototypes, glimpses of  underlying unities and, thus, ciphers by which to administer our 
comprehension of  all relevant cases in the world. The will is key to Wittgenstein’s 
account, therefore, because it is in our abiding drive to select an instance as an 
exemplary key that philosophical confusions emerge.18 A problem of  dogma, therefore, 
proceeds from what one wants, and what one expects one’s expressions and concepts to 
do, to instrumentally constitute what we consider to be a representative, true and fair 
conception of  a state of  affairs, and does so in a way that we become tendentially 
committed to that way of  seeing. Perhaps I might be drawn to place a particular model at 
the heart of  my understanding, because I am tempted by the opportunity to make sense 
of  a previously unyielding problem, fearful of  that powerlessness that accompanies 
incomprehension, or proud of  my perceptive insight into the heart of  the matter. 
 One effect of  such an avowal can be considered as something akin to a ‘gambit’; one 
sacrifices attention to – and acknowledgement of  – seemingly irrelevant contextual 
variance, in order to ensure a more profound kind of  conceptual unity, by advancing 
one’s preferred archetype as the encoding element through which to understand and 
legislate for all cases. Thus competing accounts, which perform alternate gambits 
according to differing exemplary cases, can be seen as models that threaten the 
characteristic that is the primary virtue of  one’s conceptions; their invariable 
applicability, by means of  ‘outranking’ one’s exemplar within a yet more generalised 
schema. As Cavell puts it, craving for generality “is betrayed not by a hasty 
generalization from "some" cases to "all" cases … but by the way in which, or the 
purpose for which, the philosopher selects that "best" case of  knowledge, and by what 
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one perceives as exemplary, make clear the limits of  such models, and incite the reader into an ongoing 
work that confronts their will to unify divergent cases, as much as the models that represent their chosen 
means of  achieving it.
he has had to do (to himself) in order to get the question … to arise there.”19 With 
Cavell, I see Wittgenstein’s problem of  generality as best understood not as the result of  
a hasty or premature decision to take a shortcut or a gamble; it is not a lazy act, and nor 
are the prejudices that arise from generality stupid ones.20 Rather “the easy transition 
from some to all”21 is made facile by the promise of  a revolutionary gain in descriptive 
and inferential power that occurs when one places a defining exemplar at the apex of  
one’s account as uniquely revelatory of  the conditions that must be met for any other 
such case to be adequately unified under the same concept. It seems as if  such a craving 
is not only sensible but promissory of  greater things to come; the world is rendered 
sensible, clearly defined normative boundaries appear, and because these characteristics 
appear to adhere in the thing itself, the possibility of  objective agreement and final 
judgement appears. Perhaps this is the reason, as Wittgenstein suggests, that we want so 
badly “to give the characteristics of  the archetype a foothold in the investigation”,22 
namely, to cut through the fog of  complexity and particularity, in order to seize upon an 
example that offers the chance to “enlighten”23 us, to make possible the imposition of  
organisation upon an otherwise chaotic field of  existence, by means of  “a state of  affairs  
of  the highest generality.”24 Kuusela makes a similar point, when he reflects that
“What is regarded as an illuminating example, i.e. A particular case that seems to bring to 
view something essential ... is here treated as if  it opened up a window to the essence of  
all cases. The example seems to allow a clear perception of  features barely visible in other 
cases, but which those other cases too must possess, insofar as they share the same 
essence.”25 
Finally, I would like to consider one more of  Wittgenstein's examples, one that brings to 
life the potential for confusion that can occur when our words are treated as expressing a 
unified generality instead of  an context-determined, and therefore context-dependent, 
utterance. The one that follows is of  particular interest to our current concerns, as it 
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draws an explicit relation between generality’s gambit and that form of  attentional 
“invisibility” with which an hierarchically superior, organising prototype seemingly 
legitimates an invariable purview. It also depicts how, if  one indulges in always 
conceiving by means of  conceptual unities, with greater and greater regularity (due to 
the wider and wider range of  applications they admit), then this habit threatens to make 
one’s generalities a kind of  “furniture” in our reasoning – an unnoticeable tendency of  
representation we rest upon:
To the statement "I feel in my hand that the water is three feet under the ground" we 
should like to answer: "I don't know what this means". But the diviner would say: "Surely 
you know what it means. You know what 'three feet under the ground' means, and you 
know what 'I feel' means!" But I should answer him: I know what a word means in certain 
contexts. i.e. Generality in our operating with words, thus making them familiar and 
therefore invisible. Thus I understand the phrase, "three feet under the ground", say, in 
the connections "The measurement has shown that the water runs three feet under the 
ground", "If  we dig three feet deep we are going to strike water", "The depth of  the water 
is three feet by the eye". But the use of  the expression "a feeling in my hands of  water 
being three feet under the ground" has yet to be explained to me.26
When Wittgenstein speaks here of  a “[g]enerality in our operating with words, thus 
making them familiar and invisible”, he is making a critique concerning our habits; the 
maximal generalisation in one’s use of  words renders them normalised, unapparent, 
unproblematic. They just fit, they work in a way that becomes second-nature to us, so 
that the diviner would no doubt prove at first uncomprehending, then indignant, at the 
possibility that he not be understood when he is operating with such common concepts 
such as ‘measurement’ and ‘feeling’. Perhaps the operative archetype in the diviner’s 
concept of  ‘feeling’ might be ‘an internal sensation that confirms or disconfirms an 
external event’ along the lines of  what Wittgenstein refers to as an “inner, occluded 
mental sign”27 – say, the feeling when one is being watched as one reads on a train, and 
how that feeling is subsequently confirmed by glancing up. That conflation would indeed 
allow the diviner to combine the two concepts to form an activity in which she “feels” in 
her hand that the water is three feet under the ground. To which, presumably, the task 
before her, were she to consider conducting philosophy in the manner suggested by 
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Wittgenstein, would be to consider confounding examples in which an ‘internal’ 
sensation is not at all indicative of  an ‘outside’ event; followed, perhaps, by an 
investigation into the manner in which she employed ‘internal’ and ‘external’ in her 
former explanation.28 Just as in the example, Wittgenstein’s solutions to his prototypical 
tendencies commonly derive from the closer examination of  a particular case. In this 
manner, Wittgenstein suggests, confusions of  different stripes appear in the light of, and 
supervene upon, one’s affectively driven and uncritical employment of  conceptual 
unities, and the commitments that lead to our application of  certain concepts outside of  
the particular circumstances to which they are native. 
 A point that will be of  increasing importance in the later sections of  this chapter is 
that in the current example we witness a lived form – of  acting, thinking, of  a kind of  
identity – as pivoting upon a misconception concerning some perceived invariance in 
conceiving of  the world. The license for the diviner’s activity, his understanding of  a 
significant part of  the world, and the sense in which he understands his own actions and 
reasons for doing so, are all shown to depend upon a kind of  (philosophical) confusion. 
The ways in which we are prone to describe the world, and the ways in which these 
descriptions have concrete effects upon how we then consider our actions and their 
justifications, are therefore directly affected by grammatical investigation. 
§5.2 Foucault on totality, power and the subject
The reader might be struck by an asymmetry in the following section – that is, while 
§5.1 addressed solely the notion of  generality in Wittgenstein's philosophy, §5.2 attempts 
to examine a set of  three notions in their relation to one another. Rather than this being 
evidence of  bias, I hold that this approach is demanded by the nature of  Foucault’s 
interlocking account of  dogmatism. I will argue that a trinity of  totality, power and the 
subject represent Foucault’s attempt to model, in greater detail than Wittgenstein, the 
manner by which dogmatism comes to be exerted in one’s conceptions, but in a way that 
is still analogous to Wittgenstein's concern with how exclusive conceptions “exert a 
palpable tyranny without any apparent restriction of  freedom”.29 
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 This trinity can be sketched out in the following manner. Totality is a style of  
comprehension based upon conceptual unity, similar to the accounts we have just 
considered, in which a massive field of  phenomena are cohered under a ‘central’, deeply 
explanatory, and therefore invariant account. Here, however, such coordinating 
generality is said to be expressed through a myriad of  differing relations of  power 
which, in turn, constitute human beings within those relations as being subject to those 
conceptual unities. Put simply, ‘totality’ models a form of  knowledge that expresses a 
hierarchical model that is immobile and context-insensitive to the cases that fall under its  
purview. ‘Power’ models the many unequal relations in which this form both occurs and 
is propagated. ‘Subject’ models the individual whose conceptions of  the world and self-
comprehension are both determined by these relations. Now, this rough map will be of  
little use without an accompanying legend, and therefore I propose that we briefly30 
examine each concept in turn, before turning back to the task of  seeing how they 
interlock, in an examination more detailed than that given in this short paragraph. We 
should then be in a position to summarise Wittgenstein and Foucault’s concerns and to 
locate similar problematics at work in both of  their methods.
To begin with, we can say that Foucault’s notion of  totality shows certain similarities 
with those exemplary-legitimated generalisations addressed in §5.1. Reference is made 
by Foucault at various points to totalising discourse, philosophy or theory, to total 
histories and descriptions. In each of  these uses, Foucault is describing the manner by 
which certain characteristics are understood as unified and invariable across differing 
contexts of  their employment, being made constant by their picking out a feature in a 
subject’s nature that is essential to it being just so, and hence operating as the unifying 
condition of  that manner of  conceiving. A totalising concept puts forth a ruling 
principle, which accounts for its coherence; it establishes an homogeneous network of  
explanatory relations across a set of  conceptual, spatial and historical coordinates in 
relation to it, allowing a series of  judgements, relations and identities to be formulated in 
reference to any case that falls under its remit. Foucault conceives of  their effect as a 
kind of  “conceptual architecture” – namely, a “system of  permanent and coherent 
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concepts”31  within which we live our lives. In the introduction to his Archaeology of  
Knowledge,32 Foucault makes the following succinct remark:
A total description draws all phenomena around a single centre – a principle, a meaning, 
a spirit, a world-view, an overall shape.33
For example, one might well reflect upon the fact that ‘attitudes towards madmen have 
varied throughout history’ without the possibility striking you that the existence of  the 
concept of  madman is historically situated and limited. It did not exist, and it will likely 
recede in favour of  other concepts that account for those conditions that are currently 
cohered under that of  “madman”. Foucault called this the ‘presentist fallacy’; an 
implication of  totality, in which we ‘naturally’ expect this unity, demonstrated by a 
particular “model or a concept, an institution, a feeling, or a symbol from [our] present” 
to be echoed in our past (and to be unavoidable in our future), and are thereby led to 
attempt to “find that it had a parallel meaning in the past.”34 Totalising thought, while 
perhaps admitting of  various schools or interpretations, nonetheless places the unifying 
characteristics of  one’s concepts below the ‘hurly-burly’35 of  its referent incarnations. 
Thus, “all the statements that named [madness], divided it up, described it, explained it, 
traced its developments, indicated its various correlations, judged it, and possibly gave it 
speech by articulating, in its name, discourses that were to be taken as its own” operate 
on the understanding that they do so in a relation of  truth to “the unity of  the object 
‘madness’”, “its secret content, its silent, self  enclosed truth”.36 Even in Foucault’s 
earliest work, History of Madness, we witness a process intended to disperse this 
coordinating conceptual unity, by means of  a tracing of  the origins of  our conception of 
human beings as psychological subjects from “the moment when a radical separation 
between madness and reason had taken place, the classical age, and when the possibility 
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36 AK, p35.
of  a science of  this new object appears.”37  It thus presents madness not as a stable 
referent, existing in a timeless, total sense, and separate from those cases it conceives of, 
but rather as the product of  a series of  totalising systems of  knowledge.38 As Paul Veyne 
puts it,
To say that madness does not exist is not to claim that madmen are victims of  prejudice, 
nor is it to deny such an assertion, for that matter. The meaning of  the proposition lies 
elsewhere. It neither affirms nor denies that madmen should not be excluded. Or that 
madness exists because it is fabricated by society, or that madness is modified in its 
positivity by the attitudes various societies hold to it, or that different societies have 
conceptualised madness in very different ways; the proposition does not deny, either, that 
madness has a behaviourist and perhaps a physiological component. But even if  madness 
were to have such components, it would not yet be madness. A building stone becomes a 
key stone or a header only when it takes its place as part of  a structure. … For Foucault 
the material for madness (behaviour, neuromicrobiology) really exists, but not as madness; 
to be mad only materially is precisely not yet to be mad.39
When Foucault set out to problematise madness, it was therefore not, as many of  his 
critics understand it, “a way of  denying the reality of  such phenomena. On the 
contrary, I have tried to show that it was precisely some real existent in the world which 
was the target of  social regulation at a given moment.”40 A totality – here the positing of 
the truth of  madness as running below, through, and sometimes irrupting into rational 
hypothesising during the history of  human endeavour – therefore displays limited 
similarities to Wittgenstein’s concern with generality. These similarities centre upon a 
way of  thinking that treats certain characteristics of  a conception as immutable, as 
“groupings that we normally accept before any examination”, whose “validity is 
recognised from the outset”41 and as therefore being essential to any case that is judged 
to fall under that conception. 
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 Foucault argues that the insistence upon the totality of  a concept often supervenes 
upon an historical or physiological account of  what must be the case, of  what is 
unavoidably a facet of  our reality. There, too, in “the project of  a total history” we seek 
“to reconstitute the overall form of  a civilisation, the principle material or spiritual – of  
a society, the significance common to all the phenomena of  a period, the law that 
accounts for their cohesion”,42 according to the preferenced aspect we are convinced by. 
Just as in our earlier examination of  the dogmatic effect of  projection, and how it 
becomes a kind of  furniture in our reasoning, it is because totality is the apex that governs  
the manner in which we orient ourselves in relation to a field of  human experience – 
and thus see its similarity to all the objects in that field – that it is
“not presented to the perception as the manifest bearer of  its limits and characteristics. It 
requires a certain change of  viewpoint and attitude to be recognised and examined in itself. 
Perhaps it is like the over-familiar that constantly eludes one; those familiar transparencies  
which, although they conceal nothing in their density, are nevertheless not entirely 
clear.”43
In a sense similar to Wittgenstein, then, Foucault is concerned with the problem of  a 
kind of  thought that, while it imposes an aspect by which to see the world, it does so in 
an exclusive manner that encourages the consideration that things must necessarily be 
understood this way, for that is just the way the world is. Again with Wittgenstein, it is 
exactly this quality, which Foucault here terms the ‘transparency’ of  dogma, that renders 
it as such an offensive and intolerable condition, because “a system of  constraint 
becomes truly intolerable when the individuals who are affected by it don’t have the 
means of  modifying it.”44 Thus this form of  dogmatic constraint is an effect of  the 
provision of  an apparently exhaustive notation by which to make sense of  oneself, to 
individualise oneself  by means of  appeal to a totalisation, to differentiate or include 
oneself  accordingly and, finally, to thereby conscript oneself  as an exemplar that 
supports the further proliferation of  that global and unitary knowledge in one’s further 
relations with others.45 It is on the basis of  such identities that we recognise ourselves as 
members of  a group, nation, state, strata, etc., and it is also on this basis that we consent 
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to be recognised and administered as such. The task of  philosophy for Foucault is first 
and foremost to fracture these totalities by which we conceive of  the world, to reverse 
their claims of  immobility, by undertaking genealogical investigations that respond to 
them with singular detail and contrary depictions. As Owen puts it:
By showing that a given limit is not ‘universal, necessary, obligatory’ and thus that we can 
think and act differently, that we can become otherwise than we are, genealogy opens a 
space in which what are experienced as immobile, irreversible and stable limits to 
reflection are re-experienced as mobile, reversible and unstable bounds.46
While we might perceive a similitude between generality and totality, in contrast, the 
notion of  a power relation is one that seems wholly alien to Wittgenstein’s 
methodology.47 The term is used to denote not only the means by which totalising 
thought is transmitted, circulated, and agreed upon within a group, but also how it is 
formed, tested and verified. Totalities are expressed from person to person, they are 
inherited in the techniques we employ with and upon one another, and thus their 
circulation among us supervenes upon the relations that they coordinate. For example, 
the unifying conception of  human life as being determined by the tripartite structure of  
the psyche’s id, ego, and super-ego is a totality that both coordinates and is expressed by 
the manifold techniques of  psychoanalysis. Without those relations that instantiate it, 
this totality would not be expressed in the particular way it is – it might still, however, 
find expression through other relations. Advertising and public relations, for example, 
can be seen as employing certain techniques that both derive their legitimacy from, and 
help to circulate, this particular unitary aspect of  human nature.48 Yet a power relation 
is a term that can be understood more generally than this; Foucault also, more 
minimally, described it as simply “the name one attributes to a complex strategical 
situation in a society”.49 To this end, it is an underdetermined concept, in a manner 
similar to our earlier use of  aspect: as Colin Gordon remarked, “[p]ower for Foucault is 
not an omnipotent causal principle or shaping spirit but a perspective concept.”50 It 
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provides a way of  presenting different models of  how to understand human practices, 
like so:
What does it mean to exercise power? It does not mean picking up this tape recorder and 
throwing it on the ground. I have the capacity to do so—materially, physically, sportively. 
But I would not be exercising power if  I did that. However, if  I take this tape recorder 
and throw it on the ground in order to make you mad, or so that you can’t repeat what 
I’ve said, or to put pressure on you so that you’ll behave in such and such a way, or to 
intimidate you—well, what I’ve done, by shaping your behavior through certain means, 
that is power.51
Power presents us with a way of  describing different types of  relation between people; it 
is useful as a tool for describing dogmatism because it allows one to represent the means 
by which one comes to act upon the actions of  another, and in turn is so acted upon. It 
is not a means to paint a morbid picture of  the brute restriction of  freedom,52 but 
instead how a person, institution or group enlists a subject’s will in their freely deciding 
to do as that relation determines; the concept of  a power relation is one that enables one 
to perceive the means by which a relation can determine the “possible field of  actions of 
others”.53 The notion of  power allows Foucault to model and represent the means of  
dogmatism as a cultural, shared, normative effect “that tends to render immobile and 
untouchable those things that are offered to us as real, as true, as good.”54
 If  power is a descriptor used to denote the activities, transactions and discourses we 
commonly participate in, as they are performed upon us, and by us, then we are subject 
to these relations, and it is we who respond, repeat or resist the total descriptions, 
philosophies and histories that are expressed through our relations. This is how the 
individual is to be understood as both an effect of  power and “the element of  its 
articulation.”55 Those power relations that impose a conceptual unity thereby allow one 
the means by which to adopt a static identity for one’s self. On the condition that we 
recognise and govern ourselves as members of  the set thereby understood, we gain 
access to a way of  understanding ourself, differentiating ourself, and of  forming ourself  
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within a field of  meaning that is both stable and universal. Different forms of  power 
relations operate by means of  different conceptual unities, and hence provide different 
modes of  subjectivity.56 The notion of  a subject can therefore best be understood as the 
product of  a series of  differing relations, which each “categorize the individual, mark 
him by his own individuality, attach him to his own identity, impose a law of  truth on 
him that he must recognize and others have to recognize in him.”57 
 For Foucault the reason why we give a “foothold” to archetypes in our accounts of  
the world is already imprinted in the scheme by which we go about understanding 
ourselves. We already understand ourselves in terms of  generality and similitude, through 
the choices we make, from the endless schemes of  self-understanding we are given 
through our relations with others. The functioning of  those relations are predicated 
upon our classification, our self-recognition, the logic of  similitude that makes me self-
sensible as a white man, as middle aged, as English, a geek, a leftwinger, a Dawkinsian 
gene-robot, a gemini, a potential rapist, a child of  God, an occupier, a box-set watcher, a 
squatter, an addictive personality, or a philosopher. We are too late in our resistance, if  we 
do not acknowledge that the subject we understand ourselves to be – the one we take 
pleasure or guilt in – is the incorporation of  a series of  totalities, instantiated by the way 
we are understood, the way we are classified, and the ensuing reflexive manner of  our 
employment of  these generalities in our own self-understanding. Hence, for Foucault, 
the first indication of  that form of  “[g]enerality in our operating with words” which 
makes “them familiar and invisible”, as remarked upon earlier by Wittgenstein, is to be 
inscribed in those principles by which we self-govern and are governed. 
 Indeed, even if  a person conceives of  themselves as standing in opposition to a totalised 
concept of, say, their sexuality, that act of  denial will be drawn to being expressed in 
relation to it, only as a negative coordinate to the normal positive, thereby limiting their 
critique to its negation, rather than its irrelevance or inappropriateness. For example, to 
deny homosexuality as a deviance from a natural state of  sexuality and to posit it as 
either co-extensive with, identical with, or positively differentiated from, that norm, is to 
continue to employ the totalising conception, but in its inverse. The subject is caught, 
then, because even if  it refuses to understand itself  by means of  certain prescriptions, 
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then still, the task of  redetermining one’s conceptions through this refusal reduces to a 
shadow cast by the same conceptual unity. By “switching sides”, then, one fails because 
one does not recognise that one is still seeing by means of  the same aspect that causes 
the problem to emerge in the first place. Foucault put it thus:
What often embarrasses me today … is that all this work done in the past fifteen years or 
so … functions for some only as a sign of  belonging: to be on the ‘good side’, on the side 
of  madness, children, delinquency, sex. … One must pass to the other side – the good side 
– but by trying to turn off these mechanisms which cause the appearance of  two separate 
sides. … This is where the real work begins.58 
Therefore unless a person can radically undermine those concepts that constitute their 
normal totalising thoughts, they will be bound in orbit, whether in deference or denial, 
to that field of  totality that both assert a timeless sameness and make possible their self-
recognition, through their similitude to it. Foucault thus puts a far greater emphasis 
upon what we saw earlier in the example of  the water diviner – a lived form of  acting, 
thinking, of  a kind of  identity, as pivoting upon a misconception concerning some 
perceived invariance in one’s conceptions. 
 The pay off  in this peculiar form of  notation now becomes clearer: we can begin to 
conceive of  the individual as being determined – as the accumulative impact marks left 
by a series of  total conceptions of  its nature – and mediated by the success, failure and 
particularities of  the power relations it is extricated in. The subject thereby appears in 
this light, as the “inside as an operation of  the outside: in all his work Foucault seems 
haunted by this theme of  an inside which is merely the fold of  the outside, as if  the ship 
were a folding of  the sea.”59 The subject is held in dogmatic rigidity because, as the 
object of  those totalities that concern its nature, it is convinced of  a certain conception 
of  itself  as necessarily displaying the characteristics of  that total conception. Being 
convinced of  the exemplary exclusivity of  a particular way of  seeing, the subject is led to 
see in a manner that reflects back to it the terms of  its own understanding, nature and 
history. This scheme of  description allows Foucault access to an extremely forceful style 
of  description, where the reader is challenged to understand herself  as a direct product 
of  the language that is used to describe her. 
  Finally, consider that the reason that power relations depend upon totality for their 
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force is because positing contextually-explicated singularities does not produce the same 
normative effect as positing essentialist conceptual unities by which an individual 
conceives that they must proceed. Such totally avowed schemes of  conception reorder 
their relevant fields of  inquiry according to a configuration of  form decided by what our 
attention is drawn to, so that it reflects back to the subject a coherence or 
meaningfulness which anticipates the terms of  its own way of  seeing. In contrast, 
without totalised modes of  conceiving of  the subjects they involve, disciplinary strategies 
would be left with no criteria by which to inscribe ‘correct’ procedure upon the subject, 
for the perspicuous subject would be left without the immobile norms by which to 
proceed. This is why the stability and naturalness of  such normative applications is the 
grounds upon which Foucault proposes that the task of  resistance should take place. 
§5.3 Antidogmatic method
When considering these two accounts of  the problem of  dogmatism we can see that, 
while they are certainly distinct from each other, a certain interstice emerges. This 
parallel occurs in their accounts of  how we are led to favour concepts that maximise the 
range of  objects they apply to, in order to achieve a purview capable of  legitimating a 
kind of  static representation, regardless of  the local contexts and contingencies of  a 
concept’s spatio-temporal use.  We have also seen that both authors treat this grand 
progressive hope as being an effect of  a certain style of  thought, one that, rather than 
leading to an objective form of  knowledge, is in actuality responsible for a subject’s turn 
towards dogmatism. 
 Consider the methodological similarities noted in §4.3. Can the similar parameters 
and characteristics presented there be accounted for by reference to this shared concern 
with dogmatic conceptual unity? I argue that it can: namely, by understanding dogma as  
resulting in a form of  injustice, we can give a precise account of  the methodological 
constraints that a philosophical method derived from such an account of  dogmatism 
should adhere to. That is because, presumably, both philosophical methods wish to 
avoid slipping into a state of  affairs in which their proposed solutions partake in the kind 
of  dogmatic injustice that those methods seek to address. I will outline these constraints 
in response to two broad aspects. First, the Wittgensteinian notion of  injustice and 
second, the notion of  a self-imposed form of  captivity. These two aspects are far from 
exhaustive; I will argue that both can be seen quite clearly in the accounts of  §5.1 & 
§5.2. 
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Dogmatism, whether brought about by a craving for generality, or by understanding 
one’s own nature in reference to totalised conceptions, describes a form of  dislocation 
from the contexts of  our practices. An example of  this was examined earlier, in 
Malcolm’s dismissal of  a British assassination plot, by means of  an appeal to what 
Britishness is, and therefore, what could not have been the case. For what reason would we 
wish to describe Malcolm’s behaviour, emerging from dogmatic avowal of  an invariant 
aspect, as exhibiting a form of  injustice? And why would this injustice constitute a 
problem that was overridingly important to grammatical investigation? Well, 
Wittgenstein was fairly unambiguous in his earlier account of  how injustice can flow 
into one’s expressions: it was because “everything that holds true for the archetype is 
now being claimed for the object under examination: and it is claimed that “it always 
has to . . .”60 Let me suggest two common uses of  the word injustice that might help us 
to see why dogmatic projection can be unjust. Firstly, we can understand it in roughly 
the same manner as when we say that a musician doesn’t ‘do justice’ to the score she is 
playing. Something is wrong in her performance, she is inattentive to a particular feature 
that we consider of  great importance, or perhaps she is simply not very skilled at 
depicting the detail found in the score. In short, there is a failure to render the nuance 
and detail convincingly and hence she is insensitive to the task at hand. Secondly, there is 
a more literal use of  injustice: something is overlooked, a miscarriage has occurred 
which results in unfairness: the decision is made that does not do justice to the 
circumstances it is adjudicating.
 Next, recall how earlier we followed Baker in his dismissal of  his initial exegesis in 
Chapter I. There, we encountered an understanding of  language that was informed first 
and foremost in its method by an acknowledgement of  the “incalculability” of  our use 
of  language. Because it is of  such methodological import, this is something that 
Wittgenstein constantly reminds us of, asking us, for example, to “think how many 
different kinds of  thing are called ‘description’”,61 or warning us that “If  you do not keep 
the multiplicity of  language-games in view you will perhaps be inclined to ask questions 
like: ‘What is a question?’”62 “There are countless kinds” of  sentence63, because the sense 
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that they make occurs in relation not solely to one person’s life, “but the whole hurly-
burly of  human actions, the background against which we see any action.”64 What’s 
more, when we seek out some order to this mass of  interactional complexity and 
actually “look at the actual use of  a word, what we see is something constantly 
fluctuating”,65 with many of  the words that most confuse us being “used in a thousand 
different ways which gradually merge into one another.” And this is a characteristic that 
should not surprise us, because we are using these words to describe “the complex 
nature and the variety of  human contingencies”:66  there is an “infinite complexity” in 
the lives, intentions and actions we that we seek to describe. Wittgenstein summons us 
over and over again to attend to the incalculability of  any sum total of  human language 
in use, because this contextual complexity is not a contingent or abstruse concern, but is 
rather one we judge, describe and react to every day. “Life's infinite variations are an 
essential part of  our life. And so precisely of  the habitual character of  life.”67 It is this 
contextual complexity that Wittgenstein is concerned that we do an injustice to – both 
by our insensitivity to its detail and by our unfairness to its constitutive place in what we say 
and mean. In keeping with this complexity and in order for one to resist this form of  
injustice, Wittgenstein advocates a method where, “[i]n order to see more clearly, here as 
in countless similar cases, we must focus on the details of  what goes on; must look at 
them from close to.” His commitment to examining the contextual fine-detail in which our 
utterances take place is one concerned with doing justice to those fluctuating contexts of 
our practices that our words are situated in, and of  letting the complexity of  the 
contexts that we see, from close to, thereby inform our conception of  them. Thus the 
reason that we cannot give clear criteria for the use of  many of  our concepts in advance 
of  the contexts of  their use is because what we are speaking of  makes little sense unless 
the our words are contextually given. In this light, the problem of  our projection of  
conceptual unities onto the massively complex contexts of  our life with words becomes 
apparent; such projection “make[s] unjust claims that conflict with their everyday 
practices”.68
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 Refusing to attend to context, in favour of  the unitary judgements apparently 
afforded by totalities, is an operative concern for Foucault too.69 Admittedly Foucault 
accounts for this idea of  ‘projection’ in very different terms, yet his subject is a similar 
type of  widespread dogmatic confusion – namely, one where we are led to “[seek] the 
unity of  discourse in the objects themselves, in their distribution, in the interplay of  their 
differences, in their proximity or distance”, yet when we turn to critically examine our 
discursive practices, what we “discover is neither a configuration, nor a form, but a 
group of  rules that are [instead] immanent in a practice, and define it in its specificity.”70 
Genealogy is constituted, like grammatical investigation, by the use of  specifically 
chosen “precise examples” that allow one to “loosen the embrace” in which our 
understanding held us, so that we are able to recognise that those previously avowed 
“rules [do not] define the dumb existence of  a reality” but, on the contrary, project an 
unjust “ordering of  objects.”71 Something like this sense of  injustice is apparent in 
Foucault’s account of  the foreclosure of  the possibilities of  the world through our 
conception of  it, most commonly represented as the transparent72 or invisible73 quality 
of  dogma. For Foucault, just as for Wittgenstein, this concern determines what the task 
of  philosophy constitutes, at a fundamental methodological level:
I am perfectly aware that I am situated in a context. The problem, then, lies in 
knowing how to attain consciousness of  such a context and even, so to speak, in 
assimilating it, in letting it exert its effects on one’s own discourse, on the very 
discourse one is currently employing. You say that one is inevitably a philosopher 
in the sense that one inevitably conceives the whole in some way ... But are you 
quite sure that philosophy consists precisely in that? … What does engaging in 
philosophy nowadays mean, in fact? It does not mean forming a discourse on 
totality, a discourse in which the totality of  the world would be taken up again, but 
rather, engaging in a certain activity, a certain form of  activity.”74
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Very well, but what are we to conclude from these parallel methodological concerns? 
Specifically, what does this shared apprehension of  dogmatic injustice amount to in 
terms of  methodological constraint, as was promised earlier? Well, first and foremost, 
the task of  using the various insights gathered through grammatical or genealogical 
investigation in order to construct, for example, a theoretical account of  the processes of 
language75 or fundamental account of  human freedom or reason,76 is immediately 
disqualified by this notion of  dogma: such unifying constructions, because they forward 
their own exemplary modes of  conception, would “only result in [further] injustices.”77
 Therefore it is vital to the success of  such methods that they do not commit us to 
an antimetaphysical position. In this respect I follow Kuusela78 in understanding 
Wittgenstein’s methods as being antidogmatic, rather than antimetaphysical. 
Characterising Wittgenstein as an antimetaphysical philosopher would be misleading, 
for such theories are not rejected outright, but instead they are dislodged from the 
privileged, and hence projecting, apex they stand at in our thoughts.79 Hence 
Wittgenstein's turn away from metaphysics is not a simple rejection of  what has been 
said in metaphysical philosophy, and it would be misleading in this sense to characterize 
him as an antimetaphysical philosopher. Dogmatism is overcome in philosophy by 
presenting new rules for the purpose of  codifying in them characteristic aspects of  the 
actual, blurred field of  language use. I argue a similar qualification should be made of  
Foucault. In his comments upon the universalist principles of  the Enlightenment,80 or in 
his response to Habermas’s critical theories,81 for example, we can see a similar 
differentiation between the worth of  the positions advanced and the status of  the totality 
it posits.
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 It is therefore important that both our methods ensure that the codifications 
employed to achieve their intended dislocatory effects are not supposed as new 
revelatory schemes that mark a final or hierarchically superior concept. “Our only task is  
to be just. That is, we must only point out and resolve the injustices of  philosophy, and 
not posit new parties – and creeds.”82 For Foucault, the very idea that his genealogies 
were being taken by some as the new totalities by which the reader should proceed, left 
him “mortified”,83 for such a use would render their intended effect in its inverse; a new 
immobile centre, as opposed to a dislocatory jolt. Antidogmatic method therefore 
cannot say that a particular conception is not possible. Only that, putting it another way 
immediately shows you that it need not be applied, and this comparative process 
“illustrates the method of  philosophy.”84 If  antidogmatic method is not reflexive in 
regards to the possibility of  new modes of  injustice emerging from its instruments, then 
it risks compromising the comparative power of  its models through establishing a 
conceptual unity:
	
if  we want to protect these only lately liberated fragments are we not in danger of  
ourselves constructing, with our own hands, that unitary discourse to which we are 
invited, perhaps to lure us into a trap, by those who say to us : ‘All this is fine, but where 
are you heading? What kind of  unity are you after?’85
Therefore the schemes, prompts, examples and scenarios that make up the different 
notations of  Wittgenstein and Foucault’s methods cannot be amalgamated as a principled 
undertaking, in order “to descend upon them from on high with some kind of  halo of  
theory that would unite them.”86 Foucault describes quite explicitly how this wariness is 
reflexively expressed in his method, in his refusal to give a total formulation of  his 
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83 “[I]n The Order of  Things, the absence of  methodological signposting may have given the impression that 
my analyses were being conducted in terms of  cultural totality. It is mortifying that I was unable to avoid 
these dangers: I console myself  with the thought that they were intrinsic to the enterprise itself, since, in 
order to carry out its task, it had first to free itself  from these various methods and forms of  history”. 
(AOK, p18)
84 BB, p12.
85 Foucault 1980a, p86.
86 Ibid, p87.
genealogies “that [would] invite the kind of  theoretical coronation of  the whole which I 
am so keen to avoid”.87 
 This interpretation results in a somewhat ‘permissive’ relationship to those 
problematic models arranged against it. It would be a mistake to imagine either 
philosopher would go so far as to see no worth or sense in those philosophical systems 
that might be considered good examples of  dogmatic conceptual unity. Both 
preferenced the construction of  imaginative new examples, in order to function as 
models of  comparison, as an important component of  one’s philosophical practice. It is 
therefore hardly surprising that both, in conversation with close friends, admitted to a 
reverence for those great metaphysical models of  the past that simultaneously present 
their reader with both feats of  conceptual imagination, and with an appeal for new kind 
of  dogmatic avowal:
Don’t think that I hate metaphysics. I regard some of  the great philosophical systems of  
the past as among the noblest productions of  the human mind.88 
I can still hear Foucault talking to me, with pleasure, sympathy and respectful admiration, 
about St Augustine and his constant flow of  ideas: ideas clearly all the more admirable in 
that, being hard to believe, they indicate just how far the human mind is capable of  
venturing.89
Finally, there is the inverse consideration, of  how such injustice commits one to a form 
of  self-constriction. This concern is with how we might, through a mechanistic injustice 
towards ourselves, inhibit the range of  our thought, the thing we might otherwise become. 
Given the model sketched out in §5.2, Foucault seems to more explicitly address this 
concern that Wittgenstein. The presentation of  dogmatism as a form of  constraint upon 
an individual’s thought, by means of  a kind of  certainty as to the suitability of  their 
conceptions across a range of  cases, instances and contexts, in fact strikes me as the very 
purpose of  Foucault’s accounts of  subjectivity.90 Dogmatism unchecked can determine 
what kind of  person we make of  ourselves, what problems we attend to, what we ‘take a 
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88 Drury 1967, p67.
89 Veyne 2010, p39. 
90 Perhaps Wittgenstein’s notion of  one’s craving for generality performs a similar role to that of  
Foucault’s notion of  subjectivity.
stand on’, what we preference as being of  fundamental importance to us, what political 
acts we undertake (or fail to), the ways in which we are comfortable expressing ourselves, 
how we understand what it is to mean, say, think and feel, etc, etc. 
 “Who one was, Foucault wrote, emerges acutely out of  the problems with which one 
struggles.”91 Therefore if  one operates in a ‘frictionless’ conceptual environment, where 
one thinks one has the means by which every alternative account can be shown to be 
irretrievably false, then one is liable to exhibit a peculiarly dismissive and combative style 
of  subjectivity. If  one’s thoughts are predicated upon the apparent universality of  the 
aspect one is operating under then it is only a short step towards the role of  the polemicist. 
In this way an injustice to the multiplicity of  means of  description leads one, perversely, 
to a conviction that one is proceeding according to a great truth, one whose time has 
come, and must now be shared. This dogmatic subject would proceed
encased in privileges that he possesses in advance and will never agree to question. 
On principle, he possesses rights authorising him to wage war and making that 
struggle is a just undertaking; the person he confronts is not a partner in the search 
for truth, but an adversary, an enemy who is wrong, who is harmful, and whose 
very existence constitutes a threat … The polemicist relies on a legitimacy that his 
adversary is by definition denied.92  
Foucault’s presentation is an extreme one, but it can nonetheless be understood relative 
to that form of  certainty that Wittgenstein often describes as a ‘bewitchment in which 
certain forms of  language hold us”,93 where one is guaranteed access to a necessary truth 
with which to simplify a complex and fluctuating field of  human phenomena. Such 
attempts at uniformity are to be understood as “the expression of  an attitude ... which 
comes out everywhere in our lives. The emphasis of  the 'must' corresponds only to the 
inexorability of  this attitude … towards innumerable related practices.”94 One such 
practice was that of  the water diviner.
157
91 Rabinow 1994, pxix.
92 1997b, pp381-2.
93 … “we want to establish an order in our knowledge of  the use of  language, which makes this possible. 
I.e. an order with a particular end in view; one out of  many possible orders." (Wittgenstein, in Kuusela 
2008, p133)
94 The multiple ellipses remove Wittgenstein’s example, of  multiplication, from this remark. 
Hacking’s discussions in Historical Ontology demonstrate that this problem is rendered far 
more serious when we consider that our exclusive forms of  representations are being 
used by us to describe the indeterminate complexities of  human life: the injustice of  the 
imposition of  a dogmatically held aspect upon an ‘object’ becomes more immediately 
troubling when that object is an element of  someone’s life. As considered earlier,95 in 
reference to what he coined the “looping effect”, what “is curious about human action is 
that by and large what I am deliberately doing depends on the possibilities of  
description.” Hence “if  new modes of  description come into being, new possibilities for 
action come into being in consequence”,96 and likewise, the imposition of  preferenced 
forms of  description closes off  certain forms of  life, whilst repressively prescribing 
others. Philosophy is to respond to this by refusing the organisation of  oneself  according 
to the traits, tendencies and capacities that would otherwise define us by reference to 
total and invariant forms of  knowledge. It is the exertion of  knowledge as an effect, 
which subjects human beings to a process of  defining themselves in accordance with an 
unchanging scheme, that is the inverse, accompanying injustice of  dogma. 
	 We can conclude that the habitual desire for conceptual unity is a guiding concern 
for both methods because not only does it lead to a form of  contextual blindness, but 
because it restricts the range of  concepts we operate under, causing injustice in our 
thoughts through our perpetual avowal of  a single aspect, a state of  affairs rendered 
especially problematic when we seek to do so when accounting for what human 
behaviour must necessarily be. The immediate methodological outcome of  this aspect of 
injustice is that neither philosopher can helps themselves unproblematically to the right
to tell others what they have to do. By what right would they do so? ... The work of 
an intellectual is not to shape others' political will; it is, through the analyses that 
he carries out in his own field, to question over and over again what is postulated 
as self-evident, to disturb people's mental habits, the way they do and think things, 
to dissipate what is familiar and accepted, to reexamine rules and institutions.97 
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of  person, or to do a certain kind of  act, may affect someone.”
96 Hacking 2002, p108.
97 Foucault 1988c, pxvi.
If  dogmatism results in a form of  injustice that an individual visits upon herself, then it 
is to be remedied on the level of  that individual also. If  a form of  injustice is self-
constricting, then the method of  its relief  cannot be one that conceives of  freedom as 
one’s being free to conform to another’s preferenced set of  idealised rules. Both authors’ 
location of  philosophy on the level of  conceptual struggle, of  work on oneself, is entailed 
by our own involvement in dogma; “it is we who are doing it, not having it done to 
us.”98 It is by our ‘shaping’ of  our life that our dogmatic tendencies are rendered a 
persistent effect, and it is that shape that will have to be altered for it to cease.99 
Therefore both methods seek to change the way one sees, the possibilities one considers, 
the comparisons one is liable to make, in order to overhaul the concepts that “permeate 
our life” and the limits that we currently set upon that life.100
 Yet equally, it cannot be as simple as saying that dogmatism is something that we 
as individuals are personally responsible for. Rather, dogma is something that shapes the 
life we lead and, by this regimentation, becomes self-confirming by means of  the way we 
describe that life so shaped. The impoverishment of  the conditions by which we 
conceive of  language-in-use, and the manner in which we judge and describe massively 
complex and dynamic human phenomena, etc., are thus at the same time the 
impoverishment of  what we are permitting ourselves to be. It does no good to convict 
the reader of  dogmatism, or convince her of  a new and improved dogmatic account, if  
the possibilities one uses to describe this are unfamiliar to that person’s accounts. They 
have to be incited to see the limitations within which they are operating in by 
themselves. This is one way of  making better sense of  why both Foucault and 
Wittgenstein considered the problem of  dogmatism to imply not just a critical 
investigation into the faulty purview or logic of  certain concepts, but of  a work that 
takes place upon the self. 
 Dogma is thereby understood as deeply involved in our form of  life; it 
determines the kind of  attention we pay to the world, and what we see as deserving of  
interrogation, what we see as obviously absurd, and what we fail to see at all, because of  
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99 “The way to solve the problem you see in your life is to live in a way that will make what is problematic 
disappear. The fact that life is problematic means that your life does not fit life's shape. So you must 
change your life, & once it fits the shape, what is problematic will disappear.” (MS 118, 17r c: 27.8.1937) I 
take the shape of  one’s life here to be related to one’s way of  looking at things.
100 That I can be someone's friend rests on the fact that he has the same possibilities as I myself  have, or 
similar ones. Would it be correct to say our concepts reflect our life? They stand in the middle of  it. … 
Operating with concepts permeates our life. (LWPP II, pp72-3)
it’s transparent correctness. Not only do we project onto the world those features that are 
characteristics of  our means of  representation, but we see ourselves in relations of  
similarity or exclusion to these projections too, a complication that promises the 
possibility of  recognising ourselves, measuring, understanding and contrasting what we 
are within in a stable field of  similitude. Changing our way of  thinking in terms of  
conceptual unities, curiously enough then, has deep reaching effects upon who we are; it 
is not an abstruse concern.
 If  injustice is perpetrated by our unwillingness to acknowledge other ways of  
seeing the world, or in what we cannot pay attention to, then its relief  must entail the 
refocussing of  our attention to the contexts that we currently elide. Antidogmatic 
method results in one doing justice to other, currently unseen, aspects, and in doing so it 
obviates the possibility of  being a certain kind of  subject, and so too of  “set[ting] up 
new parties – and creeds.”101
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Chapter VI
Freedom, Creativity and the Purpose of Philosophy 
_____________________________________________________
Life's infinite variations are an essential part of  our life. And so precisely of 
the habitual character of  life. Expression consists for us in incalculability.
 — Ludwig Wittgenstein – Manuscript 1371
My way of  no longer being the same is, by definition, the most unique part 
of  what I am.  
 — Michel Foucault, For an Ethic of  Discomfort 2
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The optimistic hope that one can achieve conceptual self-governance, advanced in the 
last chapter’s account of  the relation between philosophical practice and the cessation of 
dogmatism, is one that can be seen as having come under attack from a host of  
Foucault’s critics. This concluding chapter traces two common avenues of  accusation 
that Foucault’s work has attracted, and does so as a means to conclude with a final 
combinatorial appraisal of  our two anti-dogmatic methods. The challenge of  these two 
accusations is of  a kind quite different to that encountered in Chapter IV, in which 
Merquior’s argument was shown to result from a straightforward misunderstanding of  
the status of  Foucault’s methods. This is partly because both the two accusations appear 
to be somewhat compatible with our current aspectival reading, and therefore constitute 
more interesting, and more serious, charges. In defending Foucault I will be turning to 
certain methodological qualifications that were earlier established in this thesis, and in so 
doing, clarify the end to which he is shown to be aiming, one concerning freedom. Yet 
the freedom I will argue for will not be understood as simply equivalent to liberation, for 
I argue that such an understanding, treated as the defining end of  philosophy, does 
indeed result in troubling inconsistencies in method. When his work is instead 
understood as a concern for the creative aspect of  freedom that makes such liberation 
possible, these two accusations fail to impact. We will examine the idea of  creativity as a 
‘source of  freedom’ by reference to three values Foucault himself  posited as giving form 
to his method; those of  refusal, curiosity and innovation. I will argue that these three 
qualifications constitute what can best be explained in those terms derived from and 
developed in this thesis, in a manner which confirms the aptness of  my earlier exegesis 
concerning the purposes of  both Foucault and Wittgenstein’s philosophy. 
 In this way, I will conclude by demonstrating the inaccuracy of  those critics who 
treat Foucault’s work as failing simply because it cannot posit a principled foundation for 
the subject’s nature, one which could provide a universal, nativist or theoretical grounds 
for resistance. This refusal will be considered in the light of  Wittgenstein’s own refusal to 
posit theoretical principles in his own methods. Indeed, not only this conclusion, but the 
means by which it is reached, will be demonstrably influenced by the arguments put 
forth in my earlier reading of  Wittgenstein. Likewise, by chapter’s end, I will have 
provided reasons why a new set of  historical methods concerned with averting 
dogmatism have now become available for Wittgensteinian philosophical activity.  More 
generally, I will have advanced a reading by which both our methods can be understood 
as a concern with the unbounded possibilities in how we conceive of  the world. That is, 
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I will show how they propose methods by which to undermine those hitherto invisible 
habits of  thought that restrict ‘creativity’ – understood as a summative term by which to 
express the possibility for innovative conception of  the world.
§6.1 Normativity and the failure of method
In order to begin framing these criticisms we first turn to Slavoj Žižek, a cultural theorist 
who, despite his sympathy for Foucault’s projects, takes great exception with his 
optimistic conception of  resistance. Specifically, in his book The Ticklish Subject,3 Žižek 
argued that, once analysed in a self-consistent manner, the proposed task of  conceptual 
resistance becomes an act impossible to achieve by using Foucault’s notation. His central 
premise for this argument concerns Foucault’s representation of  resistance as a kind of  
‘counter-power’4 – that is, as that potential for a subject to “pervert” the normative 
totalities that have, until that act of  resistance, determined the conceptions of  the 
subject with a kind of  exclusivity that informs the judgements that subject sees as 
feasible, and the kind of  objects that subject is prepared to recognize as pertinent (see 
§5.3 & §1.4). Žižek claims that Foucault fails to be consistent in the consequences that 
derive from his depiction of  resistance as being necessarily emergent from the strategic 
relations it perverts. Because of  the irremediable nature of  this relation, in which 
“power and resistance (counter-power) presuppose and generate each another”,5 it 
makes about as much sense to expect a subject to transcend those power relations that 
are the terms of  its own expression, as for a trout to attempt to liberate itself  onto a 
riverbank. For Žižek, Foucault’s earlier “embarrassment”6 at the predictable and binary 
resistance that he witnessed being inspired by his own work is therefore well-deserved, 
and must be seen as a rather disappointing and ineluctable feature of  his proposed 
practice. This is because Foucault advocates only the playful mutation of  new power 
relations, rather than a form of  emancipatory resistance proper, namely “[a] resistance 
that would not be ‘part of  the game’ but would allow the subject to assume a position 
that exempts him from the disciplinary/confessional mode of  power”.7 Foucault’s 
subject can at best replicate negatively, in its refusal or denial, a variant of  the totality it 
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seeks to overturn. Seen in this light, an act of  resistance appears as an inconsequential 
elaboration on the continuous totalities that are expressed as a subject, rather than an 
actual escape from a form of  dogmatic determination. 
 This criticism did not wholly originate with Žižek. Five years before he wrote The 
Ticklish Subject, Joan Copjec accused Foucault of  a similar failure, couching it in terms 
very relevant to this thesis. For her, it is his “disallowance of  any reference to a principle 
… that ‘transcends’ the regime of  power he analyses”8 that renders Foucault’s 
genealogical models useless. What Copjec takes to be Foucault’s squeamishness – 
namely his constant refusal to provide any principles by which we might form a theory 
of  the subject – results in a form of  notation that allows for no negation that could not 
be “absorbed” by the power regime it contests. Because of  this lack in Foucault’s 
accounts, the subject is left with nothing to refer to as the universal foundation for its 
resistance. The presumed totalities that Foucault presents as being so problematic 
cannot be countered by, for example, a principled determination of  mankind’s dignity in 
lieu of  its rationality. Such a determination, made familiar by authors of  the 
Enlightenment, for example, might permit an absolute refusal, one predicated upon an 
inalienable principle of  the subject that, if  threatened, can, in virtue of  its categorical 
nature, overrule the offending problematic. According to Žižek and Copjec, this absence 
of  such foundations in Foucault’s accounts renders it impossible “for individuals to re-
articulate and displace the power mechanisms they are caught in”.9 In this absence, 
attempts at resistance instead perpetuate the terms of  those relations. For this class of  
critic, the subject, when left without foundation, is conceived of  as some kind of  sandpit 
in which power can render its effects unopposed. The facet of  Foucault’s descriptions, 
then, that strikes such a powerful note in our imagination, is the very same facet that 
renders us incapable of  acting upon it, namely that
The individual is not a pre-given entity which is seized on by the exercise of  power. The 
individual, with his identity and characteristics, is the product of  a relation of  power 
exercised over bodies, multiplicities, movements, desires, forces.10
If  the conceptions by which I appear to myself  as a subject are radically contingent and 
historical in nature, then it is vain for me to search for a freedom from relations of  
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power, if  they are the only means which allow our emergence as subjects. If  we 
therefore refrain from positing foundations from which to express resistance, then we are 
left no recourse to a force necessary to contravene or overcome those relations that do 
develop and express themselves through our subjectivity. This argument is one of  the 
most serious criticisms levelled at Foucault, centering, as it does, on an apparently 
ineluctable problem of  power, and has had many incarnations. Predating both Žižek 
and Copjec, for instance, we can witness Baudrillard’s complaint that Foucault’s presents  
power as “always already there, purged of  all negativity, a network, a rhizome, a 
contiguity diffracted ad infinitum.”11 In a more pedestrian manner, Charles Taylor 
similarly reflects that there can be “no escape from power into freedom”. Vighi and 
Feldner put it succinctly when they state that the “burning question fuelling this cluster 
of  criticisms is whether the problem of  resistance can be conceptualised at all without a 
proper theory of  the subject as the centre and source of  possible resistance.”12 How, in 
Foucault’s reading, then, can such relations be represented as anything other than 
inescapable and ubiquitous?13 And of  course, this further begs the question, “Why should 
the subject be indeterminable? Why not have a theory of  the subject?’
 The second common critique to be levelled at Foucault’s notations relates to this 
question, for it is the equally common charge that an elided normativity is operating in 
Foucault’s work. While this normative critique has been eagerly adopted by exegetes 
such as Nancy Fraser14 and Rudy Visker,15 amongst a host of  others, it was Habermas 
who originally charged that Foucault could “give no account of  the normative 
foundations of  [his] own rhetoric”.16 Authors such as Fraser inherited this concern from 
an infamously bitter dispute between Habermas and Foucault,17 and continue to 
advance it along much the same lines. In so doing, they are liable to pose questions that 
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13 E.g.: “Freedom is precisely what many anglo-american commentators have complained is missing in 
Foucault's history. D&P Confronts Clifford Geertz with ‘a kind of  whig history in reverse – a history in 
spite of  itself, of  the rise of  unfreedom.’” (in Rajchman 1985, pp50-51)
14 1989, p29.
15 Visker argued as much with me, at the Leuven 2008 Foucault Masterclass, and was responsible for 
originally posing this problem to me, for which I am thankful. See, for example: “Isn’t the only chance of  
still using such a conception of  power meaningfully, without lapsing back into rejected naturalism of  a 
repressive concept of  power, to be found in introducing a normative framework?” (Visker 1995, p126).
16 Habermas 1985, p344.
17 Cf  Owen 1999.
can sound particularly dangerous for Foucault’s hopes as to what his projects can 
achieve, such as the following:
Why is struggle preferable to submission? Why ought domination to be resisted? Only 
with the introduction of  normative notions of  some kind could Foucault begin to answer 
this question. Only with the introduction of  normative notions could he begin to tell us 
what is wrong with the modern power/knowledge regime and why we ought to resist it.18
Thus are we led to ask: ‘By what criteria does Foucault feel pressed to ask those 
problematic questions in particular?’ ‘Surely the purpose of  them must be derived from 
some notion of  what is preferable in human life?’ Or put more charitably, ‘what tactics 
will be most effective in encouraging the task of  resistance, according to certain defining 
principles of  what it is to be human?’ If  Foucault is indeed to be understood as the 
nominalist par excellance – as the theorist who refused all theories of  the subject – then 
what can he possibly base his diagnoses and genealogical models upon, if  not a 
normative idea of  what we should be? Taylor insists that not only are these normative 
elements missing, or perhaps elided, in Foucault’s accounts, but further, if  they were to 
be introduced (or rather confessed to) then Foucault’s notation would be rendered as 
ironically contiguous with the discourses he critiques, positing, as it does, characteristics 
which are to be treated as immobile, obvious, natural. His work would also be somewhat 
duplicitous, for the norms it posits are covert and thus are likely to go unrecognised by 
their reader. Secondly, relative to my reading, what can we say is the experiential 
function of  the genealogical models produced by Foucault? If  we do acknowledge their 
aim as dislocatory rather than veridical, as I have argued, then what directs the selection 
and presentation of  these models as apt to the reader, if  not normative (and therefore 
presumably, at the last, veridical) considerations as to how that reader should conceive?
 This leaves us with two hard problems to be addressed. They are the more 
esoteric Žižekian question of – ‘if  resistance definitionally collapses into the iteration of  
power and counter-power, what then is its worth?’ And the longstanding Habermasian 
question of  ‘Why should an attempt to resist be viewed as a normatively positive goal? 
And even if  resistance were possible, how should one hope to distinguish its success 
without appeal to a normative set of  criteria by which to do so?’ In responding to these 
two churches of  criticism – let us label them broadly as the accusations of  ineluctability 
and normativity – we could of  course try to proceed in a manner employed elsewhere in 
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this thesis. Then the mistake made by our critics would be to misinterpret the task of  
Foucault’s analysis – that of  inciting an individual’s resistance – as one involving the 
positing, then overturning of, a complete and existent matrix of  Institutional Power. Yet 
such matrices do not ‘exist’: instead of  being posited ontically, reference to them is a 
facet of  Foucault’s anti-dogmatic methods, whose purpose is to help in the formation of  
a political will, one that employs singularities and counter-models in the task of  
destabilising the remit of  totalising concepts, thus transforming the rules by which the 
individual and her cultural universe are experienced. Žižek’s somewhat Marxist 
Foucault (a distant relation of  the Foucault presented here), involved as he is in building 
exhaustive models of  subjugation, would indeed offer no respite from the play of  power 
upon the subject, but this account comes only at the expense of  treating his methods 
veridically, instead of  inceptively. 
 However, this maneuver on its own (perhaps familiar to my reader in its 
similarity to that advanced in Chapter IV), actually offers little hope of  saving his 
methods from these criticisms. If  Foucault’s philosophy “rests upon the postulate of  an 
absolute optimism”,19 while in its effects it achieves nothing but to provide a convincing 
new notation by which an individual comes to regard itself  as irrevocably determined by 
restrictive totalities, then it must, by its own criteria, be rejected as repulsively ill-formed. 
Therefore aspectivally understood, Foucault’s regulative ideal would still mean that 
resistance fails to incite the formation of  a new way of  conceiving that escapes from that 
which it was purposed to achieve, if  resistance truly amounts only to a form of  counter-
power. This has the unfortunate effect of  making these criticisms all the more acute, for 
the ends to which these philosophies are to be understood as primarily being directed 
towards, are now made unachievable by the methods they recommend. 
 
It will be useful to note that these arguments both respond to an understanding of  the 
aims of  Foucault’s methods as enabling a certain kind of  freedom. This understanding is  
well-rehearsed, and not particularly controversial; indeed it is prevalent in many of  the 
texts we have relied upon during this thesis. For one such example, let us return to the 
purpose of  philosophy, as conceived of  by Owen and Heyes in my Introduction. 
Philosophy, as practiced by both Foucault and Wittgenstein, is intended to unshackle its 
practitioner from a “state of  unfreedom” brought about by aspectival captivity, itself  a 
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to say: this is how things are, look how trapped you are. I say certain things only to the extent to which I 
see them as capable of  permitting the transformation of  reality.” (Foucault 1991d, p174)
condition whereby “one cannot re-orient one’s reflection”20 due to a refusal to accept 
the possibilities of  alternate pictures by which to orient oneself  to the world. My exegesis  
is largely in agreement with this qualification. 
 Yet as Žižek et al argued earlier, the act of  resistance as counter-power means that 
freedom becomes the freedom only to alter the manner of  the relation, but never the 
fact of  the relation itself; freedom flatters to deceive because it is always a freedom to 
choose from a set of  criteria for action and judgement that are preconfigured within our 
current conceptual unities: thanks to Foucault’s austere nominalism, no others are on 
offer. At most, resistance can be conceived as the reconfiguration of  those totalities by 
which it operates, if  it were predicated upon a theory of  the subject in which to ground 
that configuration. That binary presentation of  a false pair of  either/or referents, which 
so irked Foucault earlier,21 is an example of  what freedom appears as in Žižek’s reading: 
the freedom to choose between determined alternates. Put another way, the freedom 
Žižek presents in relation to the inescapability of  power relations is only the liberty to 
select from different options within the scheme of  one’s entrapment. As Hofmeyr puts it,
If  the subject merely reacts to imposed identities, he or she inevitably remains tied to the 
latter. And although the individual is then supposedly free to choose his or her own 
norms, these norms are not of  his or her own making.22
Clearly, then, the freedom which Foucault advances as his methodological purpose 
cannot simply be the liberty to “merely react” to what is imposed upon one. Neither can 
it, however, represent something akin to Sartre’s positing of  freedom as a fundamental 
ontological feature of  our existence.23 The methodological reasons for this should have 
been made quite apparent by this point in the thesis: if  we are concerned with 
alleviating the conceptual unities that are posited of  us, then to do so by reliance on a 
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23 Interestingly, Foucault sees Sartre’s notion of  the practice of  creativity as the only useful consequence to 
be derived from his position: “I think that the only acceptable practical consequence of  what Sartre has 
said is to link his theoretical insight to the practice of  creativity—and not of  authenticity. From the idea 
that the self  is not given to us, I think that there is only one practical consequence: we have to create 
ourselves as a work of  art. In his analyses of  Baudelaire, Flaubert, etc., it is interesting to see that Sartre 
refers the work of  creation to a certain relation to oneself—the author to himself—which has the form of  
authenticity or of  inauthenticity. I would like to say exactly the contrary: we should not have to refer the 
creative activity of  somebody to the kind of  relation he has to himself, but should relate the kind of  
relation one has to oneself  to a creative activity.” (Foucault, in Rabinow 1994, p235)
freshly posited unifying conception of  what we must all be is hardly methodologically 
consistent. Foucault, while certainly being tempted himself  to posit such an “originary 
freedom”, refuses the temptation to do so.24  
 While we can assert the philosophical methods that variously concern their 
readings of  Foucault as indeed being concerned with dispelling a state of  conceptual 
immobility, his purpose cannot be reducible to the state of  captivity’s inverse, ‘freedom’, 
for this notion is imprecise in its account of  what his methods are intended to effect. 
“Freedom to adopt what subjectivity?” might be the Žižekian reply. Worse, as we have 
now seen, an unconstrained and ‘vanilla’ qualification of  freedom leaves Foucault open 
to charges of  authoring a kind of  covert descriptive deceit, one that doesn’t acknowledge 
the criteria of  its own edicts, that begins its nominalist critique half-way through, and 
thereby elides the conditionals of  its own practice. 
§6.2 Three sources of freedom
There are many avenues by which to substantiate a defense of  Foucault’s philosophy 
from these two accusations, but I choose to being with an interview given in 1980. It is 
useful in its specificity, for Foucault begins that conversation with a frank account of  
what concerns motivate his method. He imagines being asked “Why do you do the work 
that you do?” and formulates a simple and stark account in reply, beginning “Here are 
the values that I propose.”25 I judge this interview to be particularly apt in answering the 
two earlier accusations, because of  Foucault’s comfort in asserting the fundamentality of 
the values of  refusal, curiosity and innovation, not only to the method he proposes, but 
also, surprisingly, in some way, to his understanding of  them as being
[o]ne of  the tasks, one of  the meanings of  human existence—the source of  human 
freedom— [namely,] never to accept anything as definitive, untouchable, obvious, or 
immobile. No aspect of  reality should be allowed to become a definitive and inhuman law 
for us.26
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25 1988a, p1. As we shall see, his account of  freedom as being derived from these three values interrelates 
closely with many of  his other remarks, and so we can be confident that this was not an isolated concern. 
Further, in this interview, Foucault qualifies his works on madness and prison, for example, as precipitated 
by the same concerns.
26 Ibid.
Of  all of  his exegetes, perhaps Paul Rajchman most leans towards characterising 
Foucault foremost in terms of  this “virtue”27 of  refusal – that of  never accepting 
“anything as definitive, untouchable, obvious, or immobile.”28  For this reason, we will 
turn to Rajchman often during the following discussions. Refusal perhaps represents the 
most obvious of  the three values, when considering them as constituting a form of  
resistance. In qualifying refusal, we can begin by recalling how, in §1.4, we saw aspects as  
being alternate to each other, as competing with, excluding and replacing one another, 
and thus being termed ‘optional’ in their adoption by Baker. The term ‘aspect’ describes 
this characteristic, namely, that there are different ways in which we judge something to 
be the case, and certain ways of  conceiving lead one into confusion because they assume 
a total, exhaustive status – yet an aspect can equally relieve us of  the problems 
associated with that way of  understanding it replaces. The pertinent features that 
appear to us when attending to that thing, become the means of  verifying that aspect 
but, of  course, only certain connections and characteristics will appear to us as pertinent 
when conceived under a particular aspect, and so we seem to have no recourse to avoid 
this way of  seeing, for it just is the way the world is. This was taken to be what 
Wittgenstien referred to when he remarked that we are confused  “because the forms of  
representation of  our language have taken on a disquieting aspect”;29 we find ourselves 
unable “to rid ourselves of  the implications of  our symbolism.”30 Refusal can be related 
to this model directly, as the capacity, or will, to treat as dubious the implications of  the 
aspect we are currently operating under, to suspend the exclusivity inherent in our 
understanding. Foucault’s value of  refusal is – in much the same way as we saw in the 
earlier discussion of  difficulties of  the will in Chapter III – one rendered highly 
problematic by the connections and assumptions that appear necessary in the light cast 
by the exclusivity of  our conceptions. Gordon Baker put it well when he remarked that 
because of  the difficulty of  their disproval, and the exclusionary effect they have upon 
competing accounts, “[c]onceptions may be damaging because they make certain lines 
of  thinking impossibly arduous (or unnatural) to pursue. (They exert a palpable tyranny 
without any apparent restriction of  freedom!).”31 
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31 NA, p287.
 In Wittgensteinian terms, then, refusal can be considered as a concern for, and 
an overcoming of, the exclusivity by which aspects occupy us in a manner which does 
not acknowledge their optionality of  application. In the absence of  such refusal, we are 
presented only with obvious ‘answers’, predicated by means of  the aspect we operate by, 
as being always and already easily ‘to hand’, to be relied upon to steadfastly remain so. 
To refuse the terms upon which this certainty is legitimated can seem a pointless, 
destructive task, a reaction Wittgenstein seemed to experience during his 
investigations.32 Recall that we earlier posited that “[s]eeing an aspect and imagining are 
subject to the will.”33 The will to see according to an established mode of  thought is not 
so easily overturned, being complicated by its refusal’s potential for upsetting the 
authoritative positions that legislate for what Foucault sometimes termed “crystallized”34 
power relations – a description intended to draw attention to those cases in which 
“organisations are created to freeze the relations of  power, hold those relations in a state 
of  asymmetry, so that a certain number of  persons get an advantage, socially, 
economically, politically, institutionally, etc.”35 Because of  this, certain refusals will be 
more obvious to us, while others, due to our dependence upon certain conceptions in 
the justification of  our current advantageous position, will certainly not. The will to 
refuse is rendered as a personal undertaking made far more difficult by the fact that one 
may have to make revisions to those seemingly definitive and untouchable laws upon 
whose certainty we predicate and by which we may be physically, economically and 
emotionally profiting. Consider that for Foucault, however, in treating seriously this 
value of  refusal we do not necessarily become embroiled in an utterly chaotic lived 
experience36 – it “doesn’t mean that one must live in an indefinite discontinuity.” It 
instead implies an attitude or style of  thinking that allows the possibility for the adoption 
of  alternate aspects, one that allows you to “consider all points of  fixity, of  
immobilization, as elements in a tactics, in a strategy”,37 rather than as characteristics 
inherent in the object we conceive of. 
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32 Cf: PI §118, and “It came into my head today as I was thinking about my philosophical work and 
saying to myself  ‘I destroy, I destroy, I destroy.’” (CV. P21)
33 PI, p213.
34 See, for example, Foucault 1983, p222.
35 1988a, p1.
36 Although we must certainly become used to living in more chaos that we would otherwise be used to – 
“When philosophizing you have to descend into the old chaos & feel at home there.” (MS 136, 51a: 
3.1.1948)
37 1988a, p1.
 Yet this refusal should not to be lionized as an exemplar of  an absolute 
condition. Such a principled use of  the notion, while it would be most satisfying for 
Copjec, would, Foucault claims, amount to “the theoretical and philosophical 
paroxysm” of  an “originary aspiration”,38 generalized from particular instances of  
individual acts of  refusal (namely here, in this thesis, those of  Wittgenstein and 
Foucault). If  we want to understand why Foucault recoils from establishing such a 
principled understanding of  refusal, even when it appears to be in sympathy with his 
practice, we would do well to reconsider a qualification made in §5.3. There, we saw 
totality as problematic due to its attempts to normalize a field of  human phenomena 
which is radically indeterminable, and massively complex. As was argued by Hacking, 
the means by which totality can actually hold true is through a ‘looping effect’ it has 
upon a subject; the subject is brought to freely employ those invariant and reductive 
models in a determining coordination of  their own behavior and that of  those around 
them, thus ‘proving’ the totality that constricted their understanding. Essentially, then, 
the need for refusal arises because of  the apparent universality of  a totalized conception, 
when the phenomena so conceived of  are irreducible to the strictures of  that 
conception’s necessary features. The task of  avoiding dogma means that to recognize an 
aspect as an aspect is instead the immediate task confronting us, and this ability to make 
different applications of  an aspect is predicated upon a form, or technique, of  
recognition.
 But the will to refuse, understood in this way as a technique – not a universal 
condition appealed to – would, without methodological rigor, amount to little more than 
a predisposition to a form of  stubbornness, rather than a deep critique of  the conditions  
of  our thought, and the practice of  outstripping them. So we are in need of  a method 
by which to acquire the techniques that allow us to refuse the self-evident, or else little 
effect is achieved. Perhaps Wittgenstein describes something along these line in the 
following remark: “Someone reacts like this: he says "Not that!" — & resists it. Out of  
this situations perhaps develop which are equally intolerable; & perhaps by then strength 
for any further revolt is exhausted.”39 The will to refuse is not enough, for we need to 
have, ready to hand, the specific means by which we can further problematise what we 
refuse, and the means to encourage one to pursue an investigation after its first 
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39 … “We say ‘If  he hadn't done that, the evil would not have come about.’ But with what justification? 
Who knows the laws according to which society unfolds? I am sure even the cleverest has no idea. If  you 
fight, you fight. If  you hope, you hope.” (CV, p69)
dislocatory, or redeeming, instance has been experienced: refusal for its own sake is not 
yet antidogmatic. Refusal can therefore be understood as a precondition for the will to 
undertake an aspectival philosophy, but with the value of  curiosity as its accompaniment. 
 Curiosity is concerned with provoking in one a “casualness in regard to the 
traditional hierarchies of  the important and the essential.”40 In the current scheme of  
interpretation, it can be demonstrated to overlap with that element which we first made 
sense of  in Chapter II, as the ‘task of  the reader’. There, the role of  objects of  
comparison – namely to draw the reader into considering alternate possibilities by which 
to make sense of  a philosophical confusion by means of  either factual or fictive instances 
– was one concerned with inciting the reader’s curiosity. All references in this thesis to 
provocation, incitement, prompting, etc., centre upon this concept of  curiosity as the 
precondition for “changing the way one looks at things”, of  “straying afield of  oneself ”, 
and summed up by Foucault as “a readiness to find strange and singular what surrounds 
us”.  Just as Wittgenstein’s method – in which his reader is tasked with distending his 
open-ended scenarios – when successful, already involves one in an act of  philosophy 
relative to one’s own investigations, so too Foucault cites his own curiosity as both the 
motivating activity for his own research and the defining instrumental character of  his 
work’s effect. So while both genealogical and grammatical investigations are personal 
accounts of  their authors’ struggle against dogmatism, that should not be considered the 
sum total of  their methods. In addition, either the Investigations or Discipline and Punish 
“could be called a textbook. [They do] not teach by imparting knowledge, but by 
stimulating the thinking.” These text-books are intended “as invitations, as public 
gestures, for those who may eventually want to do the same thing, or something like it, 
or, in any case, who intend to slip into this kind of  experience.”41 The notion of  
curiosity is closely related to the double function of  these texts; it is both the operative 
condition of  their authors’ activity, and the intended effect upon their reader. To both 
authors, the foreclosure of  the task of  philosophy as a “learnt” experience is therefore 
antithetical; both are striking in their portrayal of  the importance of  their reader’s own 
contingent imaginative consideration and employment of  those scenarios with which 
they populate their methods. I therefore posit this parallel as an effect of  both Foucault 
and Wittgenstein’s concern with stimulating conceptual curiosity, as well as a shared 
motivation that drove both men to undertake, to revise, and restart their transformative 
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investigations with such unwavering relentlessness and passion.42 Foucault sums up this 
inspiration in the following manner:
As for what motivated me, it is quite simple, I would hope that in the eyes of  some people 
it might be sufficient in itself. It was curiosity — the only kind of  curiosity, in any case, 
that is worth acting upon with a degree of  obstinacy: not the curiosity that seeks to 
assimilate what it is proper for one to know, but that which enables one to get free of  
oneself. After all, what would be the value of  the passion for knowledge if  it resulted only 
in a certain amount of  knowledgeableness and not, in one way or another and to the 
extent possible, in the knower's straying afield of  himself ? There are times in life when the 
question of  knowing if  one can think differently than one thinks, and perceive differently 
than one sees, is absolutely necessary if  one is to go on looking and reflecting at all.43
Curiosity, by this reading, represents the willingness to not just refuse dogmatic accounts, 
but to engage with and investigate alternates, and the consideration of  the plausibility of 
other narratives, other schemes of  organisation. Through this thesis’s parallelism, we 
can give a precise methodological sense to Foucault’s qualification of  curiosity as “an 
acute sense of  the real which, however, never becomes fixed”.44 And so finally, we can 
now provide details of  the end result of  both forms of  philosophical critique, 
understood under this scheme as a practice derived from a refusal to accept one’s 
current aspects of  understanding as exclusive, and a curiosity to investigate and fabricate 
alternate aspects according to freshly admitted possibilities. This can be understood as 
the expression of  innovation, resulting in an exploration of  “what might be changed, in its 
own thought, through the practice of  a knowledge that is foreign to it.”45 Two types of  
thoughtful achievement – the genealogically achieved dislocatory experience and the 
grammatically produced aspectival switch – have been posited as the principle aims of  
our two sets of  methods. Both now also appear as related models by which to describe 
the form of  innovation that concerns Foucault in this interview. What was mapped out 
in our earlier discussions was a radical alteration in the dynamics of  our conceptions, 
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42 Foucault employs these two adjective in his description of  the effect of  curiosity, thus: “a certain 
relentlessness in ridding ourselves of  our familiarities and looking at things otherwise; a passion for seizing 
what is happening now and what is passing away; a lack of  respect for traditional hierarchies of  the 
important and the essential.” (1997a p305)
43 1992, p8.
44 1997a, p305: I take this remark to be in sympathy to our earlier qualification of  perspicuity in §1.4.
45 1992, p9.
not achieved by a change in the subjects that we conceive of, but in the conceptions 
themselves, that project their unity onto the subjects. Nominalist refusal, and aspectival 
perspicuity, are different expressions of  the related goal of  innovation, brought about by 
the consideration of  alternative exclusive aspects. Further, as we have seen, both 
practices are recommending a fundamental form of  self-innovation by means not only 
of  a broadening of  the models one is willing to operate by, but by the completion or 
recreation of  new, unconsidered ones too, making new connections, new comparisons 
and new histories. Innovation is therefore also a form of  resistance to the kind of  
foreclosure of  certain avenues of  existence, which also makes others seem obligatory 
and mundane, that Foucault ceaselessly recommends.46
 These three values of  refusal, curiosity and innovation, explicated in interview 
with Foucault, and in close parallel to the findings of  this thesis’s exegesis, will hereafter 
be referred to under the term ‘creativity’. What we thus label as creativity is, 
demonstrably, not an optional component in Foucault’s method, but understood 
correctly, as the source of  the freedom his philosophy is tailored to achieve, it is instead 
its necessary component. I posit that it is, further, the selfsame capacity for resistance, 
inscribed in his modeling of  the power of  totalising generality as its transformative, 
transgressive, “irreducible opposite.” Resistance is qualified by Foucault as entailing self-
governance through a series of  ongoing "relationships of  differentiation, of  creation and 
innovation”47 with oneself. It is to be “not solely a negation but a creative process. To 
create and recreate, to transform the situation, to participate actively in the process, that 
is to resist.”48 The particular acts of  freedom that emerges from this method are thus 
best understood as solely being a series of  effects – singular, contextually variable, and 
therefore theoretically unimportant, instantiations of  an unending and uncompleteable 
ethic of  revolt. Crucially, and similarly to Wittgenstein’s method, his reader’s 
acknowledgement is the pivot for its success, with acknowledgement (understood in §2.3) 
as the accompaniment of  an innovative conceptual experience: “acknowledgement of  
the picture consists in his now being inclined to regard a given case differently”.49 This is  
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interest to us here. Instead, innovation refers to the alteration of  one’s own “local” thoughts, deeds or 
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new instantiation.
47 1984 interview, quoted in Lazzarato 2002, p111.
48 Ibid.
49 PI §144.
why the best candidate as to what resistance looks like is provided in this thesis as the 
point of  juncture noted in the intended aims of  Foucault and Wittgenstein’s methods: 
dislocatory experience and aspectival perspicuity, respectively. Thus I advance creative 
relationships of  differentiation, between alternate aspects that are both voluntary and 
exclusive, as our best candidate for construing resistance.
 In relation to this qualification of  resistance, consider the earlier premise from 
the first half  of  this thesis – that the aim of  Wittgenstein’s philosophy was the incitement 
of  a style of  thought, a kind of  perspicuity that involves switching between conceptual 
aspects, and knowing how to employ alternate notations that trigger this switch. There, 
perspicuity became an ability to cycle through different conceptual aspects, rather than 
a comprehensive tabulation of  the inner structure of  our concepts, legitimating a 
greater and greater totality in our one exclusive model. It was rendered as an ability one 
develops, rather than a synoptic position afforded by the good work of  past 
philosophers, with such an ability’s aim being to allow one to approach one’s concepts 
without prejudice. A perspicuous representation was, on these grounds, to be 
comprehended as an achievement term, rather than a synoptic model of  grammar. 
Similarly, creativity is now widely taken to be the capacity to comprehend the world in a 
new manner, to describe it in a new lexicon, to think novelly, inventively, in a manner 
which alters, yet is not bound to, previous ways of  seeing. 
 Finally, before we turn to addressing the two accusations that began this chapter, 
it is important to consider as a side-note that, in many of  the most influential theories 
that concern creativity, an activity somewhat analogous to aspectival shifting is 
predicated as the key to its nature. For example, Arthur Koestler’s labyrinthine, 
repetitive yet rather compelling treatise on the subject, is predicated upon his notion of  
bisociation, which he takes to be the movement by which “the perceiving of  a situation 
or idea ... in two self-consistent but habitually incompatible frames of  reference” is to be 
achieved.50 The cognitive science theories of  Margaret Boden, et al, inherit from 
Koestler this notion of  bisociation as the foundational principle for a naturalistic inquiry 
into the condition of  creativity. Einstein often conjectured on what he referred to as 
“combinatorial play” as being the principle characteristic of  creative human thought, 
while his friend Bohm, the polymath and quantum physicist, was similarly concerned 
with the terms by which “the mind is free, at any moment, to give attention to new 
differences and new similarities, allowing for the perception of  a new structure of  
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‘things.’”51 The acts of  looking in a new way, of  transcending the historical conditions of 
our conceptualisation, are experiential and experimental and, for Bohm, to “experiment 
in this way with the formation of  new structures is thus seen as a creative act, in part 
because it suspends the constraints of  both personal and historical conditioning, thereby 
enabling one to acquire a new perspective.”52 In agreement with this thesis, and contra 
Boden, Koestler, et al, Bohm concluded that anyone concerned with encouraging 
creativity is duty bound to recognise that it cannot be secured by simply
following another, or setting up another as his authority for the definition of  what 
creativity is and for advice on how it is to be obtained. Unless one starts to discover this 
for himself, rather than to try to achieve the apparent security of  a well-laid-out pattern of 
action, he will just be deluding himself  and thus wasting his efforts. To realise this fact is 
very difficult indeed. Nevertheless, one has to see that, to determine the order in which 
one functions by following some kind of  pattern, is the very essence of  what it means to 
be mediocre and mechanical.53 
Each of  these theorists, despite their alternate disciplines and approaches, demonstrate a 
varying degree of  sympathy with the models advanced here. Yet I do not take any of  
these limited sympathies as grounds to reveal the ‘truth’ of  our model of  philosophical 
method, nor to secure the use of  any of  their theoretical features along analogous lines 
in this thesis, nor to posit a technical term under which to advance a new combined 
philosophy. The reason for their relevance is instead in prompting us to consider the 
centrality to our lives of  the issues that our methods address. Koestler uses his notion of  
bisociation to qualify a width swath of  human phenomena, including scientific and 
artistic discovery, both the genius and the mundane, our humour and our inventions. 
Boden believes her own theory of  creativity to apply so maximally that it explains 
equally well both computer and human cognition, citing examples of  artificial 
intelligence which she holds to be continuous with human creativity. Bohm, 
contrastingly, seeks in his accounts of  creativity an alleviation of  the mechanical habits 
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53 “It is a difficulty which I can’t remove if  I try to make you see the problems. I can’t give you a startling 
solution which suddenly will remove all your difficulties. I can’t find one key which will unlock the door of  
our safe.” (MS 153b, p30; also see Chapter III.) It can be noted, as an aside, that this thesis is not in 
complete agreement with the arguments of  Bohm. This is because he is eager to posit a perfect, 
underlying truthful veridicality, which we may approach, if  only we are capable of  sloughing off  dogmatic 
thought. The disanalogy of  this position with mine should be quite obvious.
of  thoughts in his society, in his science and in the words of  those around him, in a 
manner much closer to those examined in this thesis, while Einstein reflected upon the 
activity of  combinatorial play as the sine qua non for his own work, and for leaps of  
human intelligence in general. Regardless of  the accuracy of  this array of  positivities,54 
or the new problems that asserting their truthfulness would give rise to, we can use their 
attempts to model human creativity as indicators of  what Foucault is gesturing towards 
when he describes creativity as “one of  the tasks, one of  the meanings of  human 
existence—the source of  human freedom”. Hence, while both methods are adamant in 
their refusal that their methods can be derived from those fundamental principles that 
seem to constitute those theories briefly considered above, they none the less concern 
themselves with an aspect of  human life that holds a very significant place in our 
understanding of  ourselves, suggested by this brief  theoretical overview. If  their styles of 
philosophy achieve their intended outcome, stimulating the reader into thinking for 
themselves, filling out the detail into a whole field of  inventive scenarios, in a manner 
sensitive to their own conceptions and confusions, then creative acknowledgement is 
assured by, and synchronous with, their taking part in investigation. Something would 
thereby be achieved in our methods that relates to a deep concern, and a key 
qualification of  those events, deeds, acts and arts that are of  paramount importance to 
our lives, and it is this, rather than the positing of  an ontic and originary freedom, that I 
contend to be Foucault’s referent. By positing refusal, curiosity and innovation as the key 
values of  his work, Foucault must then do justice to them, rather than posit new creeds 
by which to restrict their occurrence.
We have already investigated the manner in which the provision of  incomplete, fictive 
and imaginative scenarios was not intended to provide a complete set of  conceptual 
templates by which an individual might have their problems indubitably resolved. Oddly 
enough, exhaustiveness – for so long one of  the regulative principles of  philosophical 
theories – is thereby rendered as a pejorative, rather than being the noble end of  
philosophical reflection. The “mechanisation” of  one’s thought, to borrow Bohm’s term 
for a moment, that can be legitimated by the assumption of  a concept’s exclusivity is 
considered deeply harmful, regardless of  the perfection of  the coordinated theory that 
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inspired its immobility. Relatedly, perspicuous representation is best conceived of  as an 
achievement term, with the models that trigger this achievement being “only meant to 
enable the reader to shift for himself  when he encounters conceptual difficulties.”55 
Likewise, the genealogies that Foucault constructed “ought to be taken as 'propositions', 
'game openings' where those who may be interested are invited to join in – they are not 
meant as dogmatic assertions that have to be taken or left en bloc.”56 Their intent is not 
so much predictive, or indeed exhaustive, but inceptive of  an imaginative and 
performative self-relation, to occur after the reader’s encounter with their texts, when 
they next find themselves tempted to apply those aspects that have been problematised 
therein. 
§6.3 Answering the accusations of normativity and ineluctability
We have located the concern of  Foucault’s methods as being the source of  freedom, 
experienced by him as the three characteristics of  refusal, curiosity and innovation, 
subsumed under the notion of  creativity. The aim is “to replace an Idealist philosophy of 
final emancipation with a nominalist philosophy of  endless revolt”.57 This aim does not 
propose nor posit an originary freedom as the restricted, hidden nature of  human 
existence, for neither does it promise transcendence from the conditions of  its previous 
conceptual captivity, and nor does it substantiate these values as necessary conditions of  
the subject. It instead offers them as values by which to proceed. We are given the 
methodological means for the achievement of  refusal, curiosity and innovation. We now 
understand both methods as the recorded expression of  a creative impulse, not a new set 
of  positivities concerning its necessary conditions, regardless of  the potential for the 
employment of  these methods in more theoretical undertakings. 
 Now, presumably, someone convinced of  our earlier two accusations might well 
respond to this account in the following way: ‘Very well, but why doesn’t this merely 
represent the reiteration of  exactly what Foucault is pejoratively charged with, namely, 
the refusal to locate a principled grounding for his representation of  the subject? How 
does the advancement of  such wholly negative qualifications as refusal, curiosity and 
innovation in any way constitute a rebuttal to this accusation? Isn’t it just a 
179
55 PI, p206.
56 Foucault 1991a, p74.
57 Rajchman 1985, p93.
reformulation of  the original charge, that Foucault places a vacuum at the heart of  his 
account of  the subject?’ 
 In part, answering these questions demands that we first turn briefly back to the 
important differentiation made in the last chapter, overlooked by many of  Foucault’s 
critics, between his notions of  totality and power. This is because Foucault clearly had 
no problem with the exercise of  power per se – in fact he seems to treat inequality in 
relations as somewhat inevitable in any complex social setting.58 It is instead the 
conceptual totalities, which come to formulate and crystallize power relations, that are 
his fundamental concern. It is when one makes someone (or oneself) do something, of  
their own free will, by means of  an appeal to a fixed, determinate and immobile account 
of  what they must be, that an injustice is perpetrated. It is injust because it overwrites 
their chance for self-governance with a positivity that determines them as being subject 
to the exclusivity it posits. As we have seen, this injustice is not only one that is 
perpetrated against creative self-governance, but is also a problem to be solved by its 
incitement. But returning to Foucault’s power/totality differentiation, he makes clear 
below that there is nothing essentially invidious in the act of  guiding the behavior of  
others: 
 
If  I accepted the picture of  power that is frequently adopted—namely, that it’s something 
horrible and repressive for the individual—it’s clear that preventing a child from 
scribbling on the walls would be an unbearable tyranny. But that’s not it: I say that power 
is a relation. A relation in which one guides the behaviour of  others. And there’s no 
reason why this manner of  guiding the behavior of  others should not ultimately have 
results which are positive, valuable, interesting, and so on. If  I had a kid, I assure you he 
would not write on the walls—or if  he did, it would be against my will. The very idea!59
Therefore, by positing power relations as, in all likelihood, an unavoidable 
accompaniment of  our social lives together, Foucault does not immediately further posit 
the totalities that might currently operate in our relations as being equally inevitable. 
Indeed, one good example of  such a “positive, valuable, interesting” power relation can 
be found in the very methods that have concerned us in this thesis – for how else are we 
to consider them, other than as examples of  relations that inform the behavior of  their 
readers? Yet, as it has been argued in this chapter and before, such relations do not 
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supervene upon one’s acceptance of  the universality or veridicality of  their methods, for 
they appeal to no total positivity that we must render ourselves by, or in opposition to. 
Yes, in a certain sense, these methods can be seen as restrictive, in that they advocate the 
solution to philosophical problems to be a particular switching of  one means of  
representation for another, thus fracturing the exclusivity that adhered to the original 
concept. But in another, more important, sense they are not so, because they refuse to 
determine the terms of  that shifting in advance of  the occasion in which it is called for, 
and nor do they posit the completed forms of  representation that are to achieve the 
relief  of  dogmatism. It is, contra Copjec, just that desire – to instantiate a principled 
account of  human nature – that determines exclusive aspects by which we arrive at the 
conceptual immobility of  dogmatism. Copjec’s approach certainly would allow for a 
form of  resistance to competing normative accounts, but only at the high cost60 of  
defining the content or worth of  an individual’s behavior by its correlation to those 
principles – namely of  instantiating a new totalising and exclusive conception, that 
(because of  its redemptive status) is labelled as of  irrevocable importance to our well-
being, and thus beyond the reach of  critique. I argue that this refusal to posit a 
principled theory of  the subject does not entail a form of  transcendental 
indeterminibility in the subject, which seems to so worry Copjec, Žižek, et al. Instead, 
this restraint from positing a universal determination occurs due to the effect that such 
theory has, the temptations it poses for our imagination. It is, then, again, a 
methodological constraint, entailed by Foucault’s commitment to the creative 
characteristics of  refusal, curiosity and innovation, rather than a metaphysical norm of  
human nature as being unprincipled. As Foucault remarked,
There is always something ludicrous in philosophical discourse when it tries, from the 
outside, to dictate to others, to tell them where their truth is and how to find it, or when it 
works up a case against them in the language of  naive positivity.61
The binary function of  these texts that was earlier a subject of  our inquiry also reveals 
something important here, in regards to what this commitment means in terms of  
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methodology. They record, in the role of  a ledger, their author’s transformative 
experience, but do so as to intentionally prompt a similar but non-identical experience in 
their reader. They are not teachings, nor performances, but philosophical practices, to 
whom refusal, curiosity and innovation are regulative aspirations for both author and 
reader. Perhaps, as Wittgenstein remarked earlier, if  one were to take such a text the 
wrong way, then “you’d think it was awful - just noise, discordant notes. You would think 
it was a poor performance, but it is not a performance at all.”  
 We have seen how the subject’s removal from Foucault’s genealogical notations 
has led to many criticisms being levelled at them, and the ensuing troubles involving 
how he then has any right to make any further commentary. But now we have also seen 
how I advance the subject’s underdetermination as a result of  his methodological 
practice, rather than of  Foucault’s covert metaphysics. If  this reading is right, then 
Foucault’s reason for this credo is not that human nature “is” utterly bereft of  systemic 
tendencies in its configuration of  its reality, but rather, that a person’s assumption of  an 
aspect of  reality as exclusive, and therefore normatively binding, is the start of  a process 
of  inhibition for that person’s capacity for innovative thought. That is both why Foucault 
refuses the task of  giving principles for a theory of  the subject, and why Copjec’s 
criticism in particular misses the mark. 
 Relatedly, if  critics who accuse Foucault of  normativity still insist upon treating 
this methodological constraint as normative, then so be it. But let me offer a way of  
understanding both Wittgenstein and Foucault as being unconcerned with advancing 
norms in their methods. Both methods recommend this conceptual light-footedness, not 
in accordance to a normative ideal concerning how one’s thought must operate, but out 
of  a concern to instigate an experience by which the creative ability to change our way 
of  looking at things is provoked in order to overcome a particular dogma, whether it is 
one concerning mental processes or our conception of  madness. The practice by which 
we are brought to change our way of  seeing certainly can indeed be said to employ 
norms of  a kind, but their status is not prescriptive; they are not accounts of  what 
human nature is, or knowledge must be, or cannot be, but instead are to be understood 
as elements that define a methodology. Further, we have seen earlier, in §§1.4, 2.1 & 5.3, 
that these methods are not interdictive, prescriptive, or even strictly veridical in their 
claims, but are instead open-ended practices that seek to provoke a certain kind of  
experience, not to effect the accrual of  a normatively unified kind of  knowledge.
 These two sets of  methods are also both established by biographical experience, 
from experiential moments in which the authors managed to dislocate themselves in 
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some manner that was previously completely inconceivable to them. And this 
experience by which the inconceivable becomes conceivable is that same one they seek 
to provoke in their reader. This is why it is imperative to understand these texts as the 
recorded expressions of  creativity, rather than treatises upon such a notion’s essential 
features. There should be no positing of  a theoretical component, nor a normative 
constraint, concerning creativity, but instead the advancing of  different methods, or a set 
of  methods, that can be taken up, intricated, and broken off  to no detrimental effect. 
They are to function as work-books, game openings, provocations, and because of  this, 
in a sense, the only hypothetical element in their work is their hope for their records to 
help prompt similar experiences in their reader. Therefore only the failure of  their 
method can disprove their notions of  the task of  philosophy. Yet if  they fail to prompt 
such experiences in their reader, they are not thereby somehow disproved en masse, but 
are instead judged to be inappropriate or inefficacious for that reader – to exhibit flaws, 
as it were, in the mirror held up to that reader. It is a great shame, a disappointment, but 
not a falsification. These methods have already been proved, for they are ledgers of  the 
success of  their methods for their inventors. Thus they are poor grounds upon which to 
formulate an accusation of  elided normativity. 
 To conclude, I am not positing that there is something wrong in accounting for 
Foucault’s philosophical practice as one concerned with freedom – it is a qualification he 
often made himself. But if  we were to leave it at that we would, like Žižek, derive an 
improper conception of  what effect his philosophy hopes to achieve. The motivating 
concern, made explicit in this chapter, is with deriving a feasible method that respects 
the “source of  human freedom”, namely the ability to overturn fixed systems of  
comprehension, by refusing, curious, innovative means. Rajchman accounts for freedom 
in a manner compatible with this understanding, when he notes that, thus understood, 
freedom
is rooted not in autonomy or the capacity to determine actions according to rules all must 
rationally accept, but rather in the unwillingness to comply, the refusal to acquiesce, to fit 
ourselves in the practices through which we understand and rule ourselves and each other. 
Such noncompliance in concrete situations of  power is not something we can abstract and 
institute in a new form of  life. It is specific and unpredictable, not universal and 
grounded.62
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Quite in contradiction to Žižek’s pessimistic reading, then, Foucault’s method does not 
in any way set out to present the ineluctable success of  disciplinary mechanisms in 
regulating society, but instead draws attention to the fact that attempting to do so is an 
artefact of  the totalising thought which he refuses. It is precisely the fact that, when 
understood through his notation, whose function is to explicate how techniques of  
discipline have colonised and been replicated in many of  our society’s institutions, we 
are brought to refuse the picture thus presented, and to experience the problematisation 
of  a new field of  thought along lines antithetical to ones that treat society as an objective 
disciplinary unity. The demonstration of  the failure of  such attempts is one of  the key 
aims in his creating such a notation, for its purpose is to elicit the realisation of  this 
claim, and its refusal. As Rajchman again notes, 
The theme of  the book is not (as is sometimes assumed) that we all live in a totally 
administered society – one big panopticon. A Utopian image of  a totally administered 
society can be found easily enough in Bentham, and in the more or less explicitly 
utilitarian reform projects Foucault analyses. But the point of  analysing its occurrence 
there is precisely to dispel the realist or objective illusion that our societies are 
administered wholes. ... his book is thus a 'dispersed' analysis of  one kind of  
preoccupation with society as a whole.63
This reversal of  expectations brings home the problem with Žižek’s proposed reading. 
His notion of  a condition that is made unsurpassable by means of  its endless suitability 
to the differing contexts of  a subject’s innovative occurrence, is a representation of  
power relations that indulges in the worst excesses of  an aspect which Foucault sought to 
problematise. His historical models of  the formation of  disciplines in our culture are 
instead supposed to represent their irresolvable shortcomings, their inability to completely 
determine our subjectivity;
When I speak of  a 'disciplinary' society, I don't mean a 'disciplined society'. When I speak 
of  the spread of  methods of  discipline, this is not a claim that 'the French are obedient'! 
In the analysis of  normalising procedures, it is not a question of  a 'thesis of  a massive 
normalisation'. As if  these developments weren't precisely the measure of  a perpetual 
failure.64 
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It seems, then, that an unclarity in method has led to a significant misunderstanding of  
the implications of  genealogical investigation. To confuse this aspect of  Foucault’s 
notation leads to a reading deeply at odds with the effect I argue for here. It is instead 
the case that for Foucault, thought itself  is a constantly creative, and therefore resistant, 
process, which his criticism tries to uncover, advocate and elicit, despite, and in 
opposition to, its dogmatic tendencies otherwise. His critique does not seek to implant a 
redeeming theoretical kind of  knowledge within the life of  an otherwise docile body, but 
instead to incite a tendency that is already indigenous to everyday thought. Creative 
thought occurs 
“both beyond and underneath systems and edifices of  discourse. It is something that is 
often hidden but always drives everyday behaviours. There is always a little thought 
occurring even in the most stupid institutions; there is always thought even in silent habits. 
Criticism consists in uncovering that thought and trying to change it: showing that things 
are not as obvious as people believe, making it so that what is taken for granted is no 
longer taken for granted. To practice criticism is to make harder those acts which are now 
too easy.65
As Baker argued back in Chapter I, aspects are voluntarily adopted, and so too can they 
be desisted. No liberating ‘release’ is on offer here, only a practice by which to adopt and 
dispose of  alternate ways of  seeing, made possible through an imaginative involvement 
in problematising notations by which to trigger one’s new aspects. To do otherwise is to 
misunderstand the remit of  such philosophy. The fact that we do see the world in a 
certain way is not an ill to be forever banished, nor a sin to be confessed, but instead 
those concepts, that represent equally our methods’ problems and their solutions, reflect 
the forms of  life by which a subject is intricated in his environment. Indeed, it is in the 
alternativity of  the many different, yet exclusive, ways we can conceive that we come to 
acknowledge that we can have no complete point of  view to attain to, no ‘view from the 
outside’:
The fact that man lives in a conceptually structured environment does not prove that he 
has turned away from life ... just that he lives in a certain way, that he has a relationship 
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with his environment such that he has no set point of  view toward it … Forming concepts 
is a way of  living not a way of  killing life.66 
The hope expressed earlier – of  a transcendent, liberating release from our conceptual 
transactions with our cultural environment – is based upon a ideal completely irrelevant 
to the models of  philosophy advocated by Wittgenstein and Foucault. We should not be 
surprised to discover that criticism emerging from that position regards these models as 
unequivocal failures, then. But as we have shown, their actual purpose is to ‘stay in 
place’, to engage in aspectival maneuver, rather than transcendental flight, with a form 
of  conceptual light-footedness being advocated in the achievement of  this perspicuity. 
When Foucault writes, he certainly does so in order to change himself, to not think the 
same thing as before. One clear indicator of  Žižek’s miscomprehension is in his 
complaint that in “[such an] attempt to break out of  the vicious cycle of  power and 
resistance, [the later] Foucault resorts to the myth of  a state ‘before the Fall’ in which 
discipline was self-fashioned,”67 ignoring the fact that, already, from its inception in 
History of  Madness, the task of  self-fashioning is first method for Foucault’s philosophy. 
Consider that by Foucault’s account the thought that allows for self-fashioning occurs 
even in the “silent habits” of  the most disciplined of  subjects, in the routine procedures 
of  the most dogmatic of  institutions. Therefore we need no turning back to an ideal 
state ‘before the fall’ to witness such an act, for it is a constant possibility of  our practice, 
even when that practice is currently rendered immobile. 
 Žižek’s way of  positing freedom as the ends of  philosophy characterises this 
process as one in which a subject can never escape its constituent relations, ‘only’ modify 
them, and thus Foucault’s philosophy appears a futile undertaking. By neglecting our 
current emphasis upon refusal, curiosity and innovation, Žižek is operating under an 
underdeveloped model of  philosophy’s aims. His onus upon resistance as a form of  
perversive counter-power is a mistreatment of  Foucault’s position, one that no doubt 
issues from his signature pessimism regarding what it is to be human, an attitude that 
really could not be more alien to Foucault’s thought. 
 Answering Fraser, too, we can now clearly say why struggle is preferable to 
submission. Struggle, ‘one of  the meanings of  human existence’,  is the expression of  a 
negative method, in which no subjection of  the subject to an anthropological universal 
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proves immune to being outstripped, with such struggle located as an effect of  
thoughtful self-creation. Resistance equated with simple “freedom from constraint” 
cannot address Žižek’s accusations of  ineffectuality, because it imparts no possible 
conception as to how we are free, once we have once been captivated. Creativity, 
however, understood as the ability to refuse the dogmatic, to curiously investigate 
alternative conceptions, and innovatively derive a new aspect from these practices, 
presents a wholly different conception of  resistance. It promises no transcendental 
escape from the means of  our captivation, and neither does it offer a definite means of  
avoiding future dogmatism; instead, resistance becomes a life practice, one informed by 
philosophical models by which one comes to recognise, problematise, and dispose of  
those aspects that previously held one captive, in favour of  newly invented ones. In 
conclusion, then, we should mention that it appears questionable how much use 
freedom alone is in qualifying Wittgenstein’s ends either. We can, of  course, be ‘free’ to 
indulge our worst conceptual habits, conceive unjustly across an indeterminate field of  
human affairs by means of  a total conceptual unity, as an expression of  our freedom. 
Why not? It would legislate for any number of  self-interested ends, no doubt. Instead, 
what Wittgenstein is concerned with is something more precise than freedom; it is the 
clarity that is to be won through the choice of  adopting and desisting in novel and apt 
conceptions, speech and practice, in a manner unconstrained by abided aspects that 
otherwise confuse our understanding and bewitch our choices of  expression. ‘Freedom’ 
under-defines the telos that drives anti-dogmatic philosophy; it is not the ‘freedom-from’, 
but the innovative ‘how-of-freedom’ that interests us here. For when a new aspect dawns 
upon you as the reader, what you have “primarily discovered is a new way of  looking at 
things. As if  you had invented a new way of  painting; or, again, a new metre, or a new 
kind of  song.”68 
 The methodological shift that occurred in Chapter II, in which the practice of  
philosophy was no longer to be performed by the therapist, but by the reader, is 
mirrored in my conclusion. Philosophy is to be imaginative, and therefore a creative69 
undertaking, and the attempt made by our potential therapist – to be responsible for 
causing the outstripping of  her patient’s dogmatic confusion on their behalf  – should be 
wary of  inattention to this aspect. Philosophy is rendered as an emancipatory practice, 
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because it has the “goal of  allowing refusal, and curiosity, and innovation.”70 One can be 
given “tips”, as Wittgenstein put it, but the effort to dislocate oneself  from dogma, and 
the new position one then adopts, are achieved by the reader. The general question over 
what is to constitute the aim of  perspicuity, first raised in Chapter I, can now be more 
fully answered; it represents the refusal of  immobility in our conceptions, the willful 
curiosity to pursue alternative problematics, and the creative ability to switch between 
one’s differing aspects of  understanding. For “[o]ur thoughts run in established routines, 
we make, automatically, transitions according to the techniques we have learned. And 
now comes the time for us to survey what we have said. We have made a whole lot of  
movements that do not further our purpose, even impede it, and now we have to clarify 
our thought processes philosophically.”71 Philosophy, then, is in no way reducible to the 
tools by which its practice is elicited, but by its relation to those problems that have 
arisen in our habits of  thought, and that now demand clarification. What then is to 
occur, what then is to be thought, are left as undetermined as that creativity to be found 
in human interests, as depicted in both grammatical and genealogical investigation. 
Because freedom is the expression of  the innovation of  his reader, Foucault refuses time 
and again to define its nature, beyond pointing to concrete singular examples. This was 
not a tactic with which to infuriate his critics, but an unavoidable implication of  his 
notion of  philosophy. Ian Hacking grasps this point well, and he, like I, asserts that 
freedom is a product that is unknowable in advance of  its occurrence. This is not meant 
as a piece of  obscurantism, but instead, “‘Unknowable’ is meant literally; it pertains not 
just to the knowledge of  the physicist or the gnosis of  the hermit, the mysticism of  the 
visionary or the high of  the jogger. It means that there is nothing to be said about 
freedom, except that within its space we construct our ethics and our lives.”72
 It is unknowable, then, because as Foucault put it, there is “no single locus of  
great Refusal, no soul of  revolt, source of  all rebellions”,73 and hence no unifying total 
account by which to establish the inalienable condition of  freedom. But this does not 
render us in a quagmire of  nihilism, as Habermas asserts. What takes the place of  such 
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a “single locus” – which is to say, what lends a form of  unity to these innovative 
undertakings – is instead the method. Why this is a profound difference should by now be 
quite clear: neither Wittgenstein nor Foucault’s method makes a claim of  necessity, 
neither locates a principle of  freedom or creativity in the crown of  its hierarchical 
picture of  philosophy. The unity it propounds is rather a facet of  its modes of  
presentation, and in the absence of  method, it dissipates. The methodological unity is 
instrumental to the innovation it incites, not the veridical claims it makes, and therefore 
the means of  our interruption can itself  be interrupted, or challenged by means of  its 
own measures, without there occurring a profound instability in the justifications of  our 
practices. No notion of  experience, aspect, or dogma is expected to survive as a 
theoretical artefact here; such a survival would be the signature of  a failure of  method, 
an asymmetrical application that refused, at the last, to adhere to its own practice.
 This explains why both our methods have been shown to exhibit a strikingly 
‘deictic’ notion of  the task of  philosophy.74 For while aspectival dexterity represents an 
overcoming of  dogmatic thought, it does not thereby equate to something akin to 
Habermas's achievement of  mundigkeit75 (the Enlightenment ideal of  being rationally 
mature and responsible), and is not locatable as a basic human condition, generalisable 
to all, yet inhibited by our dastardly concepts and the terms of  their expression. There is 
no claim of  universal systemic human knowledge to be derived from these philosophies. 
Instead, this deictic “way of  no longer being the same is, by definition, the most unique 
part of  what I am.”76 What is to be done with this philosophy is left in our hands. 
Good, well, let’s change the game. Let’s say that the intellectuals will no longer have the 
role of  saying what is good. Then it will be up to people themselves, basing their 
judgment on the various analyses of  reality that are offered to them, to work or to behave 
spontaneously, so that they can define for themselves what is good for them.
	 What is good, is something that comes through innovation.77
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